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Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with the analysis of the development of Islamism as an 
important form of political formation in Turkey. It argues that the success of the 
Islamist Welfare Party in the late twentieth century should be seen as an example 
of the type of response found at other times and other places to the strains and 
inequalities of economic development and not an exclusively Islamic response, 
though it is cast within that tradition. In this context, the process of development, 
and the historical tension between Islamism and Kemalism are analysed. It is the 
contention of this thesis that Islamism in Turkey should be examined as a 
specifically modern political reconstruction of "tradition" developed within the wider 
context of Kemalism, which remains an integral part of political ideology. The 
thesis demonstrates that Islamism in Turkey did not offer a radical alternative to 
the political ideology of Kemalism; but converged with it in terms of attitudes to 
politics and the nature and role of the state in attaining a "good society". The 
Islamists did not oppose the state and its apparatus, but its present form and the 
methods of distribution of public resources. This convergence meant that in 
practice the reconstructed Islamist party, although it articulated its ideology in 
terms of Islamic values and demands for justice, could not overcome the 
embedded structures of economic and political power. In the quest for democracy 
voters, and some potential political leaders, were keen to find an alternative to the 
Kemalist military/secularist framework, but they were not able to dislodge the deep 
rooted control of the military. Islamism as articulated in Turkish politics failed to 
prove a viable choice and the problem of democracy remains unresolved. 
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Introduction 
This thesis represents an attempt to critically examine what is called the 
phenomenon of "Islamism" in Turkey, using the case of the Welfare party from a 
historical perspective in relation to the specific process of development taking 
place in this society. This thesis holds that much of the previous literature, 
specifically that by Turkish scholars, on the Welfare Party or its predecessors has 
operated within the assumptions of the modernisation paradigm by overlooking the 
political economy aspect. This study aims to showwhat should be an interpretative 
way to proceed in examining a specific case of "Islamism" by contextualising it in 
the inequalities of capitalist development, without being "essentialist" in outlook. 
This thesis contributes to the existing literature by providing case studies which 
utilise both media analysis and in-depth interviewing in order to analyse 
"Islamism" in its social, economicand political context within Turkey, to support the 
general argument of the study and to challenge the positivist perspective that 
tends to treat the phenomenon in terms of a dichotomy between the traditional and 
the modern. The arguments constructed by the ideological needs of "secularists" 
and "Islamists" are evaluated through media analysis. The study presents the 
diversity and contradictions between Islamists and those who supported them by 
making use of qualitative interviewing. 
Islamism or Islamist activities in Turkey have been multi-dimensional and were not 
confined only to the Welfare Party. However, the Welfare Party, like its 
predecessors, took a leading role in this and competed for power as a political 
party with an "Islamist manifesto" in a secular political setting. Some other Islamist 
groups, which are divided along the lines of various religious brotherhood 
organisations (tarikats), have opted for supporting mainstream parties within the 
right-wing. Politics is, of course, about power, its distribution and its use. In order 
to understand the dynamics of Islamism, particularly with regard to the 
fundamental question of the distribution of power, this study identifies and 
analyses the ways in which economically and ideologically rooted structures have 
set the scene for authoritarian politics. It is also argued that how the imperatives 
which these structures generate create opportunities and constraints for political 
actors as far as the political endeavours and representation of those who 
ideologically are proscribed is concerned. 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter One sets out the 
methodological context. It highlights the fact that researchers who study "Islamism" 
need to deal with some important epistemological considerations since there is no 
unified "Islamist" view or voice. The construction of concepts, e. g. traditional, 
modern, secularism, Islamism or Islamists, should not be taken for granted, as 
each has to be constructed in relation to the society under examination. It is 
important to avoid essentialist or racialist thinking and categorization, i. e. 
discussing the inherent superiority or inferiority of one position, identity or culture. 
Such an approach tends to produce a monolithic identity for Muslim societies. 
Starting from assumptions based on the so-called "inherent" nature of Muslim 
societies often leads to the reproduction of a singular monolithic identity as 
"objectified" reality. To acknowledge the fact that "Muslims" in general and 
"Islamists" in particular have differing identities, are of different races, ethnicities, 
classes, genders, ages, and live in different regions, makes it difficult to talk about 
a culturally "pure" identity. Ideological determinations and cultural biases often 
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precede the conceptualizations of research problems and interpretations of data. 
Ideologies and cultural biases prevent us from understanding social and political 
episodes which occur when people are complex in terms of their identity and fluid 
in their attitudes. The categorization along essentialist lines would prevent 
epistemological and theoretical questioning of the nature of Islamism since it 
attempts to propose a predetermined and eternal attitude for Muslim societies. The 
use of homogenous and reified terms, such as traditional and modern, often 
reproduces stereotyped results. Ethnocentric cultural standards of generalization 
and interpretation are value biases set in evolutionary epistemologies, which 
propose the cultural relevance of the experiences of dominant societies, classes 
or groups. Attempts to characterize Islamism or Islamists from a "teleological" 
point of view basically depends on the assumptions, interests and goals of 
researchers. Do we as the researchers see the role of religion as a political 
orientation of retrogression, and therefore propose evolutionary cognitive 
presumptions? Do we characterize Islamism a kind of "reaction" that rejects and 
acts against the dominant discourse, modernisation, and is therefore an alarming 
"threat" to modern politics? Do we see Islamists as marginal people who are 
unable to cope with the modern world and being in a pathological identity crisis? 
Or, do we see the expression of electoral demands in religious terms as an 
outcome of realpolitik and look for reasons behind it to offer a more workable 
framework to interpret the nature of Islamism in its social context? The crucial 
point is to decide what we want to do. The cause and effect relationship in the 
modernisation paradigm between education, urbanisation and industrialisation and 
"modern attitudes", which implies that religion loses its significance in the life of the 
modern educated individual (Inkeles and Smith 1974) does not hold true when 
n 
highly educated "modern" people choose to be "Islamist" in their political 
orientation. Are they simply deviants? In the context of the modernisers optimism 
about mastering society and nature through industrialisation along an evolutionary 
progression, from a simple and mythical society to a complex and rational one, can 
an Islamist attitude be explained as irrational, against progress and pathological? 
Interpretation primarily depends upon what assumptions we start with and whether 
we take into account that history is shaped by social relations. Eagleton with 
reference to methodological preferences in social science writes that it is not a 
matter of starting from certain theoretical or methodological problems. Rather, it 
is a matter of starting from what we want to do and thus seeing which methods 
and theories will best help us to achieve these ends (1983: 210). 
In this context, Chapter Two maps out the theoretical debate and political 
discourses of Islamism by emphasising the key problems within the existing 
literature with reference to basic trends in studying Middle Eastern politics. First 
of all, it concentrates upon the conceptual debate regarding the naming of the 
phenomenon in question. This study avoids the use of the term "Islamic 
fundamentalism" in order to overcome: (a) confusion, as often clarifying a 
distinctive "fundamentalist position" in terms of the place of religion and religious 
signs and symbolism in the Muslims' life is complicated; and (b) its use in 
journalism, which often denotes "a radical, fanatic and anti-modern or anti-Western 
position", and is therefore a judgmental and value-laden approach. Instead, this 
study employs as the umbrella terms "Islamism" to refer to ideology, and 
"Islamists", to refer to those who advocate or support this ideology. Secondly, 
concerning the theoretical framework, this study argues that Islamism should be 
4 
evaluated in terms of a modern political movement in a global context, rather than 
a unique feature of Muslim societies. This is in order to avoid the assumption of 
the culturalist perspective, by Orientalists and Islamists alike, that distinguishes 
culture as the key determinant of the evolution of a society. Leftwich (1994) clearly 
argues that any study which interrelates the state and development should analyse 
the political relationships of the state with other interests and institutions in society. 
Therefore, such an approach should take into account the patterns of development 
in societies that are experiencing Islamist trends, with reference to the process of 
state formation and subsequently the changing social relations and the role of the 
state in this process. This is to say, "at any point in any developmental sequence 
what is at issue are conflicts about how resources are to be used and distributed 
in new ways and the inevitable disputes arising from calculations about who is to 
benefit or lose as a result" (Leftwich, 1994: 4). Finally, the chapter focusses upon 
the discourse of Islamism as a modern political ideology, and upon the nature of 
its social bases, to argue that Islamism cannot be denounced as a backward 
movement. 
The purpose of Chapter Three is to set out the comparative framework for the 
Republican period, by examining the historical character of surplus appropriation. 
This is done by looking at the specific social relations that governed these 
processes and their patterns of reproduction and transformation by social forces 
within the Ottoman Empire. The chapter also sheds light upon the emergence of 
Islamism at an intellectual level through the mobilisation of the content of Islam. 
This involved a political protest with its emphasis upon "progress" and 
"democratization", as an alternative approach to the modernism of the late 
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nineteenth century, when the Ottoman Empire had been the subject of ongoing 
Westernisation reforms and its unity was under threat from internal as well as 
external forces. 
Chapter Four continues the explanation of the historical background of Islamism, 
this time in the context of capitalist development within the framework of the 
Republican state and its ideology, Kemalism. It challenges the shortcomings of 
those explanations which treat the rise of the Democrat Party to power in terms of 
a clash between the "modernizing centre" and the "reactionary periphery" and, 
therefore, a traditional "religious upheaval". This is done by drawing attention to the 
structural impediments within Republican politics to meaningful participation of 
subordinated classes in the use of state power. The chapter concentrates on the 
overall role of the state in society, and the distribution of power in the context of 
political economy of etatism. Among the structural impediments it argues the 
ideological form of state apparatus with reference to the institutionalised political 
power of the military. This study shows that the power vested in the military 
bureaucracy through the National Security Council prevents the subordinated 
classes from having real choices when they exercise their democratic right of 
political participation. The chapter shows the shortcomings of the cultural or 
functional explanations of such power. It is argued that the primary use of state 
power by the military is not exclusively tied to its pursuit of "general interests", but 
to the role and the position of the military within the ruling-class structure in the 
pursuit of particularistic interests. The ultimate goal is to maintain social and 
political order and preserve the undisputed dominance of industrial and financial 
capital at the political level. This enforces the exclusion of certain actors 
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from the top layers of politics, particularly as far as the removal from power of the 
elected Welfare Party in 1997 by military intervention is concerned. 
Chapter Five continues the previous chapter's examination of the mode of 
capitalist development, in order to analyse the relative success of "Islamist parties" 
since the 1970s by concentrating upon the competition over the allocation of public 
resources in a developing economy. It is argued that the failure of the developing 
economy to deliver true democracy and facilitate better access to resources for the 
majority of the population should be treated as a key explanatory factor for the 
phenomenon of Islamism. The chapter examines the accession of the Welfare 
Party to power in 1996, within the framework of continuing uneven capitalist 
development. It argues that the Welfare Party with its distinctive "Islamist outlook", 
rose to power not primarily because of its praised proposal to transform or reform 
the existing "unjust order", but rather because of a combination of various factors 
including the failure of the "developmental state" to deliver upon its long standing 
promises, therefore the dissatisfaction with the mainstream political parties which 
had governed throughout the seventies, eighties and the first half of the nineties, 
and the fragmentation of the Turkish party system mainly due to intra-elite conflict 
after the military takeover in 1980. 
Before exploring this point further, Chapter Six shows the shortcomings of 
culturalist perspective by contributing to the existing literature by a case study, and 
therefore prepares the ground for the next chapter that represents an explanatory 
approach in analysing Islamism, and completes the argument set up in Chapter 
Five. It discusses the phenomenon of Islamism by looking at its representation in 
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both secular and Islamist media. Such an analysis is crucial in demonstrating the 
polarization of elites as the primary interpreter of terms, concepts and events in 
their struggle for power. This demonstrates that in their competition to publicise 
their party agenda, both "secularists" and "Islamists" alike, within the assumptions 
of culturalist perspective, treat the phenomenon in terms of "a clash between two 
world views" with diverging conclusions. The chapter, firstly, argues that there has 
been a lack of analysis of the political economy of mass communication, which 
would illuminate the socio-economic controversy over Islamism and why the 
established interest through big media worked to crush the Welfare Party. Second, 
as "modernism and secularism" have ideological connotations within Turkey and 
become the realms in which the whole issue of Islamism is stuck, it analyses the 
media content with regard to the issue of the relationships between Islam and 
modernity and secularism, with particular reference to the construction of identity 
in terms of exclusive definitions of the "Occidental We" and "Oriental Others", or 
vice versa, by both sides of the media in interaction with each other. The chapter 
aims to show that media reporting, by channelling and limiting discussion to 
distorted and stereotyped images of one or another socio-cultural entity, has had 
significant political consequences, not least the resignation of the Welfare Party 
government. 
Chapter Seven analyses Islamism within the context of the failures of 
developmental state by making use of small scale qualitative research in order to 
show that Islamism, within the context of the Welfare Party's accession to power, 
reflects a multi-faceted phenomenon with diverse interpretations, expectations and 
interests as far as those who advocate an Islamist ideology and those who voted 
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for the Welfare Party are concerned. The chapter offers a critical analysis of the 
"Islamist manifesto" of the Welfare Party the "Just System" in the framework of 
modern ideologies, and attempts to show that Islamism converges with Kemalism 
in terms of attitudes to politics and the nature of the state and its role in society. 
This approach relieves the study from the handicaps of the culturalist perspective. 
It uses the qualitative interviews for cross referencing purposes to show that voting 
for an Islamist party does not always necessarily mean support for its "vague 
ideology". It argues that references to religious rhetoric, with its emphasis on 
universally appealing themes such as democracy, equality and justice, provide an 
Islamist party with the means to connect itself to a widespread dissatisfaction with 
the mainstream political parties which has been in power, as an "untried 
alternative". 
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Chapter 1: The Methodology 
1.1. Introduction 
"Most debates over methods are debates over assumptions and goals, overtheory 
and perspective" (Bogdan and Taylor, 1975: 1). 
Contrary to the assumption of objectivist science, which is that theory development 
and the application of method should be free of human values and other 
contaminating influences, it is undeniable that even in scientific studies the 
categorization of concepts and applications of methods are influenced by 
scientists' professional values and practices. The personal, ethical and political 
choices of researchers often affect what is studied, how it is studied and which 
methodological procedures are chosen. Logics of inquiry are political and cultural 
constructs. Research is the production of knowledge, but not its discovery. 
Stanfield II argues that researches in the social sciences cannot be divorced from 
concerns regarding the functions of hegemonic domination in knowledge 
production and dissemination (1993: 25-26). It is the aim of this research to avoid 
the assumptions of positivism, which attempts to formulate a lawful understanding 
of the social universe and explain the causal relationships supposedly governing 
the social world'. The positivist notion of social causality, i. e. the relationships 
between variables, such as religion, social class, level of education, age, race, 
family size and political orientation, attempts to approximate social laws as 
permanently binding and do so by ignoring history. However, the eternal 
statements of cause and effect are framed historically by dominating paradigms, 
which may change when social reality can no longer be explained by them (Kuhn 
1970). 
For a summary on positivism see L. Neuman (1991) Social Research Methods. 
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Interpretive theory and critical social theory, which is a branch of the former (Agger 
1998: 31), criticise positivism and argue that knowledge is not simply a reflection 
of an inert world "out there", constituted by the relationships between variables out 
of touch with individuals, but is an active construction by scientists and theorists 
who necessarily make certain assumptions about the worlds they study and thus 
are not strictly value-free. Although interpretive theory evolves from Weber's 
attempt to understand social action on the level of meaning, interpretive theorists 
are in conflict with Weber's essentially positivist conception of social theorising as 
an objective activity. Both interpretive theory in the more critical tradition (Denzin 
1992: Clough 1992) and critical social theory reject the concept of social laws and 
criticise positivism's metaphysical view of history. People's activities in everyday 
life are explained with reference to the large scale social structures that surround 
them. Critical social theories, e. g. Marxism, portray history as a horizon of 
possibilities constrained but not determined by the past and present. Emphasis on 
the discursive nature of knowledge and its structural explanation are important 
(Denzin 1992). Agger points out that 
Critical social theories have begun to transform research methodologies in 
significant ways. Feminist theory..., critical theory ..., and postmodern 
narratives and ethnography... all reject the notion that quantitative survey 
research is the only legitimate mode of sociological investigation. These 
perspectives valorize qualitative research as legitimate and necessary in 
order to understand "depth "aspects of everyday life and personal experience 
inaccessible to anonymous survey instruments.... critical social theories even 
have impact on the ways in which people conduct quantitative analysis, 
demonstrating the inherent "undecidability" of empirical operationalizations 
of variables... as well as revealing nature power motives behind sociological 
positivism... Methodologists influenced by one critical social theory or another 
do not simply abandon empiricism but rather attempt to incorporate insights 
from critical theory into their own research and interpretation of data (1998: 
176-7). 
Given the growing tendency of empirical researchers to use both qualitative and 
quantitative methods, interpretive theory and critical social theory challenge the 
dominance of quantitative methods which were viewed as necessary features of 
"hard" science. Neuman writes that 
some people believe that qualitative data are "soft", "intangible'. and 
immaterial. Such data are so fuzzy and elusive that researchers cannot really 
capture them. This is not necessarily the case. Qualitative data are empirical. 
They involve documenting real events, recording what people say (with 
words, gestures, and tone), observing specific behaviours, studying written 
documents, or examining visual images. These are all concrete aspects of 
the world (1997: 328). 
Qualitative social research largely relies on the interpretive and critical approaches 
to social science. Lindlof notes that the kinds of explanation to be sought in 
qualitative analysis are almost exclusively ones of understanding but not of 
prediction or control. Theory in qualitative inquiry usually consists of ways to 
understand and depict "rationality" in the `foreign, obscure, banal, confused, moral 
or immoral' appearances of human conduct. Rationality here means a sense of 
reasonableness that members of a culture or movement assign to their own action. 
It is different from being rational in its classical rules of logic and evidence 
assumed by the dominant paradigm. Thus, it considers what people's rationality 
means; the researcher is interested in their logic and the kind of evidence they 
consider relevant in expressing and rationalising their actions (1995: 56-7). 
Qualitative research is based on methods of data generation which are flexible 
and sensitive to the social context in which data are produced. Qualitative 
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researchers emphasize the importance of social context for understanding the 
social world and therefore argue that the same events or behaviours can have 
different meanings or may be given varying values in different societies or 
historical eras. Bogdan and Taylor mention that the subject of qualitative study is 
not reduced to an isolated variable or to an hypothesis, but is viewed instead as 
a part structured by the whole (1975: 4). 
1.2. Interviews 
Miller and Glassner write that 
Those of us who aim to understand and document others' understanding 
choose qualitative interviewing because it provides us with a means for 
exploring the points of view of our research subjects, while granting these 
points of view the culturally honoured status of reality (1997: 100). 
Fielding also argues that interviewing has a strong claim to be the most widely 
used method of research (1993: 135). Research, however, cannot reflect the 
social world "out there" as positivists assert, although it can provide access to the 
meanings people attach to their experiences and social world. Therefore, in this 
thesis interviewing was used as a part of the overall research strategy. The 
qualitative interviews were conducted to gain access to the people's "Islamist" 
accounts and articulation of the phenomenon in question. In other words, it sought 
to get "Islamists" explanations of why they had worked or voted for a political party 
which is identified by "outsiders" as marginal and "fundamentalist". This means 
that interview subjects construct not just narratives but a part of the social world 
itself (Silverman, 1993: 91). This approach suggests that people's knowledge, 
views, understandings, interpretations, beliefs and ideologies are meaningful in 
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generating legitimate data on ontological properties of social reality (Mason, 1996: 
40). Although this does not mean that the people's accounts are treated as full 
explanations, qualitative interviewing gives greater depth than other research 
techniques for revealing the relationships between the people's accounts and the 
phenomena. For example, observational methods are primarily directed towards 
describing and understanding behaviour as it occurs. They are less effective in 
giving information about people's perceptions, beliefs, motivations and so on 
(Selltiz, 1965). 
Lopez (1975) highlights the defining features of the interview as being that 
An interview is initiated to achieve one or several objectives, takes place in 
a particular physical and social setting, and occurs as part of a procedural 
sequence of events. Further, it focuses on the present, past or future 
behavior, beliefs, opinions, attitudes or convictions of the interviewee" (cited 
in Millar et al, 1992: 2). 
It is not a casual conversation, but purposive and limited to a particular set of 
topics and takes place within a set context. 
Access 
It is necessary to gain access to "sources of data" in order to collect data for the 
subsequent analysis. Access requires the identification of a number of issues over 
which the researcher has to bargain at different levels. There are problems with the 
defensive capabilities of powerful elites when "studying up" and of negotiating with 
gatekeepers. Cassell indicates that penetrating the well-guarded precincts of the 
powerful can be frustrating and time-consuming. Gaining physical access needs to 
be completed with social access. This can be as difficult, frustrating and time- 
consuming as getting in. "One has to keep pushing, and trying, and hoping, and 
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smiling, and pushing some more" (1992: 94). Elites are frequently able to deny 
access because they may not wish themselves or their institutions to be studied. 
Gaining access is a process of continual renegotiation, bargaining and establishing 
trustful relations with gatekeepers and those to be studied (Lee 1992). The nature 
of research and sources of data, e. g. material sources, political elites or political 
organisations, may create obstacles in dealing with gaining access. The political 
and historical context in which the research is conducted can pose extra barriers 
for one who attempts to get access to the members of a targeted group. Hornsby- 
Smith points out that "gaining access is a political rather than a normative problem" 
(1992: 54). 
The "identity" of the researcher as constructed in the minds of the interviewees 
signifies the political aspect of access. The issue of being an "insider" or "outsider" 
to those to be studied may be crucial for gaining access and building trust. The 
existence of social differences between the interviewer and the interviewees carries 
certain difficulties. Language and cultural participation may have paramount 
importance. Klatch points out that "studying adherents to any 'extreme' political 
ideology is a delicate and sensitive process. The community itself is resistant to 
those outside its borders, in fear of intrusion, distortion, and so on" (1992: 74). 
Identifying and drawing boundaries of an 'extreme political ideology', or 'extremist 
activists' is particularly difficult because such labelling is used by "outsiders". The 
language used by the researcher is important in building trust and gaining access 
for an outsider. The researcher has to be aware of scepticism considering the use 
of certain terms. For example, scepticism regarding the use of 'Islamic 
fundamentalist' relates to the use of that term in a pejorative sense usually imposed 
by the media, other political parties or intellectuals and which is always coloured by 
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a tone of fanaticism. 
The place of the life of the researcher, as an insider or outsider, within the 
interview context may influence access. The presentation of ourselves (how and 
how much) as researchers may restrict interviewees' ability and willingness to 
participate in the interview procedure. Being an adherent or an opponent of a 
particular political group may shape which stories interviewees may tell and how 
these will be told. Participation in a culture includes participation in the narratives 
of that culture, or vice versa. That is very much related to social relations in 
society. Research as a part of social reality carries power relations into its own 
context. It can be argued that the research process in the social sciences involves 
power relationships between the dominant (researcher) and the subordinate 
(subject) parties which can be studied empirically like any other form of social 
inequality. This issue should be considered with reference to the complex issues 
of the cultural and political nature of domination and subordination, the cultural 
stereotyping of the dominant and the subordinate in the structuring of 
relationships, and the politics and sociology of exclusion and marginalization in 
relationships between the dominant and the subordinate (Stanfield II, 1993: 31). 
Since race, class, and gender all are structuring dimensions of inequality, where 
the researcher stands with relation to her/his subject becomes a significant issue. 
The researcher should recognize the social situation of respondents and their 
relationship to power structures (Currer, 1992: 3). Miller and Glassner (1997) 
argue that the issue of how respondents talk to us based on who we are in their 
lives is a practical concern as well as an epistemological or theoretical one. 
Qualitative interviewing benefits from the critique of positivist research methods 
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that privileges the voice and experience of the scientist and disqualifies the voices 
and experiences of his/her research objects. It treats interviewees narratives as 
legitimate research tools, though it does not ignore the validity and limitations of 
perspectival knowledge. Such an approach, applied by feminism, postmodernism 
and critical social theory, deconstructs the epistemological privileges and hierarchy 
of researcher over research subjects by treating people's perspectival knowledge 
about their experiences not only as valid data sources but also as sources of 
theoretical insight. In this process the subject is empowered to know and tell 
her/his story without being subjected to the researcher's prejudices, biases and 
assumptions (Agger, 1998: 177). 
Being an insider or an outsider for the researcher in relation to the interviewee has 
limitations. The interviews can work if the interviewer is a sympathetic stranger, 
listening with interest (Chandler, 1990: 129). Therefore, being an outsider can 
actually provide the researcher with tools to use social differences in providing 
opportunities for interviewees to express their knowledge about their experiences. 
Miller and Glassner point out that one potential benefit of social distances in 
research is that the interviewee can see her/himself as an expert on a topic of 
interest to someone typically perceived to be in a more powerful position vis-a-vis 
the social structure. Another important point is that when individuals are members 
of groups that have been stereotyped and devalued by the larger or dominant 
culture and whose perspectives, demands or presence are denied, research 
conducted by an "outsider" can be welcomed because of its approach (1997: 105- 
6). 
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There are particular difficulties associated with studying "Islamists" in Turkey, not 
least the fact they may wish to figure out the standpoint of the researcher or cease 
to cooperate when they believe that the research may be used against them under 
very controversial/ turbulent political circumstances. In the first instance, the 
appearance, or style of dress ('modern' in this case), gender (female), education 
and social status (middle class) of a researcher seems to have an effect in getting 
access to more people by using their own networks. It reveals sensitivity to 
"outsiders" which makes informants either reluctant or willing to talk. The researcher 
may be refused for reasons of fear of misrepresentation or more than welcomed for 
reasons of opportunity for respondents to express themselves in their own words 
against the received result of antagonistic media coverage. Reasonably, the 
question "why are you doing such research or who do you work for? " was often 
asked though a brief introduction of myself and the aim of research was stated at 
the beginning of each interview. I openly answered the questions about myself or 
my research. The respondents were assured of the confidentiality of their identity. 
My identity as a student provided me with legitimacy in asking questions. 
My attempts to make formal contact by letter and e-mail citing the aim of the 
research and my position as a research student were not successful. Had I gained 
access to the elites via the permission of the party, I could have been given limited 
access, which in turn would have restricted my flexibility. When I made my first 
contact it was made clear to me that the party headquarters had issued a regulation 
which prohibited any member from speaking to press or anyone else on issues 
concerning the party without an official permission, after experiencing a "media 
attack" that had distorted and used their words against them. I needed to be 
adaptable in my approach to gaining access and information and at the same time 
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attempt to make an analysis of the reasons why access was being granted or 
denied. Nevertheless, some key respondents, who held important positions in the 
Welfare Party, were identified in the early stages of the study. The first interviews 
were arranged with leading MPs by using a network of personal connections. That 
enabled me to use their names to convince other MPs to be interviewed. 
But some of the contacts I attempted to make were not successful. In some cases, 
it was impossible to get responses to questions when some of the informants were 
suspicious of my motives. Compared to the relative openness of MPs to an 
"outsider", it took quite awhile to get in contact with some of the key party workers. 
Most of my attempts were either refused or addressed to someone else. It was not 
always possible to interview party workers alone. Although I politely expressed my 
preferences, I had to accept the terms of my respondents. 
Lee and Renzetti mention that researchers may be subjected to repeated "trust 
tests" which force them to legitimate themselves in the eyes of respondents and 
they may have to construct or capitalize on a special identity (1990: 520). I had 
great difficulty on two occasions in particular, but these unexpectedly turned out 
to help me to gain more access. For example, while having a pre-interview 
conversation with a county representative who also held a high position at the 
party's headquarters, in the presence of one of the advisers to the party leader, 
who was relatively young, presumably in his thirties, with a higher degree from the 
UK, I was questioned by him as if I was a kind of "representative of an ideology" 
to which "they" were opposed. The notion of secularism was the main theme I was 
questioned about. It was clearly implied that I would not understand what they 
stood for and was highly likely to distort their views. After the adviser left, my 
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respondent, who was over sixty years of age tried to ease the situation after we 
finished the interview and put me in contact with some more people, who had 
initially refused to be interviewed. 
On the other hand, I was relatively more easily accepted by the voters. It may be 
stated that they freely spoke their minds without worrying about my "intentions" or 
standpoint, i. e. being an "insider" or "outsider". They were more precise and short 
in their answers. They did not attempt to give any "justification" on behalf of the 
Welfare Party, but strongly expressed why they voted for it and would or would not 
do the same again depending on particular conditions. 
Sampling 
Arber highlights that the way in which one designs a sample will depend on one's 
research goals (1993: 68). Decisions about the sample design for a research study 
should take into account the trade off between using a larger sample or studying 
a smaller one more intensively. The attitude to the structure of the interviews and 
the restraints for access to the interview subjects explained above determined the 
decisions about sampling and the number of interviews to be conducted. This 
meant that a different logic of sampling had to be utilized. In the literature, 
sampling strategies are discussed mainly in terms of probability and non- 
probability sampling methods (Burgess 1991). In probability sampling, every unit 
in the universe under the study has the same calculable and zero probability of 
being selected. Probability methods of sample selection are best if the researcher 
wishes to describe accurately the characteristics of a sample in order to estimate 
population parameters. With non-probability sampling, there is no means of 
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estimating the probability of units being included in the sample and there is no 
guarantee that every element has a chance of being studied. Where the 
researcher's aim is to generate theory and a wider understanding of a social 
process or social actions, the representativeness of sample can be less important. 
Using a probability sample is usually impractical for small scale qualitative 
research (Arber, 1992: 71). 
Representative sampling was irrelevant since the major concern was not whether 
the sample was big enough to be statistically representative of a population in a 
case where there was no way of knowing the whole population. I wished to 
include particular units in both interviewing and media analysis to generate data 
which would enable me to understand the social process and address the 
research question. I wanted to identify interpretative themes in data upon which 
I would construct my analysis and my argument. Most sampling techniques in 
qualitative inquiry depend on purposeful selection. In purposive sampling the 
chance of selection for each element is unknown and for some elements it is zero. 
Snowball sampling was employed by using the respondents' own networks of 
contacts or friends to reach interviewees. Arber (1993) points out that snowball 
sampling is often used to obtain a sample where there is not a list which could be 
used as a sampling frame. This approach involves contacting a member of the 
population of interest and asking whether they know anyone else with the required 
characteristics. Snowball sampling is useful when the researcher's potential 
subjects are cynical about the research itself and the intentions of the researcher. 
It provides access to more interviewees by utilising the network of respondents. 
For the aims of this research, two target groups were initially identified, namely the 
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members of the Welfare Party and those member of the electorates who voted for 
it. Later the former group was divided into two, the Members of Parliament (MP) 
of the Welfare Party and the party workers. Eighty-nine interviews with three 
different groups, ten with MPs, fourteen with the party workers and sixty-five with 
the electors who voted for the Welfare at least in the last general election of 1995, 
have been conducted. 
Structure 
Millar et al (1992) indicates that there is not one set research interview since the 
purpose of the specific research investigation will determine the style of the 
interviewer. Three types of interview can be classified: (a) highly structured; (b) 
moderately structured; and (c) unstructured. Highly structured refers to interviews 
which are conducted with a standardised schedule on which the sequence and 
exact wording of questions to be asked is predetermined, as well as the 
respondent's answers options, for example as in a survey questionnaire. However, 
the highly structured interview is conducted in a very standardised manner of 
questions and answers, that allows for some degree of probing at certain points, 
and coding and comparison to a great degree, but it either does not allow or highly 
limits flexibility for both the interviewer and the interviewee. This type of 
interviewing can be useful in situations where all the possible answers to closed 
questions are known by the researcher. On the other hand, in the moderately 
structured interview while the researcher decides upon the major questions to be 
asked in advance, there is no a preset sequential order. The open-ended 
questions can be asked in the context of a more natural conversational style of 
interaction. It allows the researcher to adjust the conduct of the interview in relation 
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to the respondent's answers and provide the necessary flexibility to cover any 
issues raised by the respondent. Moderately structured interviews have 
advantages over unstructured interviews in terms of time, control and analysis of 
each interview (Fielding, 1993: 136). For unstructured interviews no exact 
questions are prepared in advance and there is no pre-designed order in which the 
interview is expected to progress. Since the interview is planned in only general 
terms and the interviewee as the "experienced subject " is encouraged to express 
herself/himself fully and spontaneously, the interviewer takes a more subordinate 
role (Millar et al, 1992: 10). 
In this research, moderately structured face to face interviewing was used, since 
key respondents, who are given the name "Islamist fundamentalists" by 
"outsiders", would be asked for the facts as well as for their opinions about the 
phenomenon of "Islamism". This type of interview was chosen as it is valuable as 
a strategy for revealing people's knowledge, perspectives and beliefs about a 
given topic, and it is characterized by a relatively informal style, for example, with 
the appearance of a conversation or discussion. Fielding emphasises that two 
principles inform research interviews: (a) the questioning should be as open-ended 
as possible in order to gain spontaneous information about attitudes and action; 
and (b) the questioning techniques should encourage respondents to 
communicate their underlying values, attitudes, and beliefs (1993: 138). 
On the other hand, Selltiz argues that the freedom which the open-ended 
interview permits is both the major advantage and the major disadvantage of 
interviews. The flexibility may result in a lack of comparability of one interview with 
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another. Moreover, the analysis is more difficult and time consuming than that of 
standardized interviews (1965: 262-64). However, it is accepted that the closed 
question may force a statement of opinion on an issue about which the respondent 
does not have any opinion. Even when a respondent has a clear opinion, the 
closed question may not give an adequate representation of it (Mason, 1996: 38). 
As we do not have clear-cut replies that were limited in number, the closed 
question was inadequate. To avoid the disadvantages of unstructured interviews, 
moderately structured interviewing was applied. Its use allowed the respondents 
to use their unique ways of formulating their interpretations and to raise important 
issues that had not been contained in the interview schedule. It also allowed me 
to skip some questions for some respondents or introduce new topics in a flexible 
way in accordance with the course of conversation. Neither the interviews nor the 
wording of each question followed a standard order, though I had a list of 
questions beforehand. The questions, however, aimed to provide data on the 
socio-economic backgrounds of informants, such as sex, age, education, 
occupation and so on, were by and large addressed in the same manner to each 
respondent. 
Considering the structure of interviews and sampling strategy that was applied, I 
did not send out a pilot questionnaire to establish the kind of questions I should be 
asking in interviews. Given the nature of questions and the sensitivity of the 
subject matter in relation to the political context in which the interviews were 
conducted, it was thought that such an attempt could lead the representatives of 
the party to take control of the research and limit the respondents in what to say 
when they faced the questions. The content of the interviews was revealed to the 
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respondents as the interviews went on. That can be seen as an implicit power 
relation in the interviewer/interviewee relationship, as I knew the order of the 
questions, the interviewee did not know what was coming next. But, to create a 
relatively equal relationship with the respondent, in most cases I gave them an 
overall idea of the content without exactly giving them the wording of the questions 
I was going to ask. However, Chandler argues that the interview procedure 
includes an element of hierarchy. The discussion is a structured and purposeful 
conversation controlled by the researcher. The respondent's questioning is usually 
minimal compared to that of the researcher and their questions are different from 
those of the researcher. The interviews are often conducted in the respondents' 
environment and it is the researcher who records the words of the interview (1990: 
129). 
Interviewing requires skills of listening and reinforcing. Qualitative interviewers 
recognise that the narrative given by the interviewee may take a different form if 
someone else, with her/his own cultural identity, is the listener (Miller and 
Glassner, 1997: 101). The verbal and non-verbal reactions of the interviewer to 
interviewee responses must be non-judgmental and non-directive (Millar et all, 
1992: 11). I tried to be non-directive and attempted to encourage the respondents 
to continue by listening with a sympathetic and lively interest, rather than talking 
or asking leading questions to implicitly or explicitly suggest any particular 
expected or desired answer and therefore exert control over the content of 
respondents' answers. For example, one of the MPs said in the middle of the 
interview "you are not like journalists by whom we very often are questioned. You 
are not talking on my behalf, but listening to my words". I asked my respondents 
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for feedback with regard to their explanations in the course of the interview. In 
some cases, I probed informants' last remarks or repeated it to direct their 
attention to the last idea expressed and to imply that the respondent should 
continue talking about what had just been reflected upon. I also sometimes 
rephrased and reflected back to respondents what they seemed to be expressing, 
and summarised the remarks as a means of checking my own understanding. I 
had to interrupt occasionally with a question to prevent an informant circling 
around the same topic and make them move on to a new topic. By raising a 
question on a topic that had not been referred to before it was possible to move 
on to some of the other issues to be covered. 
With regard to recording interview data, there are conflicting views. Benjamin 
(1981) points out that note-taking is an integral part of the interviewing process. An 
absence of taking notes may lead to an interviewee inferring negligence or a lack 
of interest on the part of the interviewer. However, it should be noted that note- 
taking during the course of the interview can be disruptive and affect the flow of 
communication in a conversational manner. On the other hand, Hetherington 
(1970) argues that audio recordings have advantage over note-taking in terms of 
preserving verbal and non-verbal information. Audio recording can be threatening 
for respondents. Kline(1975) suggests that note taking seems preferable unless 
a detailed record of the interview is required. The appropriateness of using note- 
taking or tape-recording depends on the purpose for which the record is being 
made, as well as the consent of the respondent. Before starting each interview 
every respondent was given two choices, tape recording or note-taking for the 
mechanics of the interview. It was obvious that most people found the presence 
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of a tape recorder intimidating. Most respondents asked me to take notes. I tried 
to record the answers as near verbatim as possible during the course of the 
interview. However, I did carry a tape recorder in case the opportunity to use it 
should arise. Tape recording provided a more natural conversation while note- 
taking put limits on the interaction between respondent and myself. However, in 
most cases, note-taking was completed after the interview session since I was 
given limited time by the respondents. 
1.3. Content Analysis 
In producing the case study, four newspapers, two of which represent "secular" 
and the other two "Islamist" standpoints, have been used in conjunction with the 
interviews. Their content has been analysed to reveal the main foci of attention, 
interest, and values with regard to the research question. It is assumed that the 
qualitative analysis of a limited number of crucial communications at specifically 
chosen periods may yield more clues to particular intentions than more 
standardised quantitative methods and can capture the richness and complexity 
of the material (Mostyn, 1985: 121). Specific details may be provided which 
validate information from other sources. The usefulness of these types of 
documents does not lie in their accuracy or lack of bias, but rather in the fact that 
they are not created as a result of the case study and they can offer a broad 
coverage of time, events and settings. It was seen to be important to ascertain the 
conditions under which they were produced, as well as their accuracy. Even so, 
the documents were not accepted as literal recordings of events that have taken 
place. 
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Content analysis is often defined as a research technique for the objective, 
systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication. 
Content refers to words, meanings, symbols, ideas, themes or any message that 
can be communicated (Neuman, 1997: 272). Berelson (1971) argues that content 
analysis does not differ from a close reading using judgement, a traditional and 
time-honoured method. This definition of content analysis implies certain 
assumptions. Firstly, content analysis is often done to reveal the purposes, 
motives and other characteristics of communicators as they are presumably 
reflected in the content, or they identify the presumable effects of the content upon 
the attention, attitudes or action of readers or listeners. Secondly, content analysis 
assumes that the study of manifest content is meaningful. This assumption 
requires that the content is accepted as a common meeting-ground for the 
communicator, the audience and the analyst. The assumption is that there is a 
common universe of discourse among the relevant parties, so that the manifest 
content can be taken as a valid unit of study. However, as soon as meanings are 
attached to the symbols, the psychological predisposition of the reader becomes 
involved and to some degree it distorts the reader's comprehension of the manifest 
content. Thus there is no guarantee that the meanings in the manifest content are 
the same as the meanings to the reader. To some degree every reader takes 
his/her own peculiar meanings away from the common content. In other words, 
when readers draw conclusions from unstructured communications based on their 
own personal judgements about the content, they are making inferences. 
Therefore, Berelson argues that in general content analysis must deal with 
relatively explicit communication materials and not with relatively implicit materials. 
Under such conditions, analysis of the manifest content of communication requires 
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a certain uniformity of comprehension and understanding (1971: 20). However, 
content analysis requires more functions beyond that of inference, such as 
interpretation, which gives meaning to the content within the environment in which 
it is produced (Mostyn 1985). Thirdly, the quantitative description of 
communication content is meaningful. This assumption implies that the frequency 
of occurrence of various characteristics of the content is itself an important factor 
in the communication process, under specific conditions. 
Qualitative content analysis differs from the quantitative which is in the first 
instance a statistical technique for obtaining descriptive data on content variables. 
Mostyn argues that quantitative data are collected when the purpose of the 
research is to determine what, where, when and how many, rather than why 
(Mostyn, 1985: 116). The term qualitative, on the other hand, has been used to 
refer to a number of different aspects of research procedures. The overall purpose 
of the content analysis approach was to identify the specific characteristics of 
communications systematically and objectively in order to convert the raw material 
into data. It was thought that the two approaches could be merged, in the sense 
that while looking for what, where and how many times a specific content occurred 
in the chosen periods, my primary aim was to apply a qualitative approach which 
would reveal the meanings attached to the content, as well as why the presence 
or absence of a certain content characteristic took place in a specific newspaper 
and how it compared with the others. Social context is crucial for qualitative 
analysis in order to offer an interpretation of the content in its wider environment 
with reference to social relations, to indicate under what circumstances or when 
and why it is produced. The term qualitative, therefore, was employed to designate 
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the following: (a) the preliminary readings of communication materials for the 
purpose of the discovery of relationships, as against a systematic content analysis 
for the purpose of testing hypotheses, as in quantitative analysis; (b) an 
impressionistic procedure for making observations about content characteristics, 
as against a systematic procedure for obtaining precise, objective and reliable 
data; and (c) a flexible procedure for making content-descriptive observations or 
coding judgments, as against a rigid procedure for doing the same ( Pool 1959: 8- 
9; Mostyn 1985: 117). 
The unit of analysis for the four newspapers, two of which represent a "secular" 
orientation and the other two "Islamist", depended upon the sampling of the 
periods selected as the research went along. As the communication content is 
dependent upon the social context, the sampling of periods was necessary in 
order to reveal the relationship between the content and the social context in which 
the contents were produced. In the beginning, the unit of analysis was each issue 
of the four newspapers in the two chosen periods, June 1996 when the Welfare 
party took office, and February 1997 to July 1997 when the Welfare government 
faced repeated warnings from the National Security Council and finally resigned. 
Qualitative content analysis mainly aims to show the presence or absence of 
particular words, themes and ideas, while looking for the underlying, implicit 
meaning in the content of a text. However, while the frequency of a particular 
content was counted, the main purpose was to show its direction and definition. 
In other words, manifest and latent coding were applied together. Neuman 
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describes manifest coding as the visible, surface content in a text, or simply the 
presence or absence of a word or phrase (1997: 275). Manifest coding does not 
take into account the connotation of words, themes or phrases and is usually used 
in quantitative analysis. Latent coding is more effective for qualitative analysis 
since it looks for the wording and direction of the content. In latent coding, the 
researcher reads an entire piece of writing and decides upon its meaning, i. e. 
whether it is implicit or explicit. It is argued that one particular difficulty with latent 
coding is that the researcher's knowledge of language and social meanings may 
reduce the reliability of coding (Neuman, 1997: 276). On the one hand, as long as 
the researcher deals with the implicit meaning of the content and quotes the exact 
wording of the content, the reliability of latent coding can exceed that of manifest 
coding. On the other hand, words and concepts acquire meaning only in relational 
reference to other words and symbols that convey meaning differently (Agger, 
1998: 58). Meaning is inherently dependent not only on specific words, but on 
context. The meaning in the content is that which a social identity attributes to it. 
Contents can become sites of contested interpretations, with different audience 
communities producing different meanings. For example, the concepts of 
secularism, Islamism, Islamists and the Welfare party on the two sides of the 
media are mainly constructed with reference to other side, and to other concepts 
rather than their literal meanings. Thus, language utilizes dichotomies, and 
sociologically the very notions of "secular" and "Islamist" stand in relation to each 
other within a given context and have meaning only with reference to the other 
term. To be "secular" is not to be "Islamist", or vice versa. Each is characterized 
in terms of what it is not, or what is "other" to it. 
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Qualitative content analysis aims to expose how a content can instruct its readers 
on how to see the social world, how to differentiate between the parts within it and 
structure and change their observations and understandings about the events 
which are taking place. As emphasized earlier, qualitative analysis does not take 
a content as a true and accurate reflection of some aspect of an external world, 
but as something to be explained and accounted for through the discursive rules 
and themes that predominate in the particular social-historical context chosen for 
study. It seeks to identify how the dominant discourse/ideology restricts, limits and 
arranges what can and cannot be said about the phenomenon in question and 
how it empowers or disempowers certain agents to speak and create 
representations, and thereby to authoritatively shape the world (Foucault 1972). 
1.4. Coding the Qualitative Data 
The analyses of interviews and media content began with the identification of key 
themes and patterns in each interview and content. This, in turn, depended on the 
process of coding data. Strauss (1987) cites coding as an essential analytical 
procedure. He argues that coding is much more than simply giving categories to 
data. It is also about conceptualizing data, raising questions, providing provisional 
answers about the relationships among and within the data and discovering the 
data. Coding is about breaking the data apart in analytically relevant ways in order 
to lead further questions. The method of coding was to assign labels to the data 
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in order to sort it into analysable units by creating categories with and from the 
data. On the one hand, coding the data in a particular way allowed me to 
characterize what each stretch of the interviews or media content was about in 
terms of general thematic content, on the one hand. On the other hand, coding the 
data enabled me to bring those fragments of data together to create categories. 
The categories are defined as being about or relating to particular concepts or 
themes. Therefore, codes, categories and concepts are related to one another. 
Coding was approached as an analytical process. The role of coding in such an 
approach was to undertake three kinds of operation, as Seidel and Kelle (1995: 
55-6) identify: (a) noticing relevant phenomena; (b) collecting examples of those 
phenomena and; (c) analysing those phenomena in order to find patterns, themes, 
regularities and structures as well as contrasts, paradoxes and irregularities. In this 
sense, coding qualitative data differs from quantitative analysis, since the data are 
not merely counted. Rather, codes are attached to the data to identify and reorder 
it. Hence, coding was used to expand, transform and reconceptualize the data 
within that approach in order to formulate levels of interpretation. I have tried not 
to ignore incidents of data that did not fit into the codes. The exceptions or misfits 
were also coded, though there was not any, or enough, explanations for these. 
The ideas for coding were inspired by reading through the data. However, there 
were preselected codes taken from the research literature prior to reading the 
data. In other words, a flexible approach to coding was employed. Codes were 
created and categorized when they came to light during the reading. That enabled 
me to associate particular events, key words or processes with one another. For 
example, a particular event or policy, such as the issue of head-covering, is 
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identified in most interviews with key words, such as human rights; democracy and 
secularism or'identity crisis' are identified with the process of Westernisation, but 
not with modernisation. The coding process aimed to capture the essence of the 
pieces of information. Therefore, the important point here is to look not only at 
what has been said and how it was verbalized, but also what has not been said. 
This approach represents a step towards interpretation. For example, where the 
issue arose, respondents were asked to define or give their opinion on either 
secularism in general orthe implementation of secularist policy in Turkey, although 
this was not specifically included in the questions. It is important for the research 
to examine how they verbalise or define secularism since it is a key element in 
most discussions, as will be seen in the media analysis. From this perspective, the 
process of coding is concerned with asking questions about the data. To give 
another example, questions, such as what do respondents mean by 'identity 
crisis'? what reasons do they give for that? or how can that be linked to 
Islamism?, can be asked of the data in order to develop an interpretation. 
Coffey and Atkinson (1996) argue that coding involves the reading and re-reading 
of data and making selections from the data; it involves interpreting the data set. 
To move from coding to interpretation, the recontextualized data has to be 
displayed in such a way, in figures for example, that it can be read beforehand. 
The bits of data that relate to a particular code or category are presented together 
in order to explore the composition of each coded set. Once the data are displayed 
in a coded form, some categories can be linked together. 
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1.5. Reliability and Validity 
It is on the issue of reliability and validity that quantitative researchers are most 
critical of qualitative analysis. Qualitative research is basically criticised forfailing 
the test of prediction and control. It is argued that there is a low level of 
comparability since qualitative analysis is done with small or incomplete samples 
and the interpretation of the same data often differs from researcher to researcher. 
Understanding does not require knowledge of how to predict or control a 
phenomenon. Qualitative research attempts to understand its object of interest and 
seeks an explanation. How an event occurs, how it functions in social contexts and 
what it means to participants are all issues addressed from an interpretative 
perspective. It has strong interpretative attributes when it is supported by other 
sources of knowledge. 
Krippendorf (1980) argues that qualitative analysis is basically about the symbolic 
meaning of views, explanations and messages. I, however, do not see that 
messages have an independent single meaning that needs to be unwrapped. It is 
obvious that qualitative data can be looked at from numerous perspectives and 
these may not be shared by different researchers. The subject matter of the social 
sciences is social life itself, and as a researcher I am a part of it. I see my task as 
not simply to record views or messages, but to explain these within a theoretical 
framework that examines the underlying mechanisms which structure their content. 
The social world does not exist independently of the knowledge that people have 
of their social world and which affects their actions. Interpretative science does not 
assume that the content of a particular communication contains one meaning for 
all who encounter it. The meanings of an interpersonal or technologically mediated 
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text depend on its relationship to other texts, the competencies and interests of its 
interpreters and the conditions in which it is produced and read. This means that 
how we describe the world forms what we describe (Lindlof, 1995: 23). 
However, this does not mean that the research loses its validity. The attempt to 
use conventional criteria for validity is unrealistic since in most cases the 
qualitative research project is a one-off study and variables cannot be realistically 
selected. Rather, the ultimate reliability test must be based upon whether the data 
obtained in the research provide a trustworthy basis for drawing inferences, and 
supporting findings or conclusions (Mostyn, 1985: 124). The most important 
advantage presented by using multiple sources of evidence, such as scholarly 
works, the Welfare Party's manifesto and its election programme, in this research 
is the development of converging lines of inquiry which made the finding and 
conclusions much more convincing and accurate. The scholarly works 
concentrated upon the performance of the Welfare Party in the local governments 
and their inquiry on the nature of perceptions and expectations of its voters 
supported the findings of this research that it was on the "secular grounds" rather 
than "religious ground" many voters turned to the Welfare Party as an alternative 
to the mainstream political parties which had been in power. References to the 
surveys, such as the survey on the demands of the Welfare Party's voters further 
strengthened the validity of the findings of this research. The examination of 
content of the election manifestos and the detailed analyses of ideology of the 
Welfare Party further contributed to the multiple sources of evidence. The use of 
multiple sources essentially provided multiple measures of the arguments and 
conclusions of this research, and therefore the potential problem of validity was 
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addressed. 
The incomparability between classical conceptions of external validity, which ask 
the question of generalizability, and basic aspects of the qualitative approach 
becomes very obvious when one emphasizes replicability of results. However, the 
goal in qualitative research is not to produce a standardized set of results which 
would be produced by another researcher in the same situation or studying the 
same issue, since the assumption in qualitative research is that the attributes or 
perspectives of the researcher influences the research (Schofield, 1985: 210-2). 
In other words, the classical view of external validity is of little help to qualitative 
researchers interested in finding ways of enhancing the likelihood that their work 
will be to some extent generalizable. The idea of sampling from a population of 
sites in order to generalize across the larger population is simply unworkable in 
most situations for qualitative researchers. Many critics of qualitative methods 
share the view that it is highly unlikely that the researcherwill be able to generalize 
from a single case to a target population of which that case is a member, since 
single members often poorly represent whole populations. Nonetheless, it is 
possible to use the findings of a study to understand other similar situations. 
Therefore, an alternative approach which emphasises analysing the degree to 
which the situation studied matches other situations in which one is interested, 
provides a more realistic and workable way of thinking about the genera lizability 
of research results than do more classical approaches. This is to say that 
qualitative studies gain their potential for applicability to other situations by 
providing what is called "comparability" and "translatability". The former term refers 
to the degree to which components of a study, including the units of analysis, 
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concepts generated, population characteristics, and settings, are sufficiently well 
described and defined that other researchers can use the results of the study as 
a basis for comparison. Translatability is similar but refers to a clear description of 
one's theoretical stance and research techniques (Goetz and LeCompte 1984, 
cited in Schofield, 1993: 207). 
In sum, generalizability in the sense of producing laws that apply universally is not 
a useful standard or goal for this research. In fact, this is not a useful or obtainable 
goal for any kind of research in the social sciences. Bearing in mind the complex 
nature of Islamism, it is not the principal aim of this research to draw conclusions 
which are to some extent generalizable to a larger population, but rather to offer 
an explanation for the case studied. The rejection of generalizability as a search 
for broadly applicable laws is not a rejection of the idea that studies in one 
situation can be used as a part of a comparative framework for analysing other 
situations by avoiding stereotyping and reductionist tendencies. 
Chapter 2: Literature Revisited: "Islamism" as a Modern Ideology 
This chapter shows the key conceptual, methodological and theoretical problems 
within the existing literature in analysing the phenomenon of Islamism and clarifies 
the theoretical framework to be used in the rest of the study. It is divided into two 
sections: the first looks at the terminology that is applied and at approaches to 
explaining Islamist movements in particular and the Middle East in general; and 
the second section gives an account of analyses of the nature and context of 
Islamist movements. The chapter argues that, while not dismissing culture as a 
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variable, an analysis of Islamism should overcome the determinism of culturalist 
perspective that examines it in terms of a clash of civilisations and the failure of 
Muslims to assimilate European liberal ideas. Rather, it should construct itself 
upon a theoretical framework that takes into account the patterns of development 
in societies experiencing an Islamist trend, and brings the state into its analysis. 
In this context, it stresses that the historical formation and features of the state, its 
role in the development process, and its political relationships with other 
institutions and interests need to be analysed. The chapter argues that Islamism 
is a product of modernity, i. e. an urban phenomenon, with reference to its 
intellectual sources and social basis. Therefore, it needs to be looked into within 
the context of modern political ideologies, rather than as a unique feature of 
Muslim societies. It shows that Islamism is an ahistorical approach within which 
Islam is defined as much in terms of a political ideology as in terms of a religion. 
However, conclusions to be reached on the realms of ideology predetermine how 
the holy texts are interpreted, given their selective use by scholars and activists. 
A selective and ends-oriented reading of Islamic sources and the definition of 
Islam as a religion provides a political (national) battle with religious means and 
symbols in moral and cultural expression of developmental crisis. Islamic rhetoric 
plays the role of liberation theology with its emphasis upon oppression and 
injustice. It is a form of contextual theology in that the experience and the 
circumstances of the interpreters are given a prime importance. This emphasizes 
the fact that, despite the existence of a shared global language, each Islamist 
movement needs to be analysed within its historical circumstances and concepts 
should not be taken for granted. 
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2.1. How to Conceptualize and Approach Islamists Movements 
The problems within the existing literature can be classified as conceptual, 
theoretical and methodological, in terms of analysing the Islamist movements of 
the twentieth century. 
2.1.1. Conceptual Debate 
There seems to be no agreement on how to name the phenomenon in question, 
which in turn leads to misconceptions, stereotyping, and reductionism. By 
definition, it is not easy to clarify the nature and scope of Islamist movements, 
since several terms have been used interchangeably: reassertion, renewal, 
revivalism, resurgence, upsurge, awakening, Islamism, the return of Islam, 
fundamentalism, neo-fundamentalism, radicalism or militant Islam. As well as 
these, there are other classifications: populist Islam -elitist Islam; cultural Islam- 
political Islam; high Islam- volk Islam. The confusion over using different terms 
leads to confusion between different interpretations, streams and organizations 
within Islamist movements. 
To begin with, it is important to emphasize the fact that it would be misleading to 
attach the label "fundamentalist" to only a religion. In its strict sense any ideology, 
religious or secular, could represent a "fundamentalist" position. For academic 
purposes it is objectionable to originate an analytical category within the notion of 
"Islamic fundamentalism" as it is often used in journalism. "Islamic 
fundamentalism" in journalism is associated with a radical, fanatical, anti-modern 
or anti-Western position. As a concept it is built up by means of citing the 
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distinguishing features of "modern" or Western life, i. e. universal values. Those 
values which are found in either Islam or Islamist movements are deemed 
unacceptable by the standards of Western values, and are characterized as 
"Islamic fundamentalism". The term is defined by "outsiders", and therefore, is a 
value judgment. 
Secondly, despite retaining the term in his study, Munson (1988) emphasizes that 
the concept of "fundamentalism" is very controversial in terms of terminology and 
content and there are some problems with applying it to Islamist movements which 
advocate an ideologised version of Islam. As a term, "fundamentalism" was 
originally used in the US after the First World War to describe the doctrines of 
certain Protestant Christian biblical literalists and inerrantists who elaborated a list 
of fundamental beliefs that all true Christians should follow. They believed in the 
absolute truth of the holy scriptures and rejected much of the modern world. In 
other words, the term "fundamentalism" suggests 
the restoration of a pure, unsullied, and authentic form of the religion, 
cleansed of historical accretions, distortions and modernist deviations (Beinin 
and Stork, 1997: 3). 
In this sense, it can be argued that the term "fundamentalist" is inappropriate to 
define Islamic movements because it is impossible to clarify a distinctive 
"fundamentalist position" in terms of the place of religion in Muslim life. Before 
moving on to examine this point, it is necessary to stress the fact that Islamist 
movements by no means deny the modern world. Rather, they compete for worldly 
power and convey their activities by means of the modern world. 
In theory, all Muslim communities may be identified as "fundamentalist" in belief 
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and practice since there is no difference between the believer and the so-called 
"militant activist" in terms of believing in the inerrancy of the Holy scripture, the 
Quran, as the revealed word of Allah and the fundamentals of Islam, i. e. the five 
pillars of religion2 (Esposito, 1992: 7-8). From the conventional point of view, Islam 
is perceived not only as the supreme religion or faith but also as a coherent and 
comprehensive value system and culture for the organisation of society and the 
management of all aspects of the Muslim's life (Khumayni, 1982; 315; Nasr, 1980: 
2; Qutb, 1982: 123-4). For example, Afghani wrote that 
the principles of the Islamic religion are not restricted to calling man to truth 
or to considering the soul only in a spiritual context which is concerned with 
the relationship between this world and the one to come... Islamic principles 
are concerned with relationships among the believers, they explain the law 
in general and in detail, they define the executive power which administers 
the law, ... determine sentences and 
limit their conditions... they are concerned 
with the unique goal that the holder of power ought to be the most 
submissive of men to the rules regulating that power (1982b: 21). 
2 
For example, among the basic tenets of the Muslim Brothers, the Islamist activist 
group, there is this sense of inclusiveness of Islam. This presents Islam as religion 
and state given the historical example of Mohammed founding a political 
community originally at Medina based on religion (Hasan al-Banna 1966, referred 
to in Sagiv, 1995: 31). 
In addition, those who write on Islam often suggest that Islam is a community 
[umma], a loyalty, and a way of life... "(Lewis, 1976: 39). Similarly, Vatikiotis points 
The five pillars of Islam are: (a) testifying explicitly that there is no other God but Allah and that 
Mohammed is His messenger; (b) daily prayer; (c) fasting during the month of Ramadan; (d) 
almsgiving and (e) pilgrimage to Mecca. They togetherwith the six articles of the faith, iman, belief 
in Allah, His messenger, Holy books, angels, the Day of Judgment and Destiny, constitute the 
fundamentals of the religion of Islam and signify its unique character. 
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out that true knowledge is that of God and His Law, which embraces all human 
activity. This is an important ingredient in Islamic thinking from the start (1987: 21). 
Thirdly, the Quran is formulated in a way that is far from self-explanatory. 
Consequently, it is impossible to take the entire text literally. This means that it has 
to be interpreted. The most common form of interpretation is tafsir, exegesis, by 
learned jurists. Over the course of time, the body of exegesis has grown in size 
and conflicting interpretations have come into existence. Apart from sectarian 
differences, there are divergencies within the same sects and between the 
orthodox and mystical traditions on the meaning of the text. In other words, there 
is room, on the one hand, for a literalist reading of the Quran as well as a more 
liberal or rationalist inclination (Sidahmed and Ehteshami, 1996: 2-3). On the other 
hand, Islamist leaders, reformers or movements selectively use and reinterpret the 
religious sources, the Quran, the Sunna and other canonical religious texts in the 
light of new circumstances, with respect to the new messages they want to 
emphasize. In cross-referencing these interpretations with the ideas, institutions 
and commodities of the present and recent past, they justify their political stance 
and actions. For example, the concepts of sovereignty, social contract, liberty, 
democracy and political participation are discussed by comparing "Islamic modes 
of political organization" with Western-style pluralism (Kramer 1995; Zubaida 
1997). Although, many Islamist leaders and ideologues present their ideas and 
movements as a "return to original sources", it is still a conceptual error to view 
them or their movements as restoring an "original" form of Islam. It can be argued 
thatwhat distinguishes the Islamist leaders and followers from the ordinary Muslim 
as a believer is the political activism of the former rather than a dogmatic or 
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literalist attitude toward Holy Scripture (Sidahmed and Etheshami, 1996: 3). It 
should be re-emphasized that it is not an easy task to distinguish religiosity, 
religious signs and symbolism from those used by "Islamist political activism" which 
seeks to increase the role of Islam in society and politics, since Islam like other 
major religions is a lived tradition which people continue to profess and use to 
reinforce certain types of religious practice. In this context, however, Roy (1994) 
refers to "fundamentalism" as the attitude represented by ulemas and mollahs that 
demands the complete and total implementation of the Muslim law, Sharia, 
regardless of the nature of the political system. Such a classification suggests the 
application of different terms to different perspectives/actions, particularly for 
example if one compares the case of Iran with that of Saudi Arabia. 
Alternatively, the term "Islamic resurgence" is conceptualised to refer to an 
increasing political activism in the name of Islam by governments or ruling classes 
and opposition or dissident groups alike, i. e. Islam from above and Islam from 
below (Dessouki 1982; Akhavi 1980). In both cases, the term indicates a 
politicized, activist form of Islam and the growing use of Islamic symbolism and 
legitimation at the level of political action. Similarly, Owen (1992) offers the word 
"renewal"to describe the religious politics of the 1970s and the 1980s. He 
discusses that referring to an Islamic revival or resurgence neither denies the 
continued presence of Islam in Muslim societies nor implies that it was dead or 
irrelevant. However, the term "renewal of Islam", like others such as "awakening 
of Islam", "upsurge of Islam", "fundamentalist Islam" or "militant Islam" still seems 
to personalise Islam and gives the impression that it accommodates such acts in 
its very nature, and so keeps coming back given certain circumstances. 
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Additionally, since research on Islamic movements is strongly bonded to the 
methodological and theoretical preferences of researchers, within the use of these 
terms the analysis of the nature of Islam as a religion, for instance, is often 
focussed on its compatibility with secular values such as democracy, nation-state 
or human rights, rather than on Islamist movements within their (secular) 
economic, social and political context. 
Ayubi talks of "political Islam" in his study to refer to the doctrine and/or movement 
which strongly asserts that Islam possesses a theory of politics and the state and 
invokes traditional sources and precedents. It is argued that it represents only one 
of several intellectual and political manifestations of the interplay between religion 
and politics. Later on, the concepts "Islamic revival" and Islamism are applied. The 
"Islamic revival" is specified as being both a means for retreating into a nostalgic 
past and a device for coping with the present and future. Ayubi continues as 
follows: 
it would be naive to regard Islamism simply as part of an `American-Saudi 
design' to consolidate the rule of, but dependent, bourgeoisie; or else to 
regard Islamism simply as the battle cry of the oppressed and exploited 
masses in their revolt against despotism and foreign hegemony. The Islamic 
revival is potentially all these things, and much more, depending on the 
specific contingency of every social and political situation (1991: x). 
Furthermore, Keddie (1988) uses the term "Islamism" in place of what she 
identifies as the misleading term "fundamentalism" and the vague "Islamic revival" 
and so on. She argues that Islamism, referring to the twentieth century movements 
for "political Islam", has the great practical value of being the term most acceptable 
to Muslims. Islamism in her definition refers to Islamic movements which overtly 
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or covertly aim to establish an Islamic state, or at least achieve the application of 
Sharia. 
Comparably, Roy (1994) speaks of "Islamism" as a political ideology. Islamism is 
used to refer to contemporary Islamist movements which see in Islam a political 
ideology as much as a religion, and therefore breaks with a certain tradition. It is 
argued that Islamism is a socio-cultural movement representing the protest and 
frustration of a generation of youth that has not been socially or politically 
incorporated into society. Clearly, the terms "political Islam" and "Islamism" are 
applied interchangeably. Yet, the term Islamism within these definitions still needs 
to be carefully used without over-generalisation in reference to each modern 
politico-religious movement. It is crucial to evaluate each case within its own 
context to capture the trends that encourage Islamism, since it can be a vague and 
an umbrella term which accommodates various cases. It would be a basic mistake, 
as Munson (1988) points out, to assume that all Islamist movements have identical 
ideological orientations, whether or not they demand a strictly Islamic polity. Not 
only does each individual case may possess its own salient features and goals in 
line with its historical background, but Islamic movements may also be internally 
divided into different forms within individual countries. 
Apart from these, another terminoIogy/classification is offered: that of cultural Islam 
and political Islam (Göle 1991). Göle argues that cultural Islam gives priority to the 
individual sphere, enforcing belief and the construction of an Islamic identity, 
although this does not mean that it is apolitical. On the other hand, political Islam 
competes for political power and aims for the transformation of political and social 
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systems from the top downwards, therefore it is revolutionary. This classification 
is reminiscent of the general discussion of the means of accession to power and 
transformation of society among Muslim intellectuals since the nineteenth century. 
In other words, the main question is one of whether the transformation of society 
would come either from below, by Islamisation of culture, or from the top 
downwards by the establishment of an Islamic state. 
Bulag, however, acknowledges to an extent the usefulness of Göle's terminology, 
argues that the terms "official Islam" and "civilian Islam" are more appropriate in 
analysing the Islamist movements. On the one hand, it seems that this 
classification is offered basically because Bulac refuses to use the adjective 
"political" along with Islam. On the other hand, it is obvious that the particular case 
of the Ottoman Empire constitutes the background for this formulation. Official 
Islam is viewed as a tradition of the Restoration period, Tanzimat, in the nineteenth 
century. This means that official Islam sees the solution within the state and 
concentrates on capturing state power, along with the contested ideologies of 
Ottomanism and Turkism. It needs an official religious perspective, so it can 
arrange the political sphere in line with the Islamic perspective of Muslim groups 
that hold state power. However, Bulac argues that this would lead to a totalitarian 
politics. It is believed that civilian Islam, on the other hand, sees the departure 
point as faith and umma without disregarding the importance of politics in human 
life. Umma is the worldwide community of Islam, which ideally commands a 
Muslim's loyalty above all considerations of race, kinship or nationality. Bulac 
argues that for civilian Islam, the umma operates before and above the state. This 
implies that the "nation-state" loses its raison d'efre (1997: 115-6). But this model 
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is not original and it does not provide any further clarification than the former in 
terms of the boundaries between the two positions and in identifying the scope of 
Islamism. It is also reductionist in terms of treating the goals, attitudes and 
activities of various groups or tendencies within Islamism or opposition movements 
as those set externally by Islam. However, it is clear that the root of such a 
formulation lies in the Islamic doctrine of oneness, tahwid. Although this 
traditionally refers to the oneness of God and His supreme sovereignty, the 
implication is of the totality and universality of the Islamic belief system. According 
to modern interpretations, monotheism provides the Muslim with a world-view that 
directs the individual towards a society free of contradictions. A society based on 
monotheism cannot accept legal, class, social, political, racial, national, territorial, 
genetic or even economic contradictions, as it implies a mode of looking upon all 
beings as a unity (Shariati, 1979: 86; Afgani, 1982b: 21). The concept of the 
"classless society", i. e. the community of believers, is one of the eminent features 
of Islamist writing. Thus, the belief in God's Oneness becomes a liberating 
(revolutionary) force emancipating the individual from all worldly servitudes and 
dependencies. At the personal level, this implies self-purification, which cleanses 
the individual from attachment to the pleasures of wealth, power and fame and 
enables them to attain a mystical spirit of total freedom and emancipation. In this 
context, tawhid requires the individual to reject submission and subservience to 
other individuals at the societal level. This rejection of non-divine authority in socio- 
political relations has significant political and economic implications. In the 
economic realm, tawhid is, therefore, interpreted as a call to abolish the 
exploitation of the weak by the strong, for the eradication of any class-polarised 
society. In the political realm, the application of the tawhid would involve a 
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constant war against all despotic forms of government as well as an external war 
against all imperialistic forces of foreign domination (Shariati, 1980: 119). Finally, 
at the cultural level, tawhid engages the believer in a steady struggle against 
cultural imperialism. It provides Muslims with an endogenous source of identity in 
the face of cultural alienation. 
2.1.2. Theoretical and Methodological Grips 
There is a significant conflict within the literature over how to analyse the nature 
of Islamist movements. Are they the result of a clash of civilizations and the failure 
of modern Muslims to assimilate European liberal ideas, which are regarded as 
universal, such as secularism, the rule of law and democracy'. Or are they the 
result of frustration and the failure of development struggles in Muslim countries 
as well as reactions to colonialism and neo-imperialism? 
4 This thesis argues that 
the phenomenon of Islamism should be evaluated from a framework which takes 
into account the patterns of development in societies experiencing such trends in 
a global context. This needs to be done with reference to changing social relations 
and the role of state in order to avoid circular arguments which attempt to explain 
the underdeveloped nature of Muslim societies in terms of their cultural fixity or 
rigidity by proposing an evolutionary, single path to modernity. Therefore, how to 
interpret social change or patterns of development in the Middle East is a crucial 
.1 
a 
Best known is S. P. Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations? "(1993). Also see B. Lewis (1988)The 
Political Language of Islam; and P. J. Vatikiotis (1987) Islam and the State. 
For a multiple explanation on the causes of the Islamist movements, see Halliday (1988) "The 
Iranian Revolution: Uneven Development and Religious Populism"; J. L. Esposito (1991) Islam: 
The Straight Path; N. Ayubi (1991) Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World; and R. 
Owen (1992) State Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East. 
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starting point for understanding why Islamism has come to present itself as the 
untried, only"alternative" and solution to the problems of Muslim countries in 
general. Such an approach implies that "Islamism" should be evaluated not in 
terms of a characteristic of Muslim societies, but in terms of political movements. 
Modernisation and underdevelopment theory alike have placed the emphasis 
upon "change agents" and produced much more state-centred approaches. The 
former has focussed upon internal educated elites, and the latter upon external 
forces. Within these frameworks, the causes of underdevelopment have been 
seen to rest either within the structures of societies and are therefore attributable 
to their own deficiencies, or within external factors and the collaboration of internal 
and external forces. Modernisation theory uses a particularist approach and often 
directs attention to the numerous barriers in existence, which could include 
traditional values or a lack of rationality or entrepreneurs in a given society which 
was assumed to be in a transitional stage from traditional to modern, on the one 
hand. In this context, what symbolizes "tradition" is often treated as an obstruction 
to those who wished to introduce change. 5 Underdevelopment theory within a 
universalistic approach places the Middle East in the international context and 
examines barriers to development in terms of colonialism, its means of 
incorporation into the world market and its asymmetrical relationship with the 
central economies. 
5 
For a comparison of the themes, innovation, diffusion, the introduction of technology from the 
outside and the role of traditional culture in blocking development, see M. J. Levy (1952) The 
Structure of Society; B. Hoselitz (1960) Sociological Aspect of Economic Growth; G. Foster (1962) 
Traditional Culture and the Impact of Technological Change; and E. M. Rogers (1962) Diffusion 
of Innovations. 
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Culturalist Perspective 
Modernist literature has described the Middle Eastern societies in terms of what 
they are not, and their histories have been generally accounted forwhat they have 
lacked, the presence of which has led to the development of Western societies. 
The culturalist approach postulates the existence of an evolutionary path to 
modernity and insists on explaining the "European miracle" with reference to the 
presence of presumed features such as the presence of extensive market 
relations, the process of Occidental rationalization, and the competitive state 
system. ' This sees the developmental pattern in the Middle East as a deviation 
from the Western one, which is privileged as universal, rational, pluralist and 
secular. Such reasoning has important implications when one studies Islamism 
from the point of view of modernisation theory. Islamism is envisioned in terms of 
a "reactionary act" against modernity, that is equated with rationalism, science and 
industrial society. Culturalist analysis defines culture as the key determinant of the 
evolution of a society. It is proposed that the essential cause behind the relative 
stagnation of Muslim societies is Islamic culture with its'unchanging nature', that 
distinguish Muslim societies from the developed world with the unique dynamism 
of Western culture, i. e. Christianity. ' The culturalist perspective has based its 
political analysis upon the cultural peculiarities of Muslim societies and has looked 
for cultural impediments to Western-style development or democracy with 
J. A. Hall (1985) Powers and Liberties: The Causes and Consequences of the Rise of the West; 
M. Mann (1986) The Sources of Social Power, and Gellner (1988) Plough, Sword and Book: The 
Structure of Human History. 
See for example P. Crone (1980) Slaves on Horses; M. Cook (1983) Muhammad; P. J. Vatikiotis 
(1987) Islam and the State. 
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reference to language, religion and history of the region. " One of the most hotly 
discussed issues relating Islamist movements have been the notion of secularism, 
since modernisation theorists has strongly emphasised that secularization is a 
necessary component of modernization. It is argued that: 
the secularization of political culture explicitly underlines the decline of 
religious values generally throughout the society.... Material values rank 
higher than other worldly values and concern with the ethical social 
relationships based on universalistic norms takes the place of beliefs and 
rituals rooted in specific religious traditions. There is growing scepticism 
concerning the truth or validity of traditional religious doctrine, and less 
concern with transmitting religious ideas in the socialization process. People 
do not think about religion much; it occupies a diminishing part of their 
consciousness. There is growing tolerance of religious values foreign to 
one's own culture and a growing relativism based on scepticism of all 
religious truth claims (Smith, 1970, p. 115). 
However, within the rise of Islamist movements in the twentieth century it seems 
that universalistic norms, such as secular nationalism, have not diminished 
religious beliefs, orientation or organisation in the Middle East. Effort has been put 
into understanding the cause of this continuation as an influential factor in the 
social and political life of Muslim societies, since the assumption was that this 
situation is an abnormal or unnatural one in the modern era. Islam and Islamic 
culture is held responsible for the "backwardness" of Muslim societies, for 
"despotic", authoritarian forms of rule, or for instability of regimes and democracy. 
However, this approach is called "Orientalism" by Said (1978). According to him 
Orientalism is a discourse of domination, both a product of European subjugation 
of the Middle East and an instrument in this process. 
9 
See B. Lewis (1964) The Middle East and the West; E. Gellner (1983) Muslim Society; (1987) 
Culture, Identity and Politics; and (1992) Postmodernism, Reason and Religion. 
52 
In general, one of the problems in the political analysis of the Middle East is the 
heavy reliance on tired methodologies and cliches. Sadowski emphasizes the fact 
that neo-Orientalists [such as Crone, Pipes, or Gellner]... too portray Islam as a 
social entity whose "essential" core is immune to change by historical influences 
(1997: 42). The most often repeated and misrepresented assumption is that there 
is no church-like institution in Islam, i. e. no separation of religion and state. 
Therefore, Islam claims to be able to legislate for the whole of human activity. This 
leads to the conclusion that the concept of the secular theoretically has no 
counterpart in Islamic culture. This is a view that is shared by scholars, be they 
Western, Muslim, or Islamist, as shown earlier. However, Kramer (1980) argues 
that while Islam is based on the unity of religion and state, this assumption by no 
means implies that Islam is inflexible and unchanging. There is a need to 
distinguish between the profession of faith, ibadaf, that is immutable to change, 
and the worldly affairs, muamalat, which are subject to the changing 
circumstances provided that the results conform to the word and spirit of the 
Sharia. It has become clear that one of the methodological impediments to 
studying Middle Eastern politics is that "the element of particularism, uniqueness 
orimpenetrability [of the region] has been greatly overrated" (Halliday, 1996: 215). 
However, this does not mean that the application of universal concepts would 
dismiss the particular historical circumstances of regional politics in attempts to 
test or produce universal theories. In this context, neither is the Muslim response 
to Orientalism analytical. It tends to overestimate "the uniqueness of Middle 
Eastern societies" while rejecting universalist approaches. As Roy (1994) 
highlights, the Muslim response can be classified as threefold: (a) the nostalgia 
argument, which claims that it was Islam that brought civilisation to the West; (b) 
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the rejection of the assumed Western superiority associated with the 
condemnation of Western immorality and doubletalk; and (c) the apologetic 
perspective that asserts that every universally praised value is referred to in the 
Quran and Sunna, and therefore, Islam is the best religion. Orientalists and 
Islamists alike have attributed an essentialist and deterministic character to Islam, 
and explain Islamist movements with reference to the holy texts and historical 
experiences by tending to mistake the script for reality or to compare it with 
Christianity and Western culture. Both approaches attribute to Islam a monolithic 
character and, therefore, overlook the fact that Islamist movements differ in terms 
of their social context, their understanding of Islam, their political alliances and 
actions and their impact on society. They lead to the conclusion that the "reality" 
is predetermined by Islam. Attempts to show the compatibility or incompatibility 
of Islam with, for example, secularism, democracy or nationalism, with reference 
to Islamic texts and historical practices in culturalist reading are often closed with 
a remark on the absence or deficiency of this or that, on the one hand, or the 
misunderstanding of Islam by non-Muslims or deviation from one "true Islam", on 
the other. Reductionism bypasses the fact that similar political and economic, not 
to mention cultural, circumstances allowed the rise of many other ideologies and 
movements in the Middle East. In other words, many of the phenomena classified 
as peculiarly Islamic are not unique to Muslim societies when one considers the 
political discourses in societies which are aware of being at the periphery of global 
power relationships. It is interesting to view the similarities between the common 
discourse of Islamist movements and that of populism in general in terms of, for 
example, attitudes towards the problems of industrialization, the West or the relics 
of indigenous values. Although there are many ambiguities and overlaps in 
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definitions and meanings for the term populism, the term has been employed here 
to refer to the following: (a) a particular socio-historical movement appealing to the 
people across class lines; (b) a moralistic rather than programmatic discourse that 
manifests a cultural expression of developmental crisis, and claims to support and 
represent the "common people" in the face of 'corrupt' economic and political 
elites; (c) an expression against relations of inter and intra-national subordination 
and domination; (d) and an emphasis upon cooperate and communitarian forms 
of modernisation and industrialisation. It can be suggested that the emergence of 
populism in general and that of Islamism in particular, both as an ideology and as 
a movement, appear in societies and social groups which are aware of being 
peripheral to centres of power. They share a common language of the need to 
recapture an imagined sense of community, a quest for roots and authenticity. 9 
References to "imperialism" and "oppression" are among the central themes of 
Islamist ideology, though their saliency on the whole discourse is very much 
dependent upon the pattern of historical experience with imperialism of each 
society having an Islamist trend. It is important to re-emphasize the fact that 
Islamism that is influenced by Islam and expressed through Islamic symbolism 
represents a continuity in the history of Third World movements in terms of its 
revolutionary nature and its outlook (see Table 1 below). Roy indicates that: 
the crowds that in the 1950s demonstrated underthe red or national flag now 
march beneath the green banner... the same individuals who followed 
Nasser or Marx in the 1960s are Islamists today. There is an abundance of 
coming and going and of connections between the two Third World 
movements-it is the Islamic revolution in Iran that has best embodied the 
Third World continuity of the Islamist movement by expressing the North- 
9 See G. lonescu and E. Gellner (1969) Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics 
for a general account of populism, including its concepts, social roots and ideology, and some 
case studies on Latin America, Africa and Eastern Europe. 
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South opposition in religious terms (1994: 4-5). 
Although there are certain differences among Islamist movements, there is a 
shared language which signifies their global context and links them with populist 
discourse in general. It contains following themes: (a) the roots of the 
underdeveloped nature of the Third World lie in the legacy of colonialism and 
neocolonialism; (b) the international system is dominated by the Western powers 
and serves to exploit the Third World; (c) the Third World is economically, 
politically and culturally dependent on the Western powers and their allies, and this 
state of affairs is maintained by the collaboration of corrupt elites; (d) 
independence and cultural autonomy can be attained by a return to indigenous 
(Islamic in this case) means and by the elimination of corrupt ruling elites, who are 
the clients of Western powers and their allies (Hunter, 1986: 189-190). 
Table 1: Populism and Islamism Compared 
Characteristics POPULISM10 ISLAMISM 
Response to the confrontation with problems of development and imperialism. the twin problems of domestic developme 
Pattern of questions the applicability of universal development (Western); undermines the the same and; 
Development position of classical evolutionism with its conception of a unilinear development there is a belief that the products of moder 
path; protests against the pace and pattern of the modernisation process. attractive, which has to be incorporated, Ii 
There is a belief in the possibility of controlling the modernisation process in avoided; the Muslim countries are econoni 
the sense that a synthesis between the basic values of the traditional culture of powers and their allies and this state of aff 
the society and the need for modernisation is attainable, though the selections social groups. 
from this traditional culture are often arbitrary and the synthesis reached will 
depend upon the level of development of the society; asserts that the roots and 
causes of underdevelopment lie in the legacy of colonialism and 
neocolonialism. 
"' The general content of populism is drawn from G. lonescu and E. Gellner (1969) Populism: Its 
Meanings and National Characteristics 
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theology are: (a) to grasp social reality, which means the experience of millions 
with oppression and injustice; (b) to confront this reality with the revelation; and (c) 
to orient reflection towards action to change that reality in order to create a just 
society. This is not a promise but already a realised utopia. For example, 
Mutahhari believes that 
Islamic movements... are directed against despotism, capitalist colonialism 
or materialistic ideologies subscribing to colonialism in its new shape... after 
having passed through a period of mental crisis the Muslims are once again 
[in the 1970s] struggling to reestablish their "Islamic identity" against the 
challenges of capitalist West and the communist East (1982: 309). 
As there is no blueprint from the tradition, this discourse is certainly shaped and 
reshaped by history. Neocolonialism and Zionism represent evil, demonstrating the 
belief that Muslims are confronted by a large scale conspiracy. This is followed by 
the advocation that jihad against unbelief and unbelievers is a religious duty, as 
mentioned earlier (Esposito, 1991: 163-64). A selective and ends-oriented reading 
of Islamic sources and the definition of Islam as a religion provides a political, not 
to mention national, battle with religious means and symbols. As the ideological 
flexibility of Islam allows a wide range of interpretation, some of the themes of 
Islam serve the cause of popular mobilisation: an emphasis on the common 
concerns of the community of believers; a call for rebellion against unjust or un- 
Islamic rulers; and support for struggle. Khomeini defines Islam as "the religion of 
the strugglers who want right and justice, the religion of those demanding freedom 
and independence and those who do not want to allow the infidels to dominate the 
believers" (Khumayni, 1982: 315). 
Because all interpretations (by authorities) are based upon the word of God, they 
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serve the purposes of political mobilization. However, studying Islamist movements 
necessarily includes what Islamists say and do, they can be understood in a 
variety of ways. A danger in studying a movement is that ideas, interpretations and 
activities may be viewed in isolation from their setting in an attempt to build up a 
kind of general theory of the movement under examination. Being unaware of 
historical circumstances may lead to the researcher missing the fact that the 
assertions of people in a movement are often ideological justifications for what 
they fight for. For example, Faruki's reference to jihad is a response to a concrete 
situation. He writes that 
For its crime against... the corporate existence of the Palestinians... as well as 
the ummah, Islam [Muslims) condemns Zionism. Islam [Muslims) demands 
that... injustice perpetrated against the innocent be undone... This 
obligation... is a corporate religious obligation... Defence of the ummah... is 
jihad, or holy war, and it is prime religious duty... It is a first Islamic principle 
that aggression and injustice be met with an identical proportion of same (S. 
2: 194) (1983: 262). 
As seen above, references to the holy texts are common in Islamist writing. But the 
holy texts are only one source of Islamism and constitute only one element in the 
group of factors influencing or justifying activity. History, national considerations, 
experience and political, social and economic positions on national as well as 
international levels form other sources of action. Therefore, it is doubtful that a 
strict study of Islamic heritage within a particularistic approach will explain the 
nature of Islamist movements, although it has a certain coherence and relevance. 
It is important to reemphasise that identification with Islam may signify a symbolic 
and moral orientation, but it does not reveal much about the movements' social, 
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economic or political origins or programs. The analysis of Islamism should go 
beyond the religious texts and the writings of leaders and ideologues. 
Underdevelopment Theory 
Underdevelopment theory has been applied by critics of modernisation theory in 
analysing the Middle East. It is argued that modernisation theory is empirically 
invalid, theoretically inadequate and politically ineffective. The three stages model 
of modernisation theory is dismissed because it ignores the historical and 
structural bases of underdevelopment. Contrarily, development and 
underdevelopment are seen as opposite sides of the same economic process. 
That is, development in one region occurs only at the expense of 
underdevelopment in another. The three-stage model is dismissed for ignoring the 
historical and structural bases of underdevelopment. It is argued that the very 
existence of the world capitalist system means that the development potential of 
underdeveloped countries is blocked. " The underdevelopment of the Middle East 
is seen as a direct result of its asymmetrical power relationships with capitalist 
countries, its means of incorporation into the capitalist world economy, and 
colonialism. The unit of analysis for modernisation theory is the nation-state with 
reference to the backwardness of its people and its traditions. The absence of 
values and the lack of an educated elite is considered to be conducive to capitalist 
development. Underdevelopment theory takes as its unit the global system with 
reference to the structural position of the Third World societies in the global 
12 
For the basic arguments of underdevelopment theory see, A. G. Frank (1969) Latin America: 
Underdevelopment or Revolution; P. Baran (1973) The Political Economy of Growth; S. Amin 
(1976) Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formation of Peripheral Capitalism; and I. 
Wallerstein (1979) The Capitalist World Economy. 
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economic system, i. e. the power relationship between "centre" and "periphery". 13 
Underdevelopment theory provides more insights in terms of the global context of 
Islamism, for instance, the Middle East experience of colonialism and 
neocolonialism and the pattern of formations of nation-states, while incorporating 
it into the World capitalist system. However, its universal concepts, such as class, 
are not easily applicable and are not exhaustive. Bromley (1994) argues that while 
underdevelopment theory provides a comparative analysis, it tends to 
overestimate the asymmetrical relationships between the capitalist powers and the 
Middle East and proposes a geopolitical determinism as contrasted to cultural or 
theological determinism. For him, the central analytical question should be based 
upon the process of state formation, to investigate the linked processes of state 
formation and capitalist development in the modern Middle East. Such an 
approach entails the study of the relation of state to economics and civil society 
as a whole, based on a historical and comparative analysis of societies with 
reference to their experiences of modernity within the political and social forces 
operating within the societies of the region. 14 What this framework implies is that 
models derived from the analysis of the development pattern of the West are not 
workable in analysing Middle Eastern politics since as a developing region in the 
modern capitalist era, the Middle East in general faces two common problems: (a) 
the consolidation of state power rapidly and in difficult circumstances; and (b) the 
13 
14 
See, S. Amin (1976) Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral 
Capitalism; R. Owen (1981) World Economy, 1800-1914; H. Islamoolu (1987) The Ottoman 
Empire and World Economy; K. caglar (1987) State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist 
Development. 
See also R. Owen (1992) State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East. 
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sponsoring of socio-economic development in adverse conditions. 
2.2. Islamism: A Modern Ideology 
The nature of Islamism can be examined in terms of its agenda as an ideology that 
differs from traditional Islam with respect to its historical background and social 
basis. The Islamist discourse generally focuses upon the notion of the "Islamic 
state", the failure of Westernisation movements in Muslim lands, and subsequently 
the crisis of identity and the imperialist exploitation of Muslim people. Before going 
into details about these themes, it may be useful to look at the historical 
experience of Islamist movements. 
The Historical Experience of Islamist Movements 
The historical background which influences later Islamist movements is usually 
examined in three phases: 15 
(a) the "revivalist" and reformist movements of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries in the wake of European expansion into Muslim lands. The belief was 
that the Muslim world was in a state of decline because it had departed from the 
straight path of Islam. The "revivalist" movements shared the aim of the moral 
regeneration, of the values and power of their societies through a return to the 
spirit of the Quran and the simple way of life. In revivalist movements, Islam as a 
15 
For a comparative summary, see D. Sagiv (1995) Fundamentalism and Intellectuals in Egypt: 
1973-1993; Choueiri (1990) Islamic Fundamentalism, and J. L. Esposito (1993) Voices of 
Resurgent Islam. 
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common ideology was suitable for the unification of tribes into an "Islamic state". 
This occurred, for example, in the cases of the Wahhabi state of Saudi Arabia, the 
Mahdist state in Sudan, the Sanusi movement in Libya. However, for the 
reformists to meet the political, economic, scientific and cultural challenges of the 
West, there was a need for a selective synthesis of Islam and modern Western 
thought. It was argued that the sources of the West's strength must be 
assimilated. Islam had to be seen to be compatible with modern science and the 
best of Western thought. This approach is further explained with respect to the 
Ottoman Islamism in the next chapter. 
(b) The "neo-revivalist" or "radicalist" movements of the early twentieth century 
were directed against the intrusion of European powers into the Middle East. By 
the 1930s, most of the movements against foreign occupation and rule had 
acquired a predominantly ethnic-nationalistic character, although Islamic elements 
were often invoked as secondary factors. But the creation of politically active 
organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood by Hassan al-Banna in Egypt in 
1928 and the Jamaat-i Islami (Islamic Society) by Mawdudi in the Indian 
subcontinent in 1941, signified another pattern that distinguished them from earlier 
reformist movements. Their influence had reached beyond the borders and had 
a great effect on the development of Islamic movements throughout the Muslim 
world. Both were far more critical of the West, and of the secular type of 
government and nationalism, and emphasized the ideological self-sufficiency of 
Islam. The failure of both the West (capitalism) and the East (Marxism) was 
declared, and Islam was proposed as the third way for state and society. It was 
suggested that the crisis of the Muslim people was first caused by Muslims who 
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had failed to be sufficiently Islamically observant, as well as by imperialism and the 
cultural threat of the West. Islam was reinterpreted to address modern realities 
and revitalize the community in both religious and socio-political terms. It was 
reasserted that the Quran and the Sunna are the basis of Muslim life. While 
Western secularism and materialism were condemned, they were not against 
modernisation. There was a longstanding attempt to distinguish Westernisation 
from modernisation, and Western values from modern ideas and institutions 
(Esposito; 1992: 120-6). 
(c) After the failure or overturning of secular nationalist or socialist regimes, the 
contemporary movements have been exemplified by the re-emergence of the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Jaamat-i Islami of Pakistan, Qaddafi's seizure 
of power in 1969 in Libya, the Iranian revolution in 1979, Nimeiri's declaration of 
Islamic government in Sudan in 1983, and to some extent the rise to power of the 
Welfare Party after the general election in Turkey in 1995, the subject of this study. 
The Islamism of the twentieth century, beginning especially in the 1960s and 
growing in the 1970s and 1980s, is not a traditional phenomenon. One of its 
salient features is that there is a call for a return to an earlier model of social and 
political practice, i. e. for the reconstruction of an idealized past by abandoning the 
present for the future, that differentiates Islamic ideology from any other ideology. 
It is a distinct and modern discourse which cannot be discredited as backward. For 
every country reinterpretation or reconstruction of the past for the future is defined 
by their own vision of the past. The context of Islamist movements depends on the 
various historical conjunctures, political conditions, intellectual sources and socio- 
economic bases in each country. In Egypt, for instance, Islamist movements 
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display four characteristics: growing religiosity among the populace: growing social 
and political criticism by some mosque preachers; the mainstream Islamic 
"fundamentalism" best represented by the Muslim Brotherhood; and the "neo- 
fundamentalism" which consists largely of splinter groups from the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the 1970s and 1980s. While in Tunisia, the sudden emergence 
and speedy expansion of a significant Islamic movement from the late 1970"s 
onwards has to do with the economic and cultural marginalization of a large 
segment of the population in the transformation period from state capitalism to an 
open door policy (Ayubi, 1991: 72). With regard to the Iranian revolution, although 
the dominant ideology, forms, leading personnel and proclaimed goals have all 
been religious in appearance and inspiration, its success in fact was largely due 
to secular factors (Hunter, 1986). It was undertaken in the name of Islam and was 
a reactionary revolution, i. e. a return to an imagined previous order. Halliday 
(1988) argues that the Islamic element in the Iranian revolution is a reflection of 
several factors that produced the unique circumstance of a twentieth century state 
run by religious institutions along lines derived from the Quran and Islamic law, 
and in which the major influences are in the hands of a personage who is 
constitutionally designated as the interpreter of holy texts. The religious imprint has 
contained an effort to transform the law, culture, polity and social practices of Iran 
to observe a model supposedly elaborated in the seventh century, during the time 
of the Prophet Mohammed. The Iranian revolution took place in a socio- 
economically developed society. People who made the revolution had benefited 
materially from a process of a rapid capitalist development, despite increasing 
inequality. Neither defeat in war, attributed to events in Egypt, nor serious 
international economic pressure assisted the advance of the Islamic 
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revolutionaries. The lack of legitimacy of the Shah's regime, the corruption 
inherent within it, and the alienation of a large sector of middle class were among 
the contributing factors. 
Frustration, Dissatisfaction and "Self" Identity 
Islamist movements are multi-facet. Their general features are identified in the 
literature, which includes both crisis-oriented and success-oriented perspectives, 
(Mehmet 1990; Esposito 1991), as follows: (a) an identity crisis precipitated by a 
sense of loss of identity, and a lack of self-esteem caused by the experience of 
Westernisation. It represents a quest for a more authentic identity rooted in an 
Islamic past. With the failure of imported ideologies such as nationalism and 
socialism, Muslim societies experienced a "domination complex" are in their search 
for self-identity. (b) disillusionment with the West. The failure of many Muslim 
rulers and their Western inspired governments to respond adequately to the 
political and socio-economic needs of their societies has been experienced across 
similar top-down modernisation programmes, whose main component was the 
necessity of secularism. It is more an expression of social demand for equitable 
development. It represents broken promises, unfulfilled expectations and 
increasing disenchantment with the top-down development strategy that was 
enforced by the ruling elite in the name of modernisation. This strategy has 
unjustly produced "haves" and "have-nots" in the post-war period. (c) the 
newfound sense of pride and power that resulted from the military (Arab-Israeli 
war) and economic (oil embargo) success of 1973 and the Iranian revolution of 
1978-79. It is an assertion of identity and pride in past Islamic achievements in 
scholarship and political power that have long been threatened by the West, first 
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by colonialism and more recently by cultural invasion. 
From the Islamists' perspective, a deep cause for Islamist movements is 
dissatisfaction with (alien) Western ideals, values and institutions and a reaction 
to the Muslim status quo on an international level. This leads to the claim that all 
other political groups, except Islamists, are the agents of failed ideals and 
institutions. It is asserted that Islamism constitutes the third phase in the history 
of Muslim societies. This phase was preceded by the invasion of Muslims by 
foreign powers and by the independence movement seeking liberation from this 
political dominance. The contemporary Islamist movements seek to restructure 
society and rebuild socio-economic life on the foundations of Islam, while trying to 
reverse the impact of colonial rule and the post-liberation systems which were not 
Islamic, but were exported from the West and resulted in catastrophic 
consequences by undermining the very moral fibre of Muslim society. 
The westernizing model has failed and now Islamic movements want to 
reconstruct society. They are in search of a new social order... The Islamic 
movements have given Muslims a new outlook, a new hope, a new 
possibility... They are not averse to the technology of the West: but are not 
prepared to have it at the cost of their own identity and ideology (Ahmad, 
1983: 225). 
What Islamists in general share is the view that the Muslim masses, as opposed 
to the perceptions of their "enlightening and modernising" elites, always regard 
Islam as the basis of their identity, the source of morality and the unchallenged 
inspiration for their past, present and future. Similarly, referring to the "third phase", 
Mahdi states that a regime of "internal or indigenous colonialism" as well as an 
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external one has prepared the way for the third response, i. e. contemporary 
Islamism, which emphasizes native identity and dignity; separates Islam from the 
traditionalist thesis and modernization from the acculturation syndrome; and 
establishes a synthesis that is both Islamic and modern (1983: 239). 
The crisis-oriented explanation with its emphasis on psychological aspects focuses 
upon the idea that Muslim societies are in the midst of a major transformation 
(from traditionalism to modernity) which creates tensions and crises. Islam in this 
context provides a political alternative as well as a kind of refuge and a secure 
psychological anchor. A psychological explanation suggests that the development 
process has led people to take refuge in traditional symbols and rituals in order 
to help them to cope with the rapid change which has produced "haves" and "have 
nots". Piscatori writes of the unsettling and unrelieved exodus of people from the 
countryside to the cities... Most rural migrants quickly become the urban poor, 
victims of hope, swallowed by the very process which they believed would liberate 
them (1986: 27). 
This situation, however, is not unique to the Muslim world. Such an explanation is 
not satisfactory in the sense that various ideologies rise or have risen under similar 
circumstances, as mentioned earlier. 16 Although the frustration arising at various 
points in the development process is conducive to Islamist movements, it is not an 
exhaustive explanation of them. The direction of movements is influenced by a 
combination of various factors, such as local conditions, historical antecedents, 
acuteness of crisis and intensity of organisational drive. 
I6 
See the case study in chapter seven regarding reasons given by the electorate who voted for an 
Islamist party in the 1995 general election in Turkey. 
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Another crisis-oriented explanation (Tibi 1988) states that the "repo Iitisation" of 
Islam is a counter-acculturation, an expression of the defensive culture and 
material misery of the Islamic people. From this point of view, if the process of 
Westernisation, with its attendant disintegration of pre-industrial social structures, 
is not accompanied by a process of industrialisation, it will produce people with 
damaged identities. What is seen here is another positivist cause and effect 
relationship. Tibi's model shares a basic assumption with the three stages model 
of modernisation. With an emphasis on cultural impediments, he implies that if 
Muslim countries had successfully passed through the transitional stage to 
modernisation, for example become secularised and accompanied Westernisation 
with industrialisation, the "repolitisation of Islam" would not have been occurred. 
The Western model of development is still treated as a blueprint for 
underdeveloped parts of the world and Islamism is still presented as a pathological 
illness of Muslim countries in transition. 
The Islamist Discourse 
Islamism is an ahistorical approach. Contrary to modernist theorists who see Islam 
as the "cause"of backwardness, Islamists find the "cure" in Islam, i. e. "[true] Islam 
is the solution". Therefore, they claim that Islam can meet the political, social and 
economic demands of "modernity". Islamism puts the emphasis upon going back 
to the fundamentals laid down in the Quran and the Sunna, and the historical 
experiences of the Medinan state, rather than seeking the revival of traditional 
Islam in its entirety. Islamist movements explicitly envisage themselves as socio- 
political movements, founded on Islam defined as much in terms of a political 
ideology as in terms of a religion (Roy 1994). One proof of this is the symmetrical 
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comparison that Islamists regularly make between their thought and the major 
political ideologies of the twentieth century, such as Marxism, fascism, and 
capitalism, rather than religions. Zubaida indicates that: 
modern Islamism is a political ideology..., which in recent years has become 
a dominant idiom for the expression of various and sometimes contradictory 
interests, aspirations and frustrations. In this it has replaced the previously 
dominant secular nationalism and Marxism. The wide variety of social and 
political forms to be found historically and in the present cannot be 
interpreted as variations on a common model of an essential Muslim society, 
but are explicable only in terms of the normal practice of social and political 
analysis, like any other range of societies (1995: 151). 
As mentioned earlier, Islamism starts from the premise that Islam is a universal 
system of thought and a comprehensive way of life. Religion is integral to politics, 
law and society (Afghani 1982a; Khomeini 1979; Qutb 1982). This is to say, it is 
not enough for society to be composed of Muslims. Rather, it must be Islamic in 
its foundation and its structure. This is a call for the establishment of an "Islamic 
state", though this does not mean that all Islamists share a common view on what 
constitutes an "Islamic state" and how it should function. 
The Concept of the "Islamic State" 
No Muslim thinker has provided a theory of the "Islamic state". It seems that the 
conclusions to be reached predetermine how the holy texts are interpreted, given 
their selective use by scholars or activists. The state is conceptualized and used 
interchangeably with government by reference to specific issues, such as the 
legitimacy of temporal government, or the sovereignty of God versus the 
sovereignty of people; the election of the head of state; and the question of the 
compatibility of Islam and democracy or Islam and secularism. The framework for 
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discussion seems to be determined by finding reasons to approve or disapprove 
of the rising concerns in Muslim societies with the process of change, although the 
outcome would vary from country to country depending upon political, social and 
economic variables. The discussion of the Islamic state reflects the influence of 
different ideas which accompanied the evolution of Muslim societies since the time 
of the Prophet. The abolition of Caliphate in 1924 also required some adjustment 
between theory and reality. It seems easier to define the Islamic state in terms of 
what it is not, rather than what it is. For instance, there is an agreement that 
hereditary succession, monarchy, dictatorship, and military rule are not Islamic, 
though the history of Muslim societies provides plenty of examples of these 
(Khomeini 1979; Mawdudi 1982; lqbal 1983). The main distinguishing point among 
Islamists in defining the nature of the "Islamic state" seems to lie in to what extent 
the Sharia should be applied and who has the right to interpret it, and hence who 
is allowed to use state power. 
Ulema, who are referred to as either traditional, or conservative, or fundamentalist 
in the literature, identify an "Islamic state" with a recognition of their own role as 
guardians and interpreters of the divine law. They assert that an Islamic state is 
based on the sovereignty of God, which means the denial of human will by basing 
itself on the assumption that God has not left the matter of worldly life to the 
discretion of human beings, but has prescribed a clearly defined path. Therefore, 
an "Islamic state" is fully equipped to deal competently with all the complexities of 
modern life. A contemporary Islamic state, therefore, should engage in law-finding 
and not law-making. Consequently, the responsibility in this process cannot be left 
to laymen, but should be that of prominent ulema (Ahmed, 1987: 32). However, 
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for Rida, considered to be the founding theoretician of the "Islamic state" in its 
modern sense, while the Sharia continues to have overriding authority there exists 
a decisive place for the positive law to find solutions to the unpredicted problems 
of the time being, as long as compatible with the Sharia. It is in consultation with 
the experts that the decisions of the state acquire a religiously binding force. Rida 
argues that the head of state should be elected and aided in his judicial capacity 
by those who are the representatives of all Muslim groups, chosen from a small 
number of highly educated experts on the divine law who have a perfect reputation 
among the Muslims. The head of the state is legitimate as long as he is bound by 
the Sharia and the principles of Islam, for example, consultation. Through their 
representatives, the ulema, the community has the right to challenge his decisions 
whenever these are seen to contravene these principles (Enayat, 1982: 77). 
Mawdudi's idea of "true Islam" and the model "Islamic state" is derived from both 
the authoritative sources and Muslim history. Mawdudi attempts to derive the 
imperatives of Islam from the Quran, the Sunna and other sources while 
disregarding what he sees as the distorted version of Islam. He dissociates his 
Islamic state from most of the Muslim political history after the end of the Medinan 
era. Mawdudi dismisses both secular democracy and socialism, which, he argues, 
are based on the assumption that men are free to decide their worldly affairs 
independent of religion. He identifies the "Islamic state" as a "theo-democracy" 
which is ruled by the whole community of Muslims and in which Muslims are given 
a limited popular sovereignty. Mawdudi rejects the assertion by the ulema that the 
divine law regulates all aspects of human life. He argues that God has chosen to 
remain silent on a vast range of matters, thus leaving space for Muslims to 
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exercise their own discretion in this unoccupied field. However, this freedom to 
make law should not be in conflict with the spirit of the revealed law. The Islamic 
state, in Mawdudi's view, is a vehicle to bring about a world revolution that 
combats evil and establishes good. Mawdudi rejects a dynastic rule or personal 
dictatorship and insists on a republican form of government, albeit, an authoritarian 
one. He does not advocate a theocracy ruled by the ulema, but a Sharia 
governance with the ulema functioning as advisers, in which authority is exercised 
by popular incumbents. Mawdudi tends to provide some checks on the ruler's 
authority, such as the formation of a parliament as a modern version of the caliph's 
advisory council, the subordination of the ruler to the Sharia, and the election of 
the head of the state either directly or indirectly, although that does not necessarily 
mean general suffrage. Women and non-Muslims are excluded from politics 
(1982: 253-9). 
For Khomeini, who attempted to develop a Shia doctrine of the state, the "Islamic 
government" is constitutional not in the sense that represented in the 
parliamentary system or in the people's councils, but in that those in administration 
observe a number of conditions and rules laid down in the Quran and the Sunna. 
Nobody has the right to legislate, as the power of legislation is confined to God. In 
the absence of the twelfth Imam, God's representative on earth who went into 
occultation and is to return, Khomeini proposed the right of the jurisprudents, 
wilayat i-faqih, to establish and rule the "Islamic state" and provide guidance for 
the Islamic community. He argued that "The rule of the jurisprudents is a 
subjective matter dictated by the Sharia, as the Sharia considers one of us a 
trustee over minors" (1982: 321). The head of the government, wilayat i-faqih, 
must consult with the parliament, but is not necessarily bound by their decisions. 
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"The prophet, the Imams and the people obey God's will and Sharia" (1982: 318). 
On the other hand, a modernist approach attempts to harmonize the idea of an 
"Islamic state" based on the sovereignty of God with the democratic right of the 
community to legislate freely in vast undefined areas. For lqbal (1983), real Islamic 
laws are very few in number and do not preclude democratic forms of government, 
but these should still be in the form of an Islamic democracy within the clear limits 
of Islam. He envisages the Islamic state as an ideal secular state that sustains the 
sovereignty of God and the supremacy of divine law, although tradition is not 
binding upon the people, and is also truly democratic. Igbal emphasizes the 
Islamic principle of consultation as the basis of democracy, and understands it in 
terms of consultation with all, although this is interpreted by Islamic jurists or 
traditionalists as the consultation of experts with the divine law. He dismisses the 
exclusive interpretative rights of the clerics and places this authority in the hands 
of elected representatives of the people, who can reserve, conceal or extend its 
application according to procedure. 
Obviously, for Islamists the nature of "true" Islam and what it requires or dictates 
is greatly dependent on the interpretation of the holy texts. In addition to the 
doctrinal differences between various sects and schools, even those with the same 
turn of mind have reached different views regarding their religion. The selective 
use of religious texts often justifies rather than determines the course of political 
action. The varied use of Islam for specific purposes leads to different 
interpretations and perceptions. Ayubi (1991) indicates that even if 
"fundamentalists" believe that there is only one truth, the interpretations and 
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perceptions of it are widely different, as shown above. A lack of a single, concrete, 
historical model creates confusion as well as a lack of consensus as to what an 
Islamic state is. This confusion originates from several factors. Firstly, the historical 
Medinan state is not a comprehensive model that offers all solutions for the time 
being. Secondly, the later Caliphal practice of the Umayyads and Abbasids was 
some way from providing a political framework, rather than providing examples for 
few institutions, such as a tax system. Thirdly, the absence of a fully "Islamic state" 
in history seems to have given way to an "imagined" ideal formula, a version of a 
utopian society (Esposito, 1984: 221). It is that point where Islamist ideology differs 
from other ideologies since it calls for the reconstruction of an idealized past by 
abandoning the present for the future, thereby creating a new and just system. 
Finally, the relationship of religion to politics, like most beliefs and practices and 
indeed revelation itself, has been subject to a variety of interpretations throughout 
the ages. 
With regard to the application of Sharia law, there are varied views in the literature 
on the short-term aims of Islamists. Ayubi (1991) argues that "neo- 
fundamentalists", referring to the splinter groups of the Muslim Brothers, 
ideologically share two notions: a belief in the non-separation of religion from 
politics and the need for the immediate application of the Sharia. On the other 
hand, Roy (1994) points out that Islamist movements are less persistent on the 
application of the Sharia than are the "fundamentalist" ulema. For Islamists, Islam 
is a totalizing ideology that must first transform society, rather than requiring the 
simple application of the Sharia within any kind of regime. The Ulema is criticized 
by Islamists for their compromise with Western modernity and their servility to the 
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Western powers, which in turn leads to the approval of a secular government. The 
renewal of society requires a return to Islam, an Islamic religio-political and social 
reformation or revolution, that draws its inspirations from the Quran and from the 
first Islamic movement led by the Prophet Mohammed. Therefore, for the most 
"radical" of the Islamists, Roy identifies in the disciples of Sayyid Qutb and of 
Khomeini, but not of Mawdudi, that there is a duty to revolt against a Muslim state 
which is considered to be corrupt. 
The Social Basis of Islamism 
There is a general tendency within the literature to identify Islamism as an urban 
phenomenon. Ayubi (1991) argues that while the signs of general religiosity and 
sympathy to the Islamic cause can be seen within a broad trans-class social base, 
"militant" Islamists represent much more specifically defined social groups. He 
emphasizes that the usage of the same terminology allows the "radical activist" to 
converge with a more broadly based "Islamic resurgence", seen as a kind of rising 
cultural nationalism whose main drive is the quest for authenticity. On the other 
hand, the distinctive social background of the Islamists sets this group apart. Their 
discourse is better seen as the moral/cultural expression of developmental crisis, 
which has resulted in frustration among the lower middle class in general and the 
intelligentsia and students in particular. Ayubi concludes that "radical political 
Islam" is a movement of the intelligentsia. Islamism is a movement of students 
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and of the new middle class of officials (including army officers), professionals and 
technocrats. Members of the traditional class of merchants and artisans (bazaaris) 
have also been active in Islamic movements in Iran and in Syria and even, on a 
limited scale, in Egypt. The bazaaris form a major component of the contemporary 
Islamist movements in Iran and Syria. Apart from Iran where the Shi'i clergy have 
played a historically and socially different role, Islamic movements have 
sometimes benefited from the support of some individual Sunni ulema, but these 
movements have not been movements of the clergy. 
Similarly, Munson (1988) asserts that religious and political movements and 
politicized religious groups appeal to specific social strata. He has shown that the 
active supporters of Islamic movements during the 1970s and early 1980s were 
students and recent university graduates. For example, in Iran, high school and 
university graduates played a crucial role in the revolution. In Egypt, a study of 
thirty-four members of radical Islamic groups imprisoned in the 1970s found that 
twenty-nine were either university students or recent graduates when arrested. 
Most of these students were educated in secular institutions and many were 
students of engineering and other applied scientific fields. Students of relatively 
traditional Islamic studies were also active in Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
Ayubi (1991) considers that while the middle strata have expanded in size and 
proportion in most Arab societies, the rising expectations that have been 
stimulated, in particular by the acquisition of higher education and the move to 
urban centres, have not been met because of the constrained nature of economic 
development in these societies. He argues that the general rise of Islamism is a 
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reflection of the fluid class map, although it is not always easy to delineate the 
boundaries between the petite bourgeoisie and the new middle strata, or between 
artisans and workers. He stresses that Islamism in all its formulations tends to be 
more successful in stressing cultural identity and seeking independence from the 
state than in spelling out class-specific social and economic objectives. Islamist 
movements consist of a loose coalition of bourgeois factions, some rural agrarian 
capitalists, notables and estate owners, proletarianized members of the state, 
employed petite bourgeoisie, the under-employed intelligentsia and the student 
population, although that also brings a clash of interests in the long term. 
In conclusion, Islamist movements as the conveyors of a political ideology share 
certain elements, as Owen argues (1992): (a) they are contestants for power within 
specific local political arenas defined by particular state borders, despite their 
common usage of the universal language of Islam, e. g. references to the umma. 
The vast majority of politico-religious actors behave as though their primary aim 
is to influence policies and events within a given system; (b) in their concern to 
obtain power and influence, these same actors share much of the vocabulary and 
many of the same practices as other politicians within the same arena. They speak 
of democracy, of civil rights, of constitutionalism. They seem to share a general 
concern with nationalism and the future of each national project. They reformulate 
and reexpress the dominant secular themes, for example the emphasis on 
changing the terms of foreign affairs, and Khomeini's classification of the world in 
terms of the oppressors and the oppressed; (c) their presence in the political arena 
involves them in struggles with other political groups which try to misinterpret or 
to refine their message; (d) given the need to respond to external political 
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circumstances, aII religious groups are forced to change their strategies and tactics 
over time. " 
Chapter 3: Ottoman Social Formation and the Rise of Ideologism 
This chapter is based on an analysis of the nature of Ottoman social formation in 
terms of the relations of production. This examination will provide the background 
to the related process of state formation and capitalist development in the 
Republican period, with reference to the experience of modernity, as this saw the 
rise of Islamism as an ideology in the late nineteenth century. This will help to 
locate the historical experience of Islamism in the context of modern ideologies, 
since the idea of change was at the centre of the Islamist discourse of the 
Ottoman intellectuals who were influenced by Western modern political thought, 
and to show that Islamist ideology offered a focus of protest at intellectual as well 
as societal level in the process of European economic and political expansion. It 
17 
is argued that Islamism as an intellectual movement was founded on the re- 
interpretation of Islam as a form of political ideology, which concentrated upon the 
See chapters five and seven for the discussion how an "Islamist Party" has adjusted its appeal to 
changing economic, social and political circumstances over three decades, while keeping much 
of its Islamist rhetoric at the outset in order to compete for power along with secular parties. 
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idea of progress and contested for the use of Islam in the process of development 
as an alternative approach to Westernism. 
The analysis of Ottoman social formation looks at the mode of surplus since it is 
necessary to investigate the historical character of surplus appropriation in order 
to avoid essentialist arguments about culture when dealing with policies for 
"modernising the state". Therefore, it is important to examine the specific social 
relations governing production processes and determining social access to and 
control over resources and the social distribution of the product of labour. From the 
standpoints of the ideologies of the nineteenth century, namely Ottomanism, 
Islamism and Turkism, the "state-led" Ottoman modernisation endeavour from 
above is argued to highlight the political consequences and changing relations of 
production in the process of the Ottoman Empire's integration into the world 
capitalist system on unequal terms. Its focus begins with the integration of the 
Ottoman economy into the world market and it aims to indicate the continuity 
within Kemalism in terms of the relationships between the state and society, such 
as promoting a national economy by generating a (national) bourgeoisie. Such an 
approach defines the path for the rest of the study, which concentrates upon how 
common desires are formulated by those in power in order to seize and interpret 
social and political space and to economically develop. This is not an institutional 
account of the state, but of the processes of state formation and the reproduction 
of social relations with respect to the reproduction of hegemonic knowledge, i. e. 
the ideology of the state. 
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3.1. Ottoman Social Formation 
The Ottoman society was segmented in terms of religion, ethnicity, language and 
economy. Of all the religions, Islam was the legitimating myth of the existing state. 
Because the concept of unity of state and religion was implied in the combination 
of institutions, the Sultanate and the Caliphate from the sixteenth century onwards, 
the Ottoman state has often been characterized as a theocratic state. 18 However, 
it is important to mention that the state cannot be termed theocratic on three 
grounds. Firstly, although in theory the ruler was limited in the exercise of his 
authority by Sharia law, in reality, the legislative body did not hesitate to make 
rules, called kanunnames, which were in conflict with the religious law. Since 
Ottoman society had a multi-religious character, the state needed to be flexible by 
developing a body of traditional law which did not originate from Sharia'9. The 
formula of the unity of religion and state was understood in terms of the idea that 
the viability of the state was essential for the preservation of religion. In this sense, 
the state was seen as necessary to keep religion flourishing. It took priority over 
religion. Secondly, the religious institutions, and subsequently the ulema, or the 
doctors of Islamic religion, as a distinct section of society and the representatives 
of orthodox Islam were integrated into the state structure through a modest 
religious hierarchy under the leadership of Feyhülislam, the top religious official. 
The state established control over the higher institutions of religious learning. 
Education and the law constituted the main functions of the ulema. The ulema 
were appointed as teachers in medreses, or religious universities, which were 
established and managed by the state. Concerning their judicial function, kadi 
IK 
19 
See N. Berkes (1964) The Development of Secularism in Turkey. 
Mardin identifies the Sultan's kanunnames as the early roots of secularism (1977: 282-3). 
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were appointed among the ulema in cities, towns and smaller settlements. The 
administrative structure was essentially secular rather than religious in character. 
The ulema were not allowed to determine the course of political action. They were 
bound to the state and to winning public blessing. However, there were a number 
of ulema who turned to the religious mystic orders, the Sufi circles. The Sufis, who 
were representative of heterodox Islam, were engaged in the moral and spiritual 
elevation of the people through meditation and intuition, and the propagation of 
religion in conquered lands. The state attempted to control the Sufi orders and 
dealt severely with any religious manifestation that escaped state control. Thirdly, 
an extensive programme of secularization developed during the latter stage of the 
Ottoman Empire in the form of the separation of religious institutions from the 
educational, judicial and political spheres. 
In theory, Ottoman society was divided into two classes. The class division clearly 
marked out a difference with respect to basic relationships of the means of 
production and distribution of surplus between the ruling class, askeri, and the 
subject class, reaya. The askeri was represented by the officers of court, the 
army, the civil servants and the ulema. As Ottoman society was segmented 
religiously, ethnically and linguistically, the reaya was divided along these lines as 
well as those of residence and occupation. The division of reaya into religiously 
oriented communities formed the Millet system. However, this was not unique to 
Ottoman society, as they made their contribution by making it a part of the 
structure of the society as well as the state. The Millet system, with each individual 
or group belonging to one millet or another, meant that subjects had status and 
standing in society only through membership of such millets. Each had their own 
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religious leaders who were responsible to the state, and relative autonomous in 
governing their own affairs. The Muslims, the Jews, the Armenians and the 
Orthodox Christians, such as the Greeks, the Rumanians and the Slavic subjects, 
each established and maintained their own institutions to carry out the functions 
of education, religion, jurisdiction and social security (Shaw, 1976: 151-53). 
However, it should not be presupposed that each millet was homogeneous or 
united in itself, as they were also divided along ethnic lines, into sects based upon 
religions, language differences and regional remoteness. 
A second significant division between the reaya arose in accordance with their 
residence and position in the economy, and whether this was urban or rural. 20 The 
components of rural areas, towns and cities, were: religious communities, any 
groups belonging to different legal schools, guilds, fraternities, lineage groups and 
ethnic communities. Merchants, artisans, men of religion, and dervishes, who were 
exempted from military service and had some taxes levied on their rural 
counterparts, were city dwellers along with the members of the Ottoman ruling 
class. The most developed urban economic groups of craftsmen had their own 
guild organizations to regulate their affairs and promote group and individual 
interests. The guilds acted as mediating structures between the craftsmen and 
small traders, as well as in relation with the state (Shaw, 1976: 157-58). They 
performed all sorts of social functions, such as providing social security, building 
2) 
up funds, distributing food to poor members or non-members as well as providing 
religious guidance. Merchants trading over long distances enjoyed exemption from 
There is a significant gap within the literature on social history. A comprehensive picture of 
Ottoman rural and urban life is still some way from being completed. The conventional approach 
seems to have made generalizations from the limited knowledge of major cities or towns, such as 
Istanbul, Salonica, Bursa and Damascus. 
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taxes and strict regulations. Contrary to popular opinion, the activities of merchants 
were not illegitimate in the eyes of the state. Merchants were able to accumulate 
significant capital invested in various internal enterprises, in taxfarming or lending 
to the ruling class. Merchants gained important positions as moneylenders to the 
members of askeri and tax-bidders when tax-farming started replacing the 
Ottoman classical land regime after the sixteenth century (Faroqhi, 1992: 216). It 
is crucially important to recognize the sub-strata within the reaya rather than see 
them as "flocks of the Sultan", as is often done. This point becomes clear by the 
position of nomads and peasants in the society. The nomads, who lived in the 
mountains, steppes and deserts, were outside the general structure of urban and 
rural society. The nomads in Anatolia and the Balkans constituted a distinct group 
and were subject to special status among the tax-paying subjects. The state 
organized and utilized their labour power as a mobile and comparatively free 
source of labour for special purposes, in return for exempting them from 
extraordinary taxes. Since the employment of the peasant in such enterprises as 
mining, transportation, and guarding bridges and mountain passes would mean 
the disruption of agriculture, the state often employed nomads. They also provided 
manpower for military purposes. They were subject to enforced migration and 
settlement in rural areas as far as the Empire's population policies were 
concerned, which aimed for even distribution of the labour force in the realm of the 
Empire (Inalcik, 1993: 102-16). 
Another sub-stratum within the reaya was the peasantry. The village was the unit 
of settlement for peasant families. It is important to note that physical and ethnic 
conditions, regional differences, settlement conditions and cultural, political and 
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military circumstances led to the various village types, and differences in size, 
population and economic activity. Under these circumstances it is impossible to 
speak of a particular village type on the scale of the Empire, although there 
emerged village settlements which acquired common characteristics in the core 
regions, Anatolia and the Balkans under the influence of the Ottoman land and 
taxation system. This was the fundamental cell of Ottoman society. Its labour unit 
was symbolized by the married peasant male with his wife and children. The 
husband as the organizer of the family economy and its administration was 
recognized as the taxpayer by the state. The unit of land which could be operated 
by peasant family labour and a pair of oxen was the basic unit of agricultural 
economy. The peasant economy was based on the individual family possession 
of arable land with access to communal village possessions, such as woodland, 
pasture land, meadow and water. 21 
The Mode of Production: Feudal or Asiatic? 
21 
22 
The debate concerning Ottoman social formation has been conducted for the last 
two decades from the point of view of its being either Asiatic or feudal or 
alternatively of neither Asiatic nor feudal origin, but sui generis. 22 The fact that 
The main characteristics of the land regime are given below. Timur believes that communal 
production was a dominant characteristic of Ottoman mode of production (1979: 164-66). If this 
was the case, he misses the point that the concept of communal production is not compatible with 
the concept of the feudal mode of production, on which he believes Ottoman society was based. 
He asserts that the commune, or village in fact, consisting of patriarchal families was the unit for 
the tax assessment. What is clear here is that he mistakes the production of the patriarchal family 
as a communal one and confuses the concept of tirnar. The size of communal possession 
between the neighbouring villages was determined by the state's official, kadi, who drew the 
borders between them and allocated special certificates to each. For further detail on timar, see 
H. inalcik (1993) the Middle East and Balkans Under the Ottomans: Essays on Economy and 
Society. 
See, for example, S. Divitcioglu (1981) Asya Üretim Tarzi ve Osmanli Toplumu; I. Kücükömer 
(1994) Düzenin Yabacilasmasi, on the Asiatic mode of production; H. Gibb and H. Bowen (1950) 
Islamic Society and the West J. Ortayli (1979) Türkiye /dare Tarihi; T. Timur (1979) Osmanli 
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Ottoman mode of production could not achieve the transition to the capitalist mode 
of production has led some theorists using the teleological approach to conclude 
that Ottoman social order was stagnant, despotic and pre-feudal, i. e. Asiatic. To 
those who identify it as feudal, answers were to be found in the "patrimonial" 
nature of the state, the incapability of the feudal class, the lack of bourgeoisie, and 
the absence of the fragmentation of political power or political autonomy of towns, 
which are thought to lead to capital accumulation and therefore to transition. What 
is striking is that several discussions have been motivated by political rather than 
scholarly considerations. On the one hand, the intellectuals who adhered to "the 
official line", i. e. Kemalism, have showed an overwhelmingly conformist attitude to 
the Republican history thesis in decoding the historical documents. On the other 
hand, others have carried out their discussion with no open expression of their 
critical view, as Faroqhi comments (1992: 5). Therefore, the literature suffers 
severely from the values of researchers, which affects the results. Ideologies are 
represented as concrete knowledge of truth. As analysis proceeds from ideological 
premises, researchers lose their focus on particular aspects of reality. 
The Feudal Mode of Production 
It is very common in the literature to identify feudalism with the "fief", the 
"vassalage", and the "chivalry", i. e., with the feudal hierarchy. This emphasis has 
often been upon its juridical terms. As Hilton expresses it: "to reduce feudalism to 
serfdom is as bad as to insist that without the fief there is no feudalism" (1985: 
Toplumsal Düzeni; H. Cin (1985) Osmanli Toprak Düzeni ve Bu Düzenin Bozulmasr, H. Berktay 
(1987) "The Search for the Peasants in Western and Turkish History"; J. Haldon (1992) "The 
Ottoman State and the Question of State Autonomy", on the Ottoman feudalism and; F. Köprülü 
(1981) Osmanli Devletinin Kurulmasi; H. Inalcik (1993) The Middle East and Balkans under the 
Ottoman Empire, on the sui generis nature of Ottoman state. 
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227). Feudalism has often been characterized with a fact which conflicted with the 
idea of a centralized state. It has been a short step to describe every 
fragmentation of political authority as feudal. 23 However, the term "feudalism" 
broadly means both the fief and the manor (feodalite and seigneurie), two 
inseparable facets of the same social order. A general picture of feudal society can 
be drawn as follows: the feudal system meant the rigorous economic subjection 
of a host of humble folk to a few powerful men. It was an unequal society based 
on a rigid class structure rather than a hierarchical one, with chiefs rather than 
nobility and with serfs, not slaves. Private property in land was concentrated by 
birth in the hands of numerically small class of aristocratic peers, both in space 
and time by judicial and customary sanctions. The serfs had to pass on their 
surplus production in the form of feudal rent to this landlord class and provide a 
variety of other direct or indirect services, as well as the payment of fees for 
obtaining leave to marry, for example. The existence of a manorial system 
provided the landlords with the means to control the process of production. The 
relations of the lord with the serfs or tenants were regulated by "the custom of the 
manor" (Bloch, 1961: 443-445). It is important to bear in mind that feudal rent is 
neither reducible to a payment for the right to use the land, nor the appropriation 
of surplus only in the form of surplus-labour. Rather, the feudal landed property 
contains the possibility of a direct relation of the landlord to the process of 
production. This direct relation depends upon two elements: (a) the title to the land 
as a right of exclusion; and (b) the form of payment in rent. The right to exclude the 
direct producer from the land is a necessary legal separation of the direct 
23 
See, for example, M. Sencer (1974) Toprak Agaliginin Kokenleri; I. Ortayli (1979) Turkiye Idare 
Tarihi; S. Divitcioglu (1981) Asya Uretim Tarzi ve Osmanli Toplumu; and I. Kücükömer (1994) 
Dtizenin Yabacila, masi. 
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producers from the means of production, upon which a real separation can be 
constituted. The forms of rent provide a means of control of the direct producers' 
relation to the means of production and the reproduction of the means of 
production by controlling the size, the character and the unit of production. The 
control of the reproduction of the means of production means that the form of 
feudal rent rests on the separation of the direct producer from the means of 
production. This control entails the reproduction of exploitative production relations 
and the intervention of landlords in the production process. This is the landlord's 
presence on his estate in the manorial system. It is in this institution that the two 
classes, the landlord and the peasant, meet face to face, the first to receive and 
the second to give their labour or the fruits of their labour in cash or in kind. 
Through the manorial system the landlord is able to control the whole economy of 
the land to which he has title. The principle was that the surplus product coming 
from the peasant was realised first as landowner income and then through the 
mechanism of the market as the source of demand for craft and the commodities 
of regional and international exchange (Hilton, 1985: 230). 
Having said that, within Ottoman social relations the state controlled peasants' 
holdings by the land regime known as miri, which was mainly employed in the 
Balkans and Anatolia, except for some parts of eastern Anatolia. While there is a 
great deal of literature on the mini regime, certain aspects of it have been 
misrepresented. As inalcik comments, the mini land did not cover all agricultural 
land, but areas used as fields and open to grain cultivation. The Ottoman law 
codes or kanunnames put severe restrictions on the subdivision and merging of 
peasants' holdings and their conversion into orchards and gardens. The state- 
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owned land, miri, was divided into two main categories: the land under title-deed 
and the land under tax-farming. The former was the land possessed by peasant 
families which could neither be sold nor subjected to donation nor mortmain 
(vakif). This was the principal practice under the miri land regime. In spite of the 
fact that the state gradually lost control of the land and tax-farming expanded in 
size from the later sixteenth century onwards, the main parameters of small 
peasant farming remained as the fundamental character of the agricultural 
economy right into the twentieth century. The land under tax-farming meant the 
act of renting out a source of public revenue to those who were not necessarily 
peasants. Land which was not either under the title-deed or possessed by 
peasants was rented out in return for a given sum of money as rent. The state 
sought to rent such lands to ensure continued cultivation and to prevent a loss of 
state revenue (Inalcik, 1993: 142-45). 
Another important component of the mini regime was the timar system. Timar is 
defined as the assignment of taxes to a cavalryman or state official in return for 
service to the state (Barkan, "Tamar": 287). The important point here is that timar, 
in general, means the alienation of a piece of income from the state treasury as 
grant. On the one hand, it does not mean the transfer of land as property, as is 
often supposed. 24 On the other hand, fimarwas neither an administrative unit"S nor 
a necessity of a money limited economy26. When the Ottoman state was 
24 
25 
26 
H. Cin (1978) Osmanli Toprak Düzeni ve Bu Düzenin Bozulmasi, p. 98. 
I. Ortayli (1979) Türkiye %dare Tarihi, pp. 91-2. 
M. Sencer (1974) Toprak Agali grün Kökenleri, p. 73. 
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established in the late thirteenth century it faced feudal-style institutions in Anatolia 
and Rumelia at different stages of development. Kilicbay believes that the feudal 
developments in Anatolia were probably compressed by the Islamisation of 
Anatolia before the Ottoman conquest. The rise of great private property in land 
and the maintenance of the hereditary landed aristocracy was hindered by this 
process since the heritage was divided among the inheritors according to Islamic 
law. Therefore, the most widespread unit of production was the individual peasant 
family cultivation. On the other hand, in Rumelia, there was a threefold 
development: (a) the existence of a Byzantine landed aristocracy; (b) the Latin- 
type feudal structure in Greece and the Aegean Islands; and (c) the existence of 
enforced labour and feudal landed property in Balkans (1982: 335-39). Under 
these conditions, two types of assignment were made: (a) private property as a 
form of endowment for religious purposes; and (b) the timar. The timar system 
evolved over time and reached its peak in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries. 
The state constantly attempted to convert lands held as private property to timar 
in the struggle to control the means of production. However, timarwas gradually 
replaced by tax-farming after the later sixteenth century, although this did not 
mean that tax-farmers or ayan (notables) became the feudal landed aristocracy, 
as is often claimed. Their existence did not change the composition of production. 
Individual peasant family production remained as the characteristic unit of 
production. The relations of production maintained a largely similar structure from 
the peasants' point of view with additional tax burdens. They paid their taxes to 
tax-farmers instead of sipahi. Tax-farmers, such as merchants, ex-state officials, 
ex-sipahis, wealthy peasants families, members of the ulema, or anyone who was 
able to bid for tax-farming, were not interested in the conditions and improvement 
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of production. Their short-term interest was to get back the money they had 
advanced to the state, a sum above which was in their account. In the meantime, 
the state had consistently attempted to centralize the exploitation of surpluses and 
to abolish tax-farming. However, the right to private property was finally 
guaranteed by law in the nineteenth century. An attempt after two land laws to 
provide for the collection of taxes by state officials, whose salaries were paid 
directly by the central state administration, failed. 
It is evident that the feudal land lordship did not exist in the Ottoman social 
formation. Tax-farmers or sipahi were external to the production process 
compared to the landlord in the manorial economy. Timar was neither a private 
property nor provided any rights other than that to collect tax paid in money or in 
kind. Its size in terms of income and the conditions for allocation were set by the 
kanunnames. The sipahi or tax-farmers had neither judicial nor administrative 
authority over the peasants. Both the sipahi and the peasants were judged by the 
kadi, who were the staff of the central judicial system. Hilton indicates the 
importance of the appropriation of public jurisdiction by individuals/ feudal 
landlords, which affected the relations of production (1985: 233-35). If the feudal 
land lordship did not exist, then feudal rent was reduced to mere "tax feudalism", 
or to allocation of the tax revenues from particular districts to definite state 
functionaries, who do not exist independently of their service to the state and 
whose revenues depend on their connection with the state (Hindess and Hirst, 
1979; 232). The direct producer in the Ottoman case was not separated from the 
means of production. However, Timur argues that there existed serf-like producers 
(1979: 168-72). They were crop-sharing slaves, called "ortakcikullar; in relatively 
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big farms around Istanbul and Bursa. It is clear that these producers were marginal 
to the general structure and became independent peasants over time. A manorial 
type institution never existed. In addition, all kinds of enforced labour were 
abolished, in theory, by kanunnames. In fact, there was enforced labour, limited 
to seven working days in a year, for peasants. For example, peasants had to carry 
the sipahi's production to the nearest local market (Barkan, Kanunlar: 113). 
The importance of forms of feudal rent, such as labour rent, and rent in money or 
in kind, should be emphasized since they determine the pattern of relations of 
production. While right to the land as a right of exclusion of the direct producer 
from the land entails the possibility of labour rent, labour rent makes demesne 
production possible. Labour rent means a direct physical separation between the 
labour which reproduces the labourer on land which he rents and the labour of 
producing the surplus product for the landlord on demesne production. In the 
demesne production, the landlord as an agent of the production process co- 
ordinates the demesne production and determines the balance of necessary 
labour and surplus labour. This balance determines the conditions of production 
in the land rented by the direct producers. In the absence of demesne production 
the direct producer, or tenant/villeinage who pays rent in money or in kind, can set 
the means of production in motion. However, this capacity is a limited one. The 
landlord in a manorial economy controls the reproduction of the means of 
production by controlling certain vital means of production, such as pasture lands, 
mills, and dykes and by controlling the size of the units let and the forms of 
tenancy. Therefore, the direct producer is separated from the means of production 
in the concept of the feudal mode of production. If 
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separation/subsumption is possible, then it is not the case under the feudal 
mode of production the direct producer has `possession of the means of 
production'... the concepts possession of/ separation from the means of 
production must be specified for different modes of production ( Hindess and 
Hirst, 1979: 232). 
In the case of money rent and rent in kind, surplus labour is supposed to be 
calculable and a measurable portion of the total product. The surplus product 
appears as a deduction from the product available to the producer. With reference 
to the Ottoman case, we witness the existence of taxes under four main headings. 
It can be seen that Ottoman taxes were at first a composition of pre-Ottoman local 
taxes in the conquered lands, some of which were abolished, or converted into 
cash to acquire relatively a standardized character over time. 27 The first type was 
the land tax, called rift resmi, set at fixed rates. It was the basic tax paid in money 
by all subjects cultivating miri land. The second type was a tax, called öcür, levied 
on agricultural products, such as fruits, honey, and fish, and was paid in kind. It 
was proportionally fixed ranging from one-fifth to one-tenth of the agricultural 
products for sale. The third was called sheep tax, and was levied on livestock, 
such as cattle, pigs, and sheep, offered for sale and paid for in money. Finally, 
there were taxes levied on a temporary base, numerous in quantity, and paid in 
money. Of these, the title-deed tax at fixed rate, or tapu resmi, was the most 
27 
The origin of Ottoman taxes has often been given as Islamic law. See for example D. M. Doan 
(1977) Tarih ve Toplum, p. 55; Z. Kazici (1977) Osmanlilarda Vergi Sistemi, pp. 51-2; H. Cin (1985) 
Osmanli Toprak DOzeni ve Bu Diizenin Bozulmasi, p. 11. The reason for this misunderstanding lies 
in the fact that when the Sunni ideology became the philosophical tool for the Ottoman state 
against the Shia ideology, that of the competing Safavids for power in the Middle East, the tax 
system like most other institutions pragmatically wore an Islamic dress. See Barkan, Kanunlar, 
p. xxxiii for further explanation. 
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important, and was paid by the inheritor of possessed land to the sipahi when his 
(sometimes her) ancestor died. Another was the rift-bozan akcesi, a special tax 
to be paid when a peasant abandons his land and settles in town. But the sipahi 
had the right to pursue and force him/her to return within a ten year period 
(Kiligbay, 1982: 364-71). 
It should be stressed that it is difficult to estimate a general rate of exploitation as 
far as the Ottoman taxes were concerned. Yerasimos assumes that taxes paid by 
peasants provided the whole portion of the surplus. He bases his discussion on 
the assumption that the feudalist nature of Ottoman social formation was taken for 
granted and peasants were in a statue of serfdom (Yerasimos, 1974, Vol I: 236) 
For instance, there were differences in terms of the peasant holdings, and the 
existence of rich, middle, and poor as well as landless peasants. This signifies 
various levels of exploitative relations, not only between the ruling class and the 
subject class, but also within the subject class. It is possible to conceive that while 
some could save a significant portion of surplus, there existed peasants whose 
substantial produce was violated. In addition, the level of exploitation for each 
peasant family could not be the same. Fluctuation in demand, or a bad harvest 
could make a difference, as taxes paid in money were made via the sale of a 
portion of the production as a commodity. 
The Asiatic Mode of Production 
The application of the concept of the Asiatic mode of production28 in Ottoman 
29 
The validity of the concept of the Asiatic mode of production tends to be discussed in terms of the 
facts, real or supposed, of Indian orChinese history. Except for Western Europe, almost the whole 
world has been shown as empirical evidence for the existence of such a mode of production in 
human history. This approach does not situate the Asiatic mode of production in time since the 
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formation is based upon a set of characteristics attributed to this mode of 
production, for example the existence of state property in land, the use of state- 
owned land by individual peasants and the existence of production for self- 
consumption. 29 Its other features are summarised as: the existence of autarkic 
villages, production for immediate consumption; limited manufacturing of products 
for the court and administrative sites; the construction and administration of water 
supplies by the state; and the control of the means of production and the 
distribution of surplus-product by a ruling class with despotic political power, which 
provides the appropriation of the surplus product. There is no large scale merchant 
class and there is limited capital speculation in long-distance trade, money lending 
and agricultural products (O'Leary, 1989: 16-18). 
In terms of theoretical consistency, Hindess and Hirst dismiss the possibility of a 
concept of Asiatic mode of production within Marxist theory since: 
A distinct mode of appropriation of the surplus supposes a distinct structure 
of relations of production. A distinct structure of relations of production 
supposes a set of forces of production which corresponds to the conditions 
of the labour process it establishes. It is for these reasons that the mode of 
appropriation of the surplus product can serve an initial index of the 
existence or non-existence of a mode of production (1979: 183). 
From the perspective of the Asiatic mode of production, it is the state which 
extracts the surplus product. Subsequently, there is no exploitative class 
independent of the state. The mode of appropriation of the surplus product is in 
the form of tax/rent. This is to say, taxes are deducted from the total social 
29 
given fact of tribal formation or state formation makes no difference to the social formation based 
upon the Asiatic mode of production. 
S. DivitcioOlu (1981) Asya Üretim Tarzi ve Osmanli Toplumu. 
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product, the level of which is politically determined. The extraction of this deduction 
depends on the state's possession of the means of coercion. Under these 
conditions, it is impossible to set up an articulate combination of the relations and 
forces of production. For example, if the mode of appropriation of the surplus 
product is in the form of taxation, that is no different in this sense from the taxes 
levied by any other aspect of the state. The exploited and the exploiters take the 
form of a division between the subject and the state. Class relations are 
represented as relations between the state and the subject. The mode of 
appropriation of the surplus corresponds arbitrarily to at least two sets of forces of 
production: the forces entailed in independent peasant cultivation and in 
communal cultivation. The substitution of one set of forces for another does not 
affect or transform the supposed basic mode of production, the distribution of the 
means of production and the relations of the production. Thence, this mode of 
production does not give a convincing explanation for the conditions of existence 
of the state. The well-known answer is that the state arises from functional 
necessity, or in other words, the notion of a hydraulic state as the means of 
organization and coordination of the large scale systematic waterworks. Hydraulic 
agriculture, as in Wittfogel's study (1957), is seen as the main cause of a 
centralized despotism, "Oriental Despotism". The notion of Oriental Despotism 
seems to have developed for political reasons, and is a continuation of the 
Western misconception of the Orient. The ideological power of the 'despots' of 
agricultural civilizations has been exaggerated. Neutral settings, which are neither 
logical nor supported by historical evidence, or hydraulic agriculture was not the 
source of despotic authority. The belief that such despots were to be found 
principally in the Orient does not have any validity. Rather, it reflects an essentialist 
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account within a culturalist perspective. The fundamental problem with this 
functionalist account is that the supposed hydraulic function does not validate the 
existence of the state. O'Leary (1985) argues that this explanation implicitly admits 
that the existence of such a state was planned or contracted by the community. 
Yet it leads to more theoretical problems. There is a logical incompatibility between 
two elements within the Asiatic mode of production. If one employs the 
functionalist account of the state - that the state performs a universal function and 
villages are autarkic, stable and self-sufficient -, this contradicts the theory of 
historical progress. If the villages are self-sufficient, which means they are not 
dependent economically on the state, then the concept of the Asiatic mode of 
production is unable to explain the existence of the state, on the one hand. On the 
other hand, if the villages are not self sufficient, then one of the basic arguments 
of the Asiatic mode of production that it is both stagnant and self-maintaining 
collapses. 
Since the idea of hydraulic function of the state as the condition of its existence 
in the Ottoman case is invalid, two alternative answers have been preferred. The 
first is that the Ottoman state arose from conquest, which is a common view in the 
writings of Western scholars. The notion of conquest implies that the conquering 
people have no social organization or mode of production prior to conquest. 
However, the fact of conquest itself does not produce a state. The second 
argument is an alternative functionalist explanation. Divitrioglu argues that the 
condition of existence of the state was based on the idea that it provided justice 
and peace, identified by the Ibn-i Haldun's "Cycle of Justice", for the subjects. In 
fact, this view is central to studies of Ottoman history. The Cycle of Justice means 
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that the primary purpose of the large mass of the subjects was to produce wealth 
by engaging in cultivation, industry and trade, and to pay taxes to the state. In 
return, the main purpose of the state, represented by the small number of rulers 
who were neither producing wealth nor paying taxes, was to organize the 
exploitation of wealth belonging to the rulers, provide for the expansion and 
defence of this wealth, keep order, and promote Islam while permitting the practice 
of other religions within the rulers' domain. Shaw points out that this Ottoman view 
of the purpose and structure of state and society appears to have come primarily 
from traditional Middle Eastern concepts, which were developed by the Sasanids 
and introduced into Islamic Middle Eastern civilization by Persian bureaucrats in 
the service of Abbasid Caliphs (1976: 112). Nevertheless, , within this 
functionalist 
account of the state, the class structure is not easily defined. The state in the 
Ottoman context is usually identified as the exploiting class. There is no convincing 
answer as to whether or not all of the exploiters were the members of the ruling 
class. There is no doubt that the members of the subject class, such as wealthy 
peasants, merchants, and artisans, were among the exploiters. 
In addition, it is true that the trade of luxury commodities was an important source 
for merchant capital. Studies show that the urban economy dominated rural 
economy. The village economy was not a closed one. The rural surplus was 
mobilized by a mercantile network that extended from humble villages to towns 
and commercial metropolises. There existed extensive trade relations between 
cities and towns, between urban sectors and rural sectors within the Empire, and 
across the borders with the Mediterranean, European, Middle Eastern, African and 
Far Eastern cities. This trade not only involved luxuries, but also agricultural as 
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well as industrial products (Faroqhi 1984; inalcik 1993). 
30 
11 
3.2. Ottoman Modernisation and the Rise of Islamism in the Nineteenth 
Century 
Ottoman social history has often been represented in the framework of the rise of 
the Ottoman Empire from the thirteenth century to the later sixteenth century and 
its subsequent decline which was accompanied by an era of reformation in 
administrative, military and educational institutions from the seventeenth century 
3° into the twentieth century. In the literature, the period between the sixteenth and 
the nineteenth centuries in Ottoman history has been described as a steady 
decline, coupled with the increasing cost of the social and political superstructure, 
and economic collapse. This view is especially based on the notion of the impact 
of the world economy on a peripheral economy which was in the process of semi- 
colonisation. It is characterized as a period of falling population, a steady decline 
in trade, stagnant or bankrupted craft production, inflation, unemployment, 
impoverished agriculture and social unrest. 31 It is clear that in the absence of 
convincing data and substantial research there is a tendency to generalize about 
the sixteenth century economic crisis for the whole of the following three centuries. 
More importantly, periods of decline for the state do not necessarily mean a 
decline in productive forces and the economy, as Owen (1993) emphasises. The 
See the following texts for a general history of the institutions of the Ottoman Empire: B. Lewis 
(1961) The Emergence of Modern Turkey; E. Z. Karal (1962) Osmant, Tarihi; N. Berkes (1964) The 
Development of Secularism in Turkey; S. Yerasimos (1974) Azgeli'ýmis1ik Sürecinde Türkiye; S. 
Shaw (1976) The History of the Ottoman Empire, Vol. I; and S. Shaw and E. K. Shaw (1977) The 
History of the Ottoman Empire, Vol. II. 
See for example, H. Gibb and H. Bowen (1950) Islamic Society and the West, p. 1; B. Lewis 
(1961) The Emergence of Modern Turkey, pp. 26-32; and C. Issawi (1966) The Economic History 
of the Middle East, pp. 3-13. 
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economic and social history of the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries is still 
insufficiently studied and the research which has been done has mainly 
concentrated on price inflation or craft organizations. The few economic history 
studies of the nineteenth century prove that the conventional view of steady 
decline, which is based upon the work of European observers, has no validity for 
the whole realm of the Empire, as each region faced different pressures and acted 
accordingly. 32 
Ottoman modernisation movement featured "state-led change from above", which 
aimed for a political transformation, but not a social change. Initially, the declining 
military power of the Ottoman Empire vis-a-vis European powers gave the stimulus 
for change in the late seventeenth century. Faced with the threat of European 
economic and political expansion, the central question for Ottoman reformers then 
was what ought to be done to save the Empire. There was a consensus that 
without catching up with Western technology, it would be impossible to keep the 
state alive. The military conflict with modern Russia, which was emerging in 
Eastern Europe as a new power in the eighteenth century, and its experience 
under Peter the Great suggested that a vigorous programme of modernisation 
might restore the power of the Empire. Among the Western powers of the 
eighteenth century, France became the object of imitation in part due to her 
diplomatic relationships with the Ottoman Empire. The capitulations in favour of 
France were extended and her trade relationship exceeded those of the other 
powers (Lewis, 1961, p. 45). The influence of Western institutions, ideas, practices 
32 
See for example, D. Quataret (1988) "Ottoman Handicrafts and Industry in the Age of European 
Industrial Hegemony"; F. Tabak (1988) "Local Merchants in Peripherial Areas of the Ottoman 
Empire... "; R. Owen (1993) The Middle East in the World Economy; and ý. Pamuk (1996) The 
Ottoman Empire and the European Capitalism: 1820-1913. 
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in particular and Western life in general came to the Ottoman Empire through 
political, commercial and educational relations between the Ottomans and West 
European countries (Turan 1993). The Young Ottomans, who were affected by 
ideas of nationalism, parliamentary government and democracy with their positivist 
Durkheimian sociology, tried to establish a constitutional government and carry on 
the implementation and expansion of secular policies. Their understanding of the 
Empire and its problems was not based on an analysis of its social structure or on 
a study of the mechanisms of imperialism. When the transformation of military 
institutions in the early nineteenth century required changes in other areas of 
Ottoman administration, new secular administrative, judicial and educational 
institutions were established, while parts of the old institutions, such as Sharia 
courts and medreses, remained intact. The reorganisation of the system of 
government gave the centre more power over the provinces. The further 
development continued with the help of the new bureaucracy, which had few roots 
in the earlier administrative structures. The new civil bureaucracy, with its 
legislative and administrative functions, was eager to accept the secular changes 
in education, administration and the judiciary because that would increase the 
power of the civil bureaucracy over the religious bureaucracy and lead to greater 
centralization of state power. The transformation of the state's administrative, 
judicial and educational institutions into the model of the West occurred between 
1809 and 1826. The new secular schools which became the new source of 
bureaucracy played a significant role in training new elites for power. Education in 
the political life of the Empire continued to have a more significant role than socio- 
economic background, as before. By the time of Mahmud 11 (1808-39), two ideas 
were popularized: the doctrines of government by law; and equality before the law 
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irrespective of race, creed or position (Berkes, 1964, pp. 90,94). These were 
confirmed by the proclamation of the Hatt-1 . Serif of Gülhane (Imperial Edict) in 
1839. 
The reforms were expected to maximize state revenue raised from land tax, as the 
result of a more efficient and centralised level of financial control. The Imperial 
edict also attempted to abolish tax-farming, although it failed as a result of the 
inability to create an alternative system and the opposition of groups that stood to 
lose their former privileges. Despite the appointment of central government 
officials and the establishment of new councils for controlling the rural tax revenue, 
a considerable part of the rural surplus based on the traditional system still 
remained largely unchanged in the hands of those groups who had previously 
controlled the surplus. Under pressure of increasing revenue to cover the cost of 
reforms and continuing wars, the Ottoman administration attempted to increase 
the duties on internal and external trade, but they lacked sufficient political power 
to change the terms of agreement signed with other countries, such as Britain. 
This was followed by increasing foreign loans and resulted in the establishment of 
the Ottoman Public Debt Administration in 1881, which was controlled by foreign 
creditors. The Administration produced a system of international financial control. 
Although the essential aim was to safeguard the position of those who held shares 
in the Ottoman public debt, the secondary aim emerged as the opening up of the 
economy to further European economic expansion. The development of 
transportation, especially railways, was important for this expansion. The Ottoman 
government, and later the Young Turks before the First World War, were too 
dependent on European loans to challenge this method of economic control 
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(Owen, 1981: 191-200). However, it is important to highlight the features of the 
Ottoman Empire in the process of integration into the world economy which 
distinguished it from the formal colonies and informal empires. The existence of 
a relatively strong central state structure, associated with conditions of rivalry for 
greater political and economic advantage and influence between the major 
imperialist powers had significant consequences in terms of the mode of 
integration into the world economy. The political, military and fiscal crisis of the 
Empire provided the competing imperialist powers with frequent opportunities to 
promote the integration process and obtain commercial privileges, for example the 
Free Trade Treaty with Britain of 1838, or concessions to venture a major 
investment project. One of the salient features, as Pamuk (1987) highlights, was 
the struggle between the central bureaucracy and those social classes, such as 
merchants and export-oriented landlords, who favoured more rapid and direct 
integration. This is because the bureaucracy, rather than these social forces, had 
the upper hand in the process, and the European powers had to deal directly and 
reach an accommodation with the central bureaucracy. Conditions of imperial 
rivalry provided the bureaucracy with the means to hinder the direct intervention 
of the imperialist power and its agents, in order to facilitate greater penetration of 
world capital. The bureaucracy during the nineteenth century was still able to 
maintain control over some areas of the economy. In the areas of small and 
medium-sized agricultural holdings the bureaucracy worked against large estates 
to preserve its fiscal base, and prevent political challenges from the provinces. 
One important consequence of the era of reforms was the role of government in 
attempting to encourage the development of industry and agriculture. The 
reformers were aware of the fact that the growth of productive resources was 
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essential for general development. At first, the factories were initiated by the 
government in order to supply the demands of a modernised army, e. g. uniforms 
and equipment. Due to basic problems, such as limited financial resources or the 
growing technological distance from Western Europe, only a few textile factories 
could function until the end of the First World War. In addition, the social structure, 
a weakened international position and Ottoman financial bankruptcy put limits on 
the types of economic policies pursued. Similarly in agriculture, efforts to increase 
production by the introduction of new techniques and means were small in scale, 
to influence the ways of the millions of peasant cultivators. Yet the agricultural 
sectorwitnessed a significant increase in production in the late nineteenth century. 
In the absence of reliable data, it could be estimated from the statistics related to 
the allocation of land to various agricultural products in Anatolia that there was a 
considerable increase in land that was subject to commercial agriculture based 
largely on the cultivation and export of a variety of cash crops. It was, however, an 
uneven development. It is impossible to present a general picture of the 
agricultural sector within the Empire. The spread of monetary transactions, the 
enlargement of the scope for capital accumulation and the growing involvement 
of peasants and artisans in the sphere of exchange all signified a gradual, though 
limited in scale, transformation of basic economic relationships. The Ottoman 
economy had gained the character of a dual economy, in which a large 
subsistence sector and a commercial sector were closely linked to European 
markets. Ottoman agriculture was transformed to some extent by the externally 
generated demand for agricultural products, the subsequent commercialization of 
agriculture itself (initially in the coastal regions), the emergence of local notables 
as clientele commercial classes with their increasing wealth and power, and the 
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adoption of private ownership, despite the attempts of the central administration 
throughout the nineteenth century to reverse the process. As a result, land 
became an attractive field of investment, and owners of export-oriented regions 
the landed notables began to exploit their holdings in new ways (Sunar, 1974: 68- 
9). However, as Owen emphasises, the impact and spread of commercial farming 
should not be exaggerated, as small peasant production remained the basis of 
Anatolian agriculture at the end of the Ottoman period (1981; 208). The extent of 
commercialization took place within a dependent economy in which any 
commercial production which took place did not become the internal market. The 
Ottoman economy became an appendage of European markets. In the absence 
of a profitable native industry, agriculture continued to account for a large part of 
the Empire's total economic output (Keyder, 1987: 25-48). 
It is important to emphasize that the emerging bourgeoisie class in the nineteenth 
centurywas largely composed of foreigners and members of ethnic minorities. The 
control and ownership of the means of production were largely in the hands of 
foreign capital and its agents, mostly ethnic minorities, from whence the capitalist 
relations of production emerged. European powers interfered in the form of 
extending protection to individual Ottoman subjects, mostly belonging to Christian 
minority groups, by issuing an official patent of protection or a foreign passport. 
This sort of interference in favour of individuals had the effect of granting to 
members of minority groups in the empire an extra-territorial exemption from many 
Ottoman laws and taxes. As a result, the conflict between the emerging 
bourgeoisie, who were mainly Christian, and the bureaucracy, whose interest lay 
in controlling the transformation of the social structure while safeguarding their 
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privileged position within the surplus-extraction relationships, was seen in terms 
of the potential separatism of growing nationalism and the rise of Christian 
comprador class (Keyder, 1988: 193). Subsequently, the idea of promoting a 
"national economy" by generating a national, Muslim bourgeoisie was developed 
during the Young Turk era (1908-1918), under circumstances inwhich the balance 
of power between Muslims and non-Muslims shifted in the favour of the latter. 
Nationalist movements in the Balkans and later in the Arab provinces resulted in 
the loss of large territories. In the nineteenth century, before the Turkism of the 
Young Turks, faced with the political disintegration of non-Muslim and non-Turkish 
minorities, coupled with integration into the world economy, two ideologies 
emerged, namely Ottomanism and Islamism. They aimed to keep the unity of the 
Empire and offer alternative approaches to modernisation against the 
Westernisation of Tanzimat reformers. 
Ottomanism 
Ottomanism's first and most important aim was the effort to combat separatist 
movements by proclaiming the equality of all Ottoman subjects. This doctrine of 
Ottomanism had originated in the era of Sultan Mahmud II, but found its most 
formal expression in the Hatt-i Serif of Gülhane (Imperial Edict) in 1839. It 
confirmed and extended the rights and privileges of minority groups, but treated 
them as millets, rather than nationalities. It is obvious that this policy hoped to 
forestall any greater discontent among non-Muslims. Any separatist movement 
that reaffirmed religious freedom and millets' privileges might prevent the 
European powers from interfering in the Ottoman domestic affairs (Davison, 1977: 
39-41). These measures were followed by a new law on nationality in 1869. In 
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addition to setting up modern secular criteria for nationality, it stipulated that all 
persons within Ottoman territory would be considered Ottoman subjects in the 
absence of proof to the contrary, and that no Ottoman subjects could acquire 
foreign citizenship without the consent of the central bureaucracy (Bab-i Ali). 
However, the Ottomanist policies proved to be unsuccessful in building an 
Ottoman nation against the nationalist movements in the Balkans. The 
disintegration of non-Muslim population in the Empire led to the second alternative. 
Islamism 
The nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries witnessed the manifestation of 
Islam under conditions in which the Westernist reformation was seen by Muslim 
masses to be in favour of non-Muslim minorities and European powers, under 
circumstances in which the Ottoman Empire was subjected to the political and 
economic expansion of European imperialism. The common people did not share 
the Westernist perspective, which favoured casting aside the old system of (mainly 
religious) values, in order to develop a new morality based on the Western system 
of values. Modernization to the new Westernist was a cultural and moral issue, 
rather than a material one. Whereas Westernists found the remedy in imitating the 
West and saw Islam as an obstacle to change, Muslim people found the 
introduction of European methods to be the cause of their decline, compared to 
the prospering situations of minorities. Under such circumstances, Islam was given 
a new role, the voice of protest. Islamist ideology offered a focus of protest, 
although its content was shaped by the level at which it was utilised. It is important 
to emphasize that Islam both at the beginning and at the end of the nineteenth 
century referred to divergent realities. Mardin classifies the Ottoman Islam into four 
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categories: (a) the official Islam of the state; (b) the heterodox Islam of mysticism 
and mystical order of dervishes; (c) the Islam of crafts and merchants; and (d) Shia 
Islam which appealed to the nomads (1977: 282). 
At the societal level, secularising reforms had made Islam more Islamic in nature. 
The religion emerged in its own well-delineated field. Islam was perceived as a 
source of political opposition. When the traditional social institutions, such as craft 
guilds or religious orders, broke down in the nineteenth century, there were no 
political institutions or central ideologies to reduce the gap between the elites and 
the ordinary people. 
At the intellectual level, Islamism was an ideology which originated between 1867 
and 1873 and was developed by Ottoman intellectuals such as Namik Kemal and 
Ali Suavi, who shared the Western orientation and social and professional 
background of the Tanzimat leaders, as an alternative approach to modernism and 
a response to Westernism, which saw Islam as an obstacle to change. It is 
important to mention that in Ottoman context, it was the idea of progress that 
dominated the discourse of Islamists rather than for example that of jihad or 
imperialism. Ottoman Islamism represented a "modernist" tendency which 
attempted to address the challenges posed by changing international power 
relations and adjust the political framework while retaining the "Islamic rationale" 
of the state. 33 The origin of reformist Islamism as an intellectual movement was 
founded on the reinterpretation of Islam as a form of political ideology as a result 
33 
Voll (199) gives a classification of Islamist reformism, namely adaptionism, conservatism, the 
modernist tendency and individual styles. Though these cannot be exclusive, this is an attempt 
to construct "ideal types" for comparision. 
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of the combination of traditional Islamic values with ideologic forms of thought. 
Türköne (1994) strongly argues despite the common assertion within the literature, 
Afghani's thoughts were not original. They were first expressed by Namik Kemal 
and his colleagues in Istanbul and preceded the pan-Islamic policies of the 
Hamidian era. 34 The bureaucratic reformism of the Ottoman Empire which began 
in the late eighteenth century and continued throughout the nineteenth century 
was undertaken in a climate in which Westernists and Islamists alike concentrated 
on the idea of "progress" and the means of modernizing the political and 
administrative structures of the Empire. Therefore, Islamism and Westernism 
converged on the necessity of change, but diverged on methods. Islamists 
condemned Westernists and the Restoration Reformation for their blind imitations 
of the superficial aspects of Western culture instead of its political institutions and 
principles. They supported the idea of limited borrowing from the West while 
keeping the Islamic identity of the state, and insisted that reforms had to be 
consistent with the precepts of Islamic law. The Japanese example of borrowing 
European sciences and techniques was the Islamist's favourite model. It was 
technology, but not customs, morals or modes of living that were to be acquired 
from the West. While the superiority of the West in science, technology and 
political culture was acknowledged, it was emphasised that Islam is a reasonable 
religion which prescribes progress. Although, their terminology was based upon 
Islam, their intellectual inspiration came from Western tradition of political thought, 
for example from ideas of Plato, Descartes, Montesquieu, Locke and Rousseau. 
Islamism reflected an Islamist approach to the problem of government and religion 
was given a major role in its schemes of reform. Islamists saw Islam as the source 
34 
For a similar argument see Keddie ( 1994) "Sayyid Jamal al-Din 'al-Afghani'", p. 12. 
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of social cohesion in the Durkhemian fashion, and argued for the use of Islam in 
the process of development. Islamists attempted to provide an Islamic rationale 
for modern ideas and institutions, albeit a selective approach/critical borrowing that 
was expected not to contradict the culture. They emphasised and further 
developed the principles of Islam which, they thought, were open to change. The 
Islamic principles, such as consultation for democracy and shura for parliament, 
were reinterpreted with reference to the holy texts and their implementation in the 
first century of Islam, and were given a new content. Islamism was a modernising 
ideology in its emphasis upon "progress" and "democratization", which were also 
among the main themes of Westernists. Islamists advocated the establishment of 
constitutional government and argued that Islam with its emphasis on consultation 
not only justified but called for parliamentary government. For Namik Kemal, the 
Quran was the ultimate source according to which the political organisation of 
believers had to be determined. "The Islamic state" was a kind of Republic at its 
inception because of the existence of the principle of "the will of community", but 
inconsistent with Sharia (Mardin, 1962: 269). To Islamists progress, freedom and 
democracy were intrinsic to Islam. Drawing their example from the French 
constitution, the establishment of the representative government, and of the 
separation of powers, and the promulgation of constitution, which had to be in 
harmony with Islamic law, were inevitable fora progressive political system. Namik 
Kemal wrote on constitutionalism, freedom and patriotism both in Istanbul and in 
European exile. He struggled to provide a synthesis of Western political thought 
and Islamic principles by comparing the ideas of the Enlightenment regarding 
government with the traditional political thought of Islam. This heavily relied on the 
vocabulary of Islamic political theory, such as justice, contract of investitures, 
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consensus of community and consultation (Mardin 1962). 
At the state level, Islam acquired a new political and ideological cast after the 
failure of Ottomanism. Islam was utilized to create a central value system and was 
promoted as a source of group identity for the Muslim population, whose 
proportion had increased significantly with large losses of territory and population. 
Under the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid (1876-1908), a form of pan-Islamism 
became official policy. The Sultan as the Caliph of all the Muslim community used 
religious orders to propagate the idea of the Ottoman Empire as the protector of 
Islamic population (Mardin, 1977: 285). Pan-Islamism, however, collapsed with the 
rise of Arab nationalism. According to pan-Turkists, while Ottomanism had proved 
a failure, Islamism had won only limited success. Therefore, Turkism was the one 
option left. It would rally the loyalties of the dominant Turkish race within the 
Ottoman Empire and reinforce it with that of the many millions of Turks in Russia 
and elsewhere beyond Ottoman frontiers. 
Turkism 
Until the nineteenth century, the Turkish sense of national identity was suppressed 
and members of the ruling group thought of themselves not as Turks, nor as 
35 
supporters of a Turkish state, but as Ottomans who served the state and religion 
(Lewis 1962; Lewis 1974). 35 The Millet, the religious community to which an 
The early signs of a Turkish national interest are seen in the fourteenth century when some books 
about the history of ancient Turkish tribes were translated from Persian to Turkish. The "Oguz 
legend" remained part of the official historiographic myth until the end of the Empire. However, the 
deflection of the Ottoman Empire away from the Turkish identity was realized after the conquest 
of Istanbul in 1453; the rise of the Turkish but Shia power of the Safavidis in Iran; and the conquest 
of Syria and Egypt in the sixteenth century. The title of Caliphate was acquired afterwards by 
Ottoman Sultan. 
individual belonged, was the determining factor of identity, as stated above. 
Nationalist uprising within the Empire led to the emergence of Turkish nationalism. 
Since Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism failed, pan-Turkism became the dominant 
policy in the Young Turk era (1908-18). The Ottoman reaction to Balkan 
separatism, the Tatar revolt against Russian pan-Slavism, the response of Turkish 
and Tatar intellectuals to the new ideas and examples set by European 
nationalism, and the renewed Turkish pride in Turkological discovery at a time of 
Ottoman defeat and Muslim abasement all combined to encourage the growth of 
Turkism, of a new political movement, based not on a dynasty, a faith, or a state, 
but on the people, the Turkish people, in their vast territories extending from 
Europe to the Pacific. Although the terms Turan and Pan-Turanism remained in 
occasional use, the movement was in effect pan-Turkism, for the Muslim Turkish 
people in Turkey and Central Asia showed little interest in the putative Christian 
or Pagan Turks. For the Turkish exiles and immigrants from the Russian Empire, 
pan-Turanism or pan-Turkism was a political programme which implied political 
unification from the Adriatic Sea to China into a single state. Among the Turks of 
Turkey this programme won only limited support. Their interest in the movement 
was social, cultural and literary, and concerned with a greater awareness of their 
separate identity as Turks (Lewis, 1962: 345). In particular, Ziya Gökalp sought 
to promote the national revival of the Turkish language. Turkism was different from 
pan-Turkism. Gökalp's Turkism was not based on any race or ethnicity. He defined 
nation as the source of all and morality, and identified it with the love of country 
and service of the nation. He argued that it was not race, but common culture, 
such as language and religion, that determined the nation. The word Turk had 
become a name which was applied only to the Turks of Turkey and those who 
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shared the Turkish culture of Turkey (Gökalp, 1968: 19). The principle was the 
composition of Turkish-speaking Muslims into a Turkish nation. This meant 
therefore that non-Muslims who lived in Turkey were Turks in respect of citizenship 
but not of nationality. This was because, from Gökalp's perspective, Islam was the 
factor which strengthened patriotic sentiment. In his opinion, the Turks should 
accept from Western civilization only its material achievements and scientific 
methods, and keep Islam as the basis of morality. The growth of nationalism since 
1908 had accustomed the new generation of Turks, who were educated in modern 
schools, to the idea of Turkishness, although the idea of the territorial state 
resisted religious and dynastic loyalties. The adoption of Turkish nationalist ideas 
created great potential for political action against the Ottoman regime, which was 
accused of being the agent of foreign interest. Turkism finally resulted in capturing 
state power in 1909 through the Young Turks, represented by the Committee for 
Union and Progress (CUP), which was initially governed by a military oligarchy. 
The Parliament and the Constitution, which were first adopted in 1876, but 
suspended in1878, were immediately reinstated. For the following decade the CUP 
was the sole centre of power. The Balkan Wars (1911-1914) constituted a turning 
point and the leaders of the CUP moved rapidly towards a policy of Turkish 
nationalism. After taking over effective control of the state apparatus, the CUP 
attempted to nationalise the ownership of the means of production and to create 
an indigenous commercial capital by supporting the emergence of a national 
bourgeoisie among the Muslims. However, the First World War broke out in 1914 
The emergence of a Muslim merchant during the First World War did not manage 
to entirely replace the economic dominance of the Christian bourgeoisie. However, 
the expulsion of this bourgeoisie during and after the war partly solved the problem 
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for Muslim merchants. The CUP ceased to function in 1918 after the defeat and 
partition of the ottoman Empire. 
However, the transformation of political regime to a parliamentary and 
constitutional monarchy was also shared by Turkists, the Turkist approach to 
modernisation differed from that of Westernists and of Islamists in terms of 
religion. For Turkists the entire question of religious reform consisted of taking 
measures to secularize religion and make it a matter of conscience by subjecting 
the legal aspects of Islam to secular legislation. The reform of medreses was not 
for them a matter of religious reform, but a matter of educational reform. Beginning 
with the 1908 Revolution, the recognition of the need to reform religious institutions 
became universal. The Westernists, who had not believed these institutions 
capable of any reform, and even the Islamists, who had never before 
acknowledged that any alterations were required, took a serious and hopeful 
interest in religious reorganisation. The religious reforms proposed in the Young 
Turk era included the abolition of the mystic religious orders and the translation of 
Quran into Turkish. The Islamists asked for a reform in the methods of teaching 
religion; the adaption of theology to the requirements of the age; and the 
unification of legal doctrines for the Muslim schools. The main reforms carried out 
by the Young Turks were: (a) the elimination of the ýFeyhülislam from the cabinet; 
(b) the transfer of the Sharia courts from the jurisdiction of Feyhülislam to that of 
the Ministry of Justice; (c) the removal of Evkaf (Muslim pious foundations) 
administration from the jurisdiction of ýeyhülislam; and (d) the transfer of the 
medreses from the control of yFeyhülislam to that of the Ministry of education. This 
last step was a serious move towards the complete secularization of education and 
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the termination of the dualism of the previous period (Berkes, 1964: 416). 
However, considering the political destruction of the Empire and the level of 
development, which determined that traditional institutions were still the only 
available means of education for many, it was under the new state that these 
reforms were believed to be necessary for political authority to be effective. As will 
be seen in the next chapter, in the development of the Turkish Republic the 
religious element was eliminated and Westernization exercised a growing 
influence. The foundations of Kemalism, therefore, were laid by Turkism and 
Westernism, but not by Islam. The new idea of a territorial nation-state based on 
the Turkish nation in Turkey appeared in the early days of the Kemalist 
modernisation. The National Pact (Misak-i Milli) of the Independence struggle of 
1919-23, contained the basic demands of the nationalist movement in Anatolia, 
and mentioned not the Turk but the Ottoman Muslim majority, united in religion 
and demanding the undivided sovereignty of people. Soon it became clear that 
Kemalist Turkism dismissed the notion of a larger entity beyond national frontiers, 
whether defined by religion or race (Lewis, 1962: 346). However, religion continued 
to be one of the essential ingredients of identity. For instance, Turkish-speaking 
Orthodox Christians from Anatolia were classified as Greeks and sent to Greece, 
while children of Muslim Bosnians, Albanians, Kurds, Chechens, and Arabs 
settled in Anatolia were accepted as Turks. Non-Muslims were known as Turkish 
citizens, but never as Turks. 
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Chapter 4: State Capitalism and the Question of Religion in Politics 
From the perspective of the theoretical framework explained in Chapter two, this 
chapter analyses the Republican development model within a corporatist form of 
society. Its main focus is based upon what Leftwich (1994) characterises as the 
forms and features of the "developmental state". It is argued that an analysis of the 
features of the Republican state and its relationships to social classes is crucial in 
order to contextualize Islamism in the development process and the changing 
nature of social relations. This is to say that when the intensification of the 
exploitative relations inherent in the national bourgeois developmental approach 
accelerated the growth of economic inequalities, which was accompanied by 
excessive use of political repression, the mobilisation of religious rhetoric as an 
effective way of political protest brought various centres of opposition together 
against the authoritarian single-party regime. In this context, the chapter argues 
the structural and ideological impediments of Republican politics to the 
participation of subordinate classes in the political decision-making processes. 
This refers to the fact that the distinguishing characteristic of the developmental 
state is that her political purposes and institutional structures have been 
developmentally-driven, while her developmental objectives have been politically- 
driven (Leftwich, 1994: 9). This is done with reference to the rise of the Democrat 
Party to power with an overwhelming majority, 53 per cent of the general vote 
securing it 86.2 percent of the seats in the Grand national Assembly in 1950 
(Lewis: 1974: 146). After Turkey opted for multi-party politics. It is often claimed 
that this was the first stage of "Islamic revivalism". This chapter highlights the 
shortcomings of such explanations, which tend to present the phenomenon in 
terms of a clash between the "modernising centre and reactionary (traditional) 
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peripheryi36 or a clash over "cultural cleavages". Possible similarities with the case 
of the Welfare Party are discussed particularly where the DP's removal from 
power by a military coup in 1960 is concerned. This approach necessitates an 
analysis of the role of the military establishment, which is an important component 
of state capitalism, in the political sphere, often as the primary political functionary. 
The general framework of the developmental state (Leftwich 1994) utilised in this 
and the next chapters in order to explain the nature of Republican politics includes 
the following: (a) a revolutionary seizure of state power from above during the 
Independence War (1919-22) and in 1923 the establishment of the Republic, 
which based its legitimacy upon nationalism and a wish to "catch up" with the 
West; (b) the dominance of a single party, which was necessary for promoting 
state autonomy, and was able to concentrate sufficient power, autonomy and 
capacity at the centre. This helped to shape and encourage the achievement of 
explicit developmental objectives by establishing and promoting the condition of 
economic growth through, for example, short and long term planning, which was 
advisory for the private sector, and the establishment of state economic 
enterprises in the1930s, and of the state planning organisation in 1961. 
Corporatism was at the centre of this mode of politics; (c) the limitation of power 
and participation in national decisions to almost the highest level of bureaucracy, 
civil and military, but this also included intimate relations with the private sector; (d) 
the elimination and subordination of political groups and socio-economic classes. 
36 
It has been a mainstream approach to explain the political, social, cultural or religious history of 
Turkey in terms of the two-tiered model, namely "centre and periphery" (Mardin 1973; Heper 
1980), i. e. modern and traditional, or "high and popular realms" (Mardin 1969 and 1977). Yet the 
concepts fail to specify what concrete social groups fall within this purview. This approach 
continues to bear the mark of the modernisation paradigm and treats either side as a united, 
distinctive, homogenous entity in itself. 
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The autonomy of the highly centralised bureaucracy was embedded in a web of 
ties with non-state actors, such as intellectuals and the dominant urban and rural 
socio-economic groups, for whom such an integration of interests was beneficial, 
since they were very weak in challenging the power of the bureaucracy; (e) shifting 
coalitions of interests, with reference to the establishment of the DP in the late 
1946, and the intensification of intra-elite and policy conflicts, with respect to the 
establishment of the National Order Party (NOP), the predecessor of the Welfare 
Party, in 1970; and (f) the existence of a high degree of repression and 
suppression of civil rights. 
The omnipresence of the state in Turkish society and politics, its determining 
economic role, its principal command of resources and political organizations and 
its `pronounced autonomy' vis-ä-vis the society, put the state itself at the centre of 
all national political questions. The analysis is structured around the concept of the 
Republican state in the context of Kemalism and Kemalist modernisation, the 
overall role of the state in society and the distribution of state power, and focuses 
on ideological and bureaucratic elements with reference to the political economy 
of the period 1923-50. The state apparatus is conceptualized as a politico- 
ideological form, or a historically accumulated network of institutions, norms and 
values whose reproductive functions permeate all the constituent dimensions of 
the social formation. The reproductive role performed by the state is explained in 
terms of its own reproductive imperatives as a historical form of political 
domination, based on a specific set of material and ideological foundations which 
privilege certain policies, strategies and actors above others. It is intended that 
such an analysis will prepare a comparative framework for identifying similar 
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tendencies, beliefs and attitudes between two ideologies, Kemalism and Islamism. 
Each of these bases its raison d'etre upon social-engineering, in terms of some 
key concepts such as the notion of state, politics and society and the construction 
of identity, although they represent two rival ideologies in the first instance, in 
terms of their attitudes towards the mode of modernisation, the West and the role 
of religion in society. 
4.1. Modernisation, Kemalism and the State 
4.1.1. Literature Review 
The assumptions of the modernisation paradigm37 using both evolutionary theory 
and functionalist theory, have constituted the key frameworkfor studies on Turkish 
political life as well as on the phenomenon of "Islamism". Evolutionary theory 
assumes that social change is gradual, unidirectional and progressive. Societies 
move from the primitive, simple and undifferentiated traditional stage to the 
advanced, complex and differentiated modern stage (Rostow 1964; Levy 1967). 
It is argued that modernisation, which is assumed to be an irreversible and 
progressive process, is not only inevitable but desirable. This is because, from the 
functionalist point of view, modernisation is a systematic process which involves 
37 
changes (for the better) in all aspects of social behaviour, personal, social and 
political. It is accompanied by differentiation, which refers to the process of 
progressive separation and specialization of roles and institutional spheres in the 
For a comparison of the main arguments of modernisation theory in analysing change in terms of 
economic, social, political and individual spheres, see for example D. Lerner (1958) The Passing 
of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East; S. N. Eisenstadt (1963) Modernization: Growth 
and Diversity; P. F. Sugar (1964) "Economic and Political Modernization: Turkey"; D. Apter 
(1965) The Politics of Modernization; L. W. Pye (1966) "The Concept of Political Development"; N. 
J. Smelser (1966) "Mechanism of Change and Adjustment to Change"; F. X. Sutton (1966) 
"Analyzing Social System"; D. E. Smith (1970) Religion and Political Development; W. W. Rostow 
(1971) The Stages of Economic Growth; and A. Inkeles and D. H. Smith (1974) Becoming Modern. 
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political system. Hence it is argued that a modernised political system has a better 
capacity to handle the functions of national identity, legitimacy, participation and 
distribution than does a traditional political system (Smelser 1966; Coleman 1968). 
One important point is that the concept of modernity has been presented as a 
fixed arrangement which was mainly inspired by Western societies, and religion 
in this context loses its validity. Most literature on modernisation strongly 
emphasises the idea that secularization is a necessary component of 
modernisation, as mentioned before. It is often claimed that it was the secular 
process of social change which modernised countries (Lerner1964; Apter 1965; 
Smith 1974). Smelser argues that during the process of modernisation, the values 
governing the economic, political and scientific spheres become more established 
in their own right and are no longer sanctioned directly by religious belief, but by 
an autonomous rationality (1966: 32-3). Therefore, modernisation is seen as 
transformative (progressive) in the sense that traditional structures and values 
must be totally replaced by a set of new values, for example nationalism, in order 
for a society to become modern. However, in these distinctions, the static, sacred, 
undifferentiated character of tradition tends to be overstated and it is turned into 
a blanket term to cover all forms of social life other than the modern (industrial) 
type. Such an approach runs the risk of confusing the abstract nature of ideal 
types with empirical reality, and projecting the Western experience as a mono- 
causal, uniform and inevitable process (Bendix, 1967: 314). 
A large portion of the scholarly work on the Turkish politics and state bears the 
mark of the culturalist perspective and is confined to the description of institutional 
arrangements and analysis of the manifestation of certain cultural peculiarities 
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which may occur in such institutions. Many studies have illustrated either how 
patron-client relationships prevailed at all levels of the state and society (Mardin 
1969; Avcioglu 1973; Sencer 1974; Evin 1988)01 how the ideological and religious 
beliefs of society have influenced both popular and elite perceptions of the role of 
the state, the arrangement of power within it, and the outcomes of this 
arrangement in the "top-down" modernisation process (Berkes 1964; Tuncay 1981; 
Köker 1990; Turan 1991). Or they have focussed on the style of government and 
on various political and institutional manifestations of the country's culture within 
the framework of its state (Karpat 1959; Heper 1977 and 1985; Dodd 1979; 
Tachau 1984; Akarli 1985). In most of the analyses, the state machinery or the 
state elite is seen to operate in the interests of the nation, and so it is seen as 
neutral. Culturally determined elite-pluralism, along with its association with the 
modernization endeavour bears the influence of functionalism for political analysis. 
The state is perceived as an agent which maintains order, particularly in the face 
of increased differentiation, and economic and political crises. This image is 
particularly apparent in the interpretations of military intervention in politics, which 
will be explained further in this chapter. 
The study of social and political institutions using the concept of patrimonialism, 
denoting pre-modernity has been very influential. The pioneering works of Heper 
(1974 and 1977) on bureaucracy borrow Weberian concepts of "patrimonial 
bureaucracy" and "legal-rational bureaucracy". These two concepts are employed 
to indicate the institutional differences between the Ottoman Empire (pre- 
modern)and the Republican (modern) regime. The common approach is to classify 
the (modernising) state and/or society within the framework of a sharp division into 
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two polar sets, i. e. traditional versus modern. It suggests that the movement 
between the two poles of traditionality and modernity must be directional and 
unilinear. This means that modernity and tradition are antithetical, exclusive and 
self-regulating. Peoples, values, institutions and societies could be either 
traditional or modern, bearing the influence of Maine's primitive-complex society, 
Durkheim's mechanical-organic solidarity and Weber's sacred-secular polity. 
Lifchez highlights the need to free Turkish studies from the "schizophrenic quality 
of modern Turkish cultural life... with its sharp cleavage between an 'enlightened' 
elite of reformers and an `ignorant' mass of traditionalist or reactionaries" (1992: 
315). 
As seen above, the core emphasis has been upon the notion of evolutionary 
change - from traditional to transitional, and finally to modern, which is 
characterised as progressive and coupled with secularization. The subsequent 
emphasis has been on the "progressive" role of the state which commands this 
transition and is adhered to Kemalism. Since the main stream of Turkish literature 
a priori accepts and emphasises that Kemalism as a revolutionary ideology is 
progressive, modernising and has the potential to move towards democracy, 38 the 
state is therefore associated with modernity. However, the concept of being 
progressive in the Turkish context is ambiguous and needs to be carefully applied. 
The name "progressive" was given to those reformists who pressed for the 
39 
See fora comparison, E. Kongar (1981) Atatürk Devrim ve Kurarnlarr, S. Kili (1983) Kemalism; 
and S. Savran (1985) "Osmanli'dan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye'de Burjuva Devrimi". While the first two 
employ the modernisation paradigm, the last applies historical-materialism to address the 
transformative feature of Kemalism, so that both approaches converge on the progressiveness 
of its nature. For example, M. Heper (1985) The State Tradition in Turkey, argues that Kemalism 
provided a "transient transcendental state" with normative foundations to prepare the people for 
democracy. See also N. Berkes (1964) The Development of Secularism in Turkey. 
122 
adoption of representative forms of government and equal protection under 
secular law in the nineteenth century, as mentioned in the previous chapter. This 
was despite the fact that the establishment of representative institutions did not 
mean a process of democratization. This is to say, the modernisation of political 
institutions did not bring political rights and liberties for the general public until the 
second half of the 1940s. In addition, the concept of being "progressive" 
underwent a transition in its meaning with the transition to multi-party politics. It 
was associated then more with participatory democracy, and created a confusion 
through identifying progressive reformism with a progressive attitude towards the 
operations of participatory democracy. Reformism, however, principally aimed at 
modernising the state ratherthan liberalizing political competition (Evin, 1988: 210- 
1). Political development is mainly understood in terms of political stability based 
on the capacity for purposeful and orderly change. To an extent, this excludes 
democracy as incompatible with planned development. Stability is, therefore, an 
arbitrary support of the status quo and leads to the control of social forces in order 
to maintain it. 
Moreover, the issue of secularism has been the key explanatory framework for 
most analyses of "Islamism" since the rise of the DP to power. Because Turkey is 
seen as undergoing a process of transition from a traditional society towards a 
modern one in which religion is supposed to lose its importance and become a 
matter of personal conscience, according to the premises of the modernisation 
theory, the literature has mostly concentrated upon explaining the causes of 
religious continuation in political as well as societal life. Thefavoured question has 
been "whether Islamism poses a political threat to the survival of the modern state" 
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(Lewis 1952; Karpat 1959; Landau 1976; Dodd 1979; Heper 1981; Toprak 1981; 
Rustow 1987). From this point of view, efforts were directed towards locating the 
faults of society with reference to its culture or political regime in order to offer an 
explanation for Islamism, although much of this discussion has been abstract and 
speculative rather than providing any detailed knowledge of religious practices or 
understandings of mass public. "The success of Islam" in the late twentieth century 
has dominantly been analysed within the framework of the culturalist perspective. 
The problem has often been described as a struggle between the modernising 
state and a religious society. Studies have focussed upon the relationships 
between Islam and modernisation, secularism and democracy, often upon its 
incompatibility. Islamism is seen as an abnormal phenomenon in the modern era. 
In this context, "the Turkish-Islamist Synthesis" (TIS) has been seen one of the 
main causes of rising Islamism since the1980s (Toprak 1990). The TIS was 
formulated by the rightist Intellectuals' Heart in the early 1980s to integrate 
nationalists and Islamists. It was propagated by some top state elites then working 
for the government of the Motherland party. It obviously attempted to appeal to 
both religious and national values in order to prevent the high degree of political 
polarisation that was experienced in the 1970s and mobilise religious support for 
developmental causes. It seems that it contained similar aspirations with 
Kemalism, for example social unity, solidarity and the production of model 
individuals through indoctrination. It could be argued that the TIS was an attempt 
to shape and patronise "Islamist tendencies" by the state. However, it is impossible 
to measure its impact. To assume that people are more susceptible to one 
ideology than another, both of which are supported by the state, is very simplistic. 
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The Turkish fixation with secularism, as Mardin (1977) indicates, has often led to 
the simplification of the question of modernity in terms of secularisation and has 
removed the issue of religion from its psychological and social context. In this vein, 
religion is seen as the antithesis of modernity. 39 Yalman points out that: "An entire 
generation was educated thinking religion to be some evil and irrational force of 
more orthodoxy and tradition... The intellectuals from Ankara and Istanbul had for 
political reasons completely misunderstood what Islam or religion was all about" 
(Yalman, 1969, p. 47 cited in Tapper, 1990: 7). 
4.1.2. Modernisation and Kemalism 
Turkish modernisation based its core struggle that would determine the essence 
of the new regime upon the question of religion and state. A secular-nation state 
was to replace the old notion of the Ottoman state. The official discourse is 
formulated around a theme of tension between "pre-modernity and modernity". 
This is to say, the Ottoman past represents pre-modernity, backwardness and 
reaction, whereas the Republican present represents progress, rationality and 
positivism. In this vein, religion and tradition as the representatives of the past 
were perceived as being in contradiction to the project of modernisation, i. e. 
Westernisation. 
The style of Republican modernisation shows that authoritarianism and elitism 
have been the prominent features of Turkish history. The reflections of such elitism 
39 
On the social and psychological aspects of religion and heterogenous religious understandings 
and practices, see for example $. Mardin (1989) Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: 
The Case of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi ; J. Norton (1990) "Turkish Sufis, Saints and Subversives"; 
R. Tapper (1990) Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State; and 
R. Lifchez (1992) The Dervish Lodge: Architecture, Art and Sufism in Ottoman Turkey 
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can be viewed in the whole tradition of Turkish reformism to which the republican 
cadres belong. The elitist mode of politics is accompanied by a cult of leadership. 
One of the critical consequences of the cult of leadership for Turkish politics was 
the deepening of the tension between the leader and the people. According to the 
leader, "the leader would not fail, but the people would" (Paria, 1989: 7). The ruling 
elite's mission of "elevating the people to the level of contemporary civilization" 
played a legitimising role for elitist politics since it was assumed that the people by 
themselves were neither willing nor capable of achieving this basic goal. The basic 
argument of elitist politics can be seen in this quota by Heper from Atatürk's 
speech, "reforms needed to be imposed `from above'. for `when the people are not 
educated they can easily be won over for all kinds of undesirable ends". This 
means that the people should not have sovereignty until their collective conscience 
has reached a certain level. Until then the "national will" had to be shaped by a 
leadership group, which could lead the (uneducated) people through the necessary 
stages of progress towards a more civilized pattern of life (i. e. the Western life 
style) and thereby enlighten them. It is important to indicate that the Turkish 
`Revolution', as Özbudun (1976) emphasises, was not a social revolution which 
was aimed at implementing radical changes in the existing social structure. Rather, 
it was culturally transformative. The grand strategy of the reformation was that of 
completing the Westernisation of the Turkish intelligentsia and making Turkey safe 
for the westernized intellectuals who would lead her to modernity. Most of the 
Westernisation reforms were characteristically devoted to removing the last 
possibility of challenge from the defeated medrese-intellectual faction, and to 
enlarging the dominant body of Westernized intellectuals. The aim of bringing the 
uneducated masses into active political participation was quite secondary (Frey, 
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1965: 42). Moreover, public policy was not supposed to be the outcome of a 
detached aggregation of interest, but the consequences of a search for "truth" and 
"the one best way"(Heper, 1985: 51). This corporatist nature of politics is explained 
further below. In other words, only a portion of sovereignty was to be exercised by 
the people through the Grand National Assembly, which was elected by only a 
small portion of people, who were guaranteed the right to vote. In fact, the state 
elite who perceived themselves as the only ones capable of serving the nation, 
were supposed to exercise sovereignty in order to promote the "general interest", 
the definition of which was neglected. It should be stressed that the ambition of 
Kemalism was to transfer sovereignty not to the people but to the nation, in order 
to legitimise it in the eyes of people as it transformed the political regime. 
The initial aim in taking all the measures described below was given by the new 
regime as "to reach the stage achieved by the civilised nations". This motif 
illustrated the determination of the new regime to achieve an "unconditional 
transformation" to Western civilisation and "to destroy all forces of reaction". In so 
doing, a definite doctrine of secularism was rigidly implemented as state policy, 
since the state saw secularism as a necessary tool of modernisation and religion 
as an obstacle. This meant that, after the accomplishment of modernisation in the 
public sphere, the cultural practices of ordinary people were targeted. The 
centralisation of every single aspect of social life became the new state's first 
priority, since "traditional society" was conceived and treated as the source of 
religious or ethnic reaction to the project of one secular nation-state. Therefore, 
religion had to be under the strict control of the state and should become a matter 
of individual conscience. The Westernisation programme of the Republic after the 
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termination of Sultanate in 1922 and the abolition of Caliphate in 1924 included: 
a. the abolition of the Sharia as a law of the state. It was significant for the 
new regime to have done this because it destroyed the legitimate basis of the 
Ottoman regime in the political realm. This was followed by abolishing the 
Ministries of Sharia and Evkaf closing the medreses; unifying education under the 
Ministry of Education; and abolishing the religious orders, tarikats, and their 
cloisters. The new regime in 1924 characterized some of its targets as the 
safeguarding and stabilization of the Republic, the creation of a unified national 
system of education and the need to cleanse the Islamic faith by rescuing it from 
the position of being a political instrument. All these would lead to the 
extermination of the influence of the ulema, who were the authorized defenders 
of the Sharia law and the only remaining power in society with connections to the 
old regime. This meant that they could challenge the new regime and hinder its 
reform programme as they had often done in the past. After the secularizing 
reform against the ulema in 1924, it soon became clear that it was from the 
dervishes, not the ulema, that the most threatening resistance to secularism could 
come. The first stage of the reform concluded in November 1928 with the 
secularization of the Constitution of 1924, by dropping the second article stating 
that "the religion of the Turkish state is Islam". In the second stage, the previous 
changes were supplemented, extended and consolidated (Lewis, 1961: 258-61). 
b. the establishment of the Department of Religious Affairs financed by the 
"secular" state as an agency of public service in 1924; 
c. the prohibition of polygamy in 1925 and introduction of compulsory civil 
marriage in 1926. Women were given full suffrage and equal rights with men to 
hold office in 1934; 
d. the prohibition of the Eastern head-dress fez, and its replacement by 
European hats and caps in 1925; 
e. the prescribing of a uniform to members of the clergy in 1925. The 
prohibition of the formation of societies based on religion, sect and tarikats was 
forbidden in 1938 by Article 9 of the law of Association. The same law prohibited 
political parties from engaging in religious activities or producing religious 
propaganda. Propaganda against the principles of secularism was also prohibited 
by the Penal Code adopted in 1926; 
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f. the introduction of a new legal code based on European models, which in 
1926 replaced the old code which was based for the most part on the Islamic 
Sharia; 
g. the replacement of Arabic script by the Latin script in 1928 and the 
prohibition of the teaching of the Arabic script in unauthorized schools; 
h. the adoption of the Gregorian calendar in 1926 and the replacement of the 
Muslim Friday by Sunday as the official weekly holiday in 1935. 
Ahmad (1988) argues that the attitude towards religion of the single-party regimes 
in Europe affected the regime in Turkey. The state responded to opposition and 
challenges in the name of Islam by extending secular laws and becoming more 
and more militant against Islam. The Ezan started to be recited and the Quran was 
translated and read in Turkish in the mosques and over the radio. However, the 
regime tried hard to educate the masses ideologically through education, 
concerning the level of development of the country, that was mainly available in 
cities and towns. To a very small minority that constituted the urban layer of 
society, every manifestation of religious demands would seem reactionary and 
fanatical. The government introduced Village Institutes to educate rural people in 
order to broaden its secular base. However, they were not welcomed in the 
countryside and were almost seen as the enemies of religion. Therefore, they did 
not produce a significant result and were abolished by the DP government. The 
state's policy towards Islam alienated it from the masses. 
Turkish secularism did not separate polity from religion and it did not let religion 
have its own autonomous existence. In fact, it is an example of polity-dominant 
secularization that recognises no area of religious autonomy and aims to 
completely eliminate the influence of religion in society, reform its content to bring 
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it into line with the official ideology. 40 This means that the state/government 
reaches far into the sphere of private religious practices. Hence, the secularism 
policy, which became part of the social engineering process rather than an 
outcome of the process of modernisation and societal development, has been 
highly instrumental in creating new Republican elites (Göle, 1997: 49). Control over 
education is crucial in this context since the main aim seems to be to transform 
society into an "ideal" by controlling the state. While nationalism was the tool of 
justification for this movement, it was accompanied by the centralisation of 
education and the formation of its nationalist elites. The notion of "transforming 
society into an "ideal" is the key argument by which the "modernising elite" justifies 
and reproduces their privileged position. Göle points out that Republican elites 
were the products of the new way of writing, reading and speaking, as the Arabic 
script was replaced by the Latin script and the use of foreign languages except 
Western ones was forbidden. Language and script reforms granted the new elite 
legitimacy and prestige, and distinguished them as "progressive" because they 
were modern, educated and Western-oriented. In other words, Republican elites 
were the ones endowed with the symbolic (Western) capital. Changes in life-styles 
and aesthetic values, i. e. a shift from an "Islamic" to a Western culture, created 
cultural distinctions and social stratification in society. Since their raison d'etre was 
closely linked to that of the nation-state, they were faithful to the interests of the 
nation-state and dedicated to the values of secularism and progress (1997: 50). 
Secularism was considered the prerequisite of modernisation. In this context, 
secularism meant the regulation of public space according to the preferences of 
40 
See D. E. Smith (1970) Religion and Political Development, for the four concepts of secularization, 
namely polity-separation secularization, polity-expansion secularization policy-transvaluation 
secularization and polity-dominant secularization. 
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the state and the imposition of one specific lifestyle. 
The Kemalist Conception of the State 
Kemalism was formulated in the 1930s when the West, the centre of Kemalist 
reformism, witnessed the German and Italian experiences in the aftermath of the 
Great Depression. Corporatism was the primary mode of politics. Accordingly, 
Kemalist corporatism, although it emerged in special circumstances, condemned 
both the Marxist and the liberal conflict models of politics. It conceived of conflict 
as pathological, and hence structured organizations and representations around 
the major functional groups in society according to the initiative of the state. 
Corporatism provided the "legitimate" means for the state. The party and the state 
are considered to be two complementary entities in Kemalism. In the early 1930s, 
this conception resulted in the end of the independent existence of the party. The 
concept of the state meant that "the nation is united in the personality of its leader, 
Atatürk". It is important to emphasise that as a result of the idea of eventual 
unification of the party and the state into a single authoritarian apparatus, the 
chairman of the Republican People's Party became the president and the deputy 
chairman became the prime minister. The RPP invoked the concept of populism 
to describe itself as the synthesis of the people and the sole authoritative 
interpreter of the national interest. However, the concept of populism had been 
revised over time. It was first used to express support for popular sovereignty 
during the War of Independence. In this period, populism was equated with 
nationalism and anti-imperialism, or used as a shorthand term to imply all the 
goals of the liberation movement. Later, populism was described as the 
sociological basis of the new nation-state and society, which was united in terms 
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of race, religion and culture, filled with feelings of mutual respect and sacrifice and 
shared a common fate and interest. In the absence of prior social mobilization, the 
authoritarian regime did not need to cope with a mass movement and so its aims 
were reduced to control and repression from above. Unlike in Brazil and Argentina, 
the threat and potential damage of foreign capital was not evident. The more 
targetable comprador bourgeoisie had already been ousted, and there had never 
been a landed oligarchy, albeit the existence of a relatively small number of big 
landlords in some regions, as explained in the previous chapter. There had been 
no anti-oligarchic movement as in Latin America or no mobilisation against the 
implications of economic development. Therefore, the regime lacked the kind of 
social base characteristics of fascist or populist examples (K6ker, 1992: 196-201). 
There was no breakdown of an exclusionary bourgeois system of restrictive 
parliamentarism that was followed by etatism, as was the case with fascism. 
Rather, it sought to extend bureaucratic rule and conceived a modality of coalition 
with a newly emerging bourgeoisie. Thus, it was a regime where bargaining and 
political posturing remained within the realm of the ruling elite. In addition, 
Kemalism was not born out of a crisis of redistribution of wealth, but rather out of 
a crisis of accumulation of necessary capital in a society that was just emerging 
into capitalism. 
The concept of solidarity provided the Republicans with tools to corporate society 
as one indivisible unit. Nationalism as a modern ideology was put forward to make 
nationhood the primary collective identity in a society where religious communities 
had been the primary collective identity for hundreds of years. The imposition of 
Turkish nationhood as a collective identity meant the exclusion of plural identities 
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from the public sphere. Nationalism was utilised as a substitute for the belief in 
Oneness of God, and provided the necessary concepts for meaningful action, 
good and evil and salvation. Society was not defined in terms of classes with 
separate interests, but classes were seen to be interdependent upon each other 
for their existence. Hence, it was claimed that there could no longer be any 
contradiction between society and political authority, because the nation was a 
self-governing body. As solidarity was conceptualised as being based on the 
functional interdependence of different social and economic groups, populism, in 
this context, became increasingly distinct from popular sovereignty. Rather, it was 
identified with the effort to encourage economic development and preserve social 
peace, and was linked to the state's application of distributive justice to all social 
groups. This understanding of populism is evident in Gökalp's emphasis on the 
subordination of occupational associations to the state, and the maintenance of 
an economy that is under the state's leadership. This provided the justification for 
the Kemalist experimentwith state corporatism as an authoritarian response to the 
problems of economic underdevelopment, as explained below. Since the existence 
of social classes was denied, it was then argued that they could be both 
represented and regulated by a unified party-state apparatus, led by an elite that 
could form a kind of universal class. Populism was once more revised in the 
transition to multi-party politics. Despite still avoiding the word "class", this 
understanding of populism recognised that society consists of various social 
groups, and described the task of state as harmonising the interests of these. It 
continued to dismiss the notion of class-based political parties. This is to say, 
political parties, such as the RPP, the DP and later the Justice Party, commonly 
portrayed themselves as national parties or mass parties which represented the 
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interests of all social groups and sought to reconcile them with each other. This 
view is based to a great extent on the persistent fear on the part of political or state 
elites that unless partitive interests are repressed, regulated or harmonised, 
divisions along lines such as class, religion and region will threaten both the unity 
of the nation and the authority of the state. It has also justified the effective control 
and penetration of the state into every aspect of life (Bianchi, 1984: 100-4). 
In other words, Kemalism, while adopting the market economy, did not accept 
conflicts of interest but instead emphasised the integrative aspects of the division 
of labour. Anti-liberalism remained an intellectual posture, propagated by the 
bureaucrat-bourgeois bloc. Notions of public interest were located in the "national 
will" or the "collective conscience" which nonetheless transcended particular 
groups and individuals (Sunar, 1974: 63-4). It is important to mention that this 
approach makes the concept of particular interests within authority disappear. 
Hence, the demands of people in the political system lose their importance, while 
governors claim to act on behalf of the idealised moral entity of the nation, but not 
that of people. The result was the denial of multi-party politics since the interests 
of the people were one and harmonious, and the people were by and large equally 
poor. As a result, everyone needed the encouragement and the protection of the 
only representative of the national interest, the Republican People's Party. 
Therefore, the RPP became the unquestionable patron of Turkish politics until 
1946. 
However, the RPP was not a monolithic representative of harmonious interests. 
Apart from the interest of civil-military bureaucrats, it had to incorporate the 
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interests of the land owners and urban commercial bourgeoisie into its structural 
premises. The political order, therefore, was much more the function of an 
accommodation of these three social groups. For the local notables, the central 
bureaucracy did not pose any threat to their local power and, in turn, they did not 
oppose to a large extent the cultural reform programme of the RPP. They had 
benefited from policies which had brought them even more socio-economic power 
in their respective communities (for example, laws which provided private control 
over previously state-owned lands). The central bureaucracy, which had retained 
its power due to a monopoly over governmental positions, claimed to derive its 
legitimacy from national representation and leadership. In other words, the 
recognition of the notables' authority was exchanged for the acceptance of the 
bureaucrats' leadership position. This implies that the state, which was reformist 
in terms of cultural life, did not aim to change existing social relationships overall. 
Rather, it took measures to create a national industrial bourgeoisie and to 
safeguard the conditions of existence for the reproduction of capitalist relations. 
Its role as the sole proprietor of political power was to generate a new impetus for 
the accumulation of capital, oversee the general development process, intervene 
when necessary in accordance with the interests of private capital and guide 
foreign capital, which is the subject of the next section. 
4.2. State Capitalism and the Rise of the Democratic Party 
The victory of the Democrat Party (DP) in the general election of 1950 has been 
treated as a turning point in Turkish democratic experience, since political power 
significantly changed hands through free elections after three decades of single 
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party rule. It was not a simple transfer of power from one party to another (Karpat 
1972: Sunar 1974; Ahmad 1977). By 1946 several parties had emerged to 
challenge the political supremacy of the RPP. Shortly thereafter, the DP rose to 
power. With regard to the rise of the DP, there are two views about the reasons 
behind this transition, although both are some way from providing a convincing 
explanation. The first argues in favour of the DP that the shift in power was a 
victory for democracy and individual liberties, which had previously been held 
under dictatorial control by a repressive government. It is true that, as Sunar 
indicates, the RPP governments had curtailed political liberties, jailed opponents, 
and in general acted in a dictatorial fashion. However, these reasons are not 
sufficient to explain the shift because significant questions remain to be answered. 
The founding of the DP was the project of business circles and large landowning 
families who had been in coalition with the bureaucrats since the establishment of 
the Republic. They had been supporters of the nationalist bureaucracy (1974: 66). 
The second argument suggests, in favour of the RPP, that the RPP stood for 
popular interests and progress against a handful capitalists who were trying to 
exploit the common people. The opposition to the nationalist and progressive 
bureaucracy was, therefore, a backward movement organized by capitalists. They 
succeeded when they were able to identify their parochial interests with democracy 
and the general welfare. But it is not true that the central bureaucracy stood for the 
interest of the population at large against these commercial and landed interests. 
On the contrary, popular opposition to the RPP proved to be highly militant and 
widespread. The new Democrat Party was, at the first real opportunity, 
overwhelmingly supported by popular consent. An adequate answer for this 
transition can be given with reference to the political economy of the period 
136 
between 1923 and 1950. The problem is one of identifying the location of core 
capital within the class structure of society and understanding its relationship to the 
state and dominant classes, as mentioned above. 
4.2.1. The Political Economy of the Single-Party Era 
At the founding of the Republic in 1923, Turkey was a predominantly agricultural 
country with an economy devastated by the war, especially with regard to the 
labour force. The overwhelming mass of the population lived in the countryside 
as peasants, wholly engaged in the production of foodstuffs and the raising of 
livestock, as mentioned in the previous chapter. Radical shifts in the political 
balance of power coincided with turning points in the world's economic and political 
order, when a new set of constraints came into play and a local accommodation 
of these external developments was on the agenda. The relationship between the 
world economy and the national one while integrating into the world capitalist 
system41 was very direct. It was as a result of the 1930s depression that economic 
reconstruction allowed bureaucratic control to achieve centrality. The bureaucracy 
could opt for a politically directed national economy in the inter-war period because 
of the dismantling of the world order. However, the distinctive features of 
industrialization policies in the post 1929 period in each developing country 
depended on how the roles of the state and the industrial bourgeoisie were 
41 
The World System sees the development of Third World capitalism in terms of the main internal 
contradictions that characterize its mode of production as part of the development of world 
production. The processes of the capitalist system are such that boom and crisis periods are 
reproduced in national arenas, although the political and ideological accommodations of these are 
naturally specific. The turning points of the world economy are crucial, because at such junctures 
particular local social groups and their political projects gain greater importance and help to 
determine the subsequent balance of forces (I. Wallerstein (1979) The Capitalist World Economy; 
A. G. Frank (1980) Crisis in the World Economy; and S. Amin (1976) Unequal Development: An 
Essay on the Social Formulation of Peripheral Capitalism. 
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reconciled. In countries that had an important industrial sector before 1929, further 
industrialization was based on the expansion of private enterprise. But even in 
those economies, the state created new areas of investment concentrated around 
heavy industry and infrastructural works. In others, like Turkey, the state apparatus 
was used to form an industrial class, which would eventually share an 
entrepreneurial function with the state42 
The lack of capacity and incentive on the part of private capital in investing in the 
development of industry was partly due to the fact that the import and export trade 
provided easier and quicker profits. The negative effects of the world economic 
crisis in 1929 led to an import-substitution economic policy, coupled with a strong 
corporatist state. It was the state, in the name of etatism, that assumed a major 
economic role in promoting economic development. The absence of a landed 
oligarchy in the agrarian structure and the prior expulsion of a majority of the 
Christian bourgeoisie during and after World War I meant that the bureaucracy 
derived its power solely from its position in the state structure and its unchallenged 
authority. Whatever remained of the bourgeoisie was too weak to constitute a 
class with an autonomous stance against bureaucracy. It was either the 
bureaucracy or groups within the bourgeoisie who, through their conflict, defined 
the parameters of state policies, administrative forms and the political regime. 
Nationalism helped to integrate the interests of these various groups as a result 
of the low degree of social differentiation. The peasants and the considerably small 
numbers of workers entered into this picture only indirectly, and their position was 
42 
See F. H. Cardoso and E. Faletto (1979) Dependency and Development in Latin America, for more 
detail on state corporatism with reference to Latin America. 
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determined by the outcome of the struggle for supremacy rather than by their own 
political activity (Keyder, 1987: 2-4). Under the circumstances, the bureaucracy 
became very influential in centralising the distribution and reallocation of 
resources. Since it was concentrated in the large metropolitan centres, relatively 
better organised than other groups in society with developed lines of 
communication, the bureaucratic stratum functioned as a class with its own 
political-economic project. The ideologically and politically well-established state, 
represented by the RPP, gave full support to the development of the industrial 
bourgeoisie despite opposition from agricultural and commercial capital, which saw 
itself as the backbone of the economy and liberalism as its ideological guide. 
The essential principle was to provide the necessary conditions for the accelerated 
accumulation of primary capital, and to ensure its transfer to industrial production 
through the instrumentality of the party-state. Available capital resources were 
reallocated by the interventionist state. Forming new industrial enterprises and 
passing them on to private capital was to be the means of creating and 
maintaining the conditions of existence for the development of an industrial 
bourgeoisie. In so doing, the liberal foreign trade regime and fiscal and monetary 
structures, which were intact before the 1929 depression, were revised in order to 
protect Turkish interests. The state initiated central planning for economic 
development and acted as the primary instrument in the accumulation of private 
capital by establishing industry and creating intermediary positions for the 
commercial classes. Under the policy of state capitalism, a series of state-holding 
enterprises were established to finance public investments in textiles, mining and 
other industrial areas. The aim was to create an industrial class that would be 
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capable of being the backbone of the country's development. Etatism did not 
43 
include agriculture, but rather restricted itself to the sphere of industry. Commercial 
groups were the beneficiaries of state investment since they were not only 
protected and encouraged, but were also given concessionary positions for 
providing raw material and distributing state refined goods. The bureaucrats used 
their power to establish economic interests of their own within society. A large 
number of them joined the commercial bourgeoisie and used their commercial and 
concessionary earnings to become landowners as well. 43 Etatism meant the policy 
of industrialization as conceived within the parameters of society but without the 
political institutions proper to such a society. Under the guise of a novel social 
system, a political elite and an emerging bourgeoisie joined forces to isolate a 
national economic space for themselves in which heavy oppression of the working 
class and exploitation of the agricultural sectorwould allowfor rapid accumulation. 
All this was achieved under an ideology of national solidarity that, as mentioned 
earlier, denied the existence of conflicting class interests in favour of a corporatist 
model of society. While the growing bourgeoisie allied itself with the bureaucracy, 
which was the tool of the RPP, the opposition expressed itself in the formation of 
the Free Party in 1930. However, it was closed shortly after on the grounds that 
it fed disintegrative tendencies against the Republic and the state had to apply 
increasingly aggressive measures to repress the growing opposition. The 
The founding entrepreneurs in 74.2 percent of all firms established between 1931 and 1940 were 
bureaucrats. This high figure shows the bureaucracy's growing share in national income and the 
opportunities it had enjoyed in public contracts and land speculation in the growing capital city 
(Keyder, 1987: 106). The novel called Ankara, by Y. K. Karaosmaoglu, narrates growing economic 
competitions and land speculations in Ankara among bureaucrats with reference to their 
understanding of modernity. Ankara portrays an enormous gap between the social life of 
bureaucrats and that of average residents, and their geographical segregation, as general public 
was forbidden to wander around the city centre with what was called then the "peasants' dresses", 
such as baggy trousers. Even a police patrol was provided around the city centre to prevent any 
violation of this rule. 
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industrialization process created population movement towards the cities. 
Opportunities for the economy to incorporate the masses through industrialization 
and the state's ability to incorporate them politically had, however, been 
structurally and ideologically limited (Ramazanoglu, 1985: 62-64). The 
developmental model gave the state the role of maximizing the interest of the 
national bourgeoisie. In this context, the state performed a double function: anti- 
imperialist gesturing and disciplining of the labour force. Asa result of the relatively 
weak position of the working class, the trade unions, which had no right to strike, 
were absorbed into the state apparatus. The intensification of the exploitative 
relations inherent in the national bourgeois developmental approach accelerated 
the growth of economic inequality and social polarization. 
The economic practice of state capitalism led to an increase in industrial 
production, and therefore the interests of the two groups seemed to coincide in a 
period when the growth of a domestic productive sector increased political control 
over the economy, a result which the bureaucratic class naturally desired. Yet 
there was a tension in the alliance born out of the competing claims of state 
capitalism and the market economy. During World War II, the alliance within the 
power block started to diminish, in part because the RPP, which was lacking any 
popular base and was a party of the bureaucratic and professional strata, 
attempted to alter the balance of power between the urban and rural classes by 
undermining the position of agricultural capital and therefore creating potential of 
threat to the existing order. Throughout the war, people on fixed incomes became 
poorer while those engaged in trade and industry grew richer. The peasant 
masses had been economically deprived and found themselves unable to maintain 
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their earlier levels of consumption. The severe disparity between the wealthy and 
the poor peasantry induced the Government to attempt to gain the favour of the 
latter by placing a land reform proposal before the Parliament (Saribay, 1991: 
120). However, there was no pressure from below for land reform, and the 
problems in the agricultural sector were not linked to shortage of land. Rather, it 
was the shortage of the labour force and the necessary tools for production in 
agriculture, which was the problem with the war because the government had 
adopted a policy of mobilisation by which close to one million male adults were 
taken out of the labour force, most of them from agriculture; draught animals were 
confiscated for military use; and most agricultural inputs became impossible. The 
policies aimed at incorporating agricultural production into the process of 
generalised commodity production resulted in turning substantial sections of the 
landed interests away from the RPP. In the war period, the state faced a decline 
in its revenue in terms of taxes and duties due to a sharp decrease in the importing 
of capital goods (Sunar, 1974: 68-73). The war economy as managed by the RPP 
was characterized by black market dealings in essential items, shortages and 
rising prices. Merchants, industrialists and those fractions of agricultural capital 
keeping up with the rapidly changing situation benefited largely from the uneven 
implementation of etatist policies during the war period and its aftermaths. The 
etatist policies of the RPP had been successful in the creation of a capitalist class 
and the monopolistic control of state power. However, this newly accumulated 
wealth then the source of investment in industry and agriculture, and led the 
commercial bourgeoisie, with the support of capitalist farmers, to demand more 
direct participation in the use of state power, the re-implementation of liberal 
economic measures and the opening of the Turkish economy to world markets. 
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This meant generating an alliance between domestic private capital and foreign 
capital, and breaking up the alliance with the bureaucracy. (Ramazanoglu, 1985: 
68-7). However, the revenue of the state remained static and inadequate during 
the war period. The result was an increase in taxes. A heavy wealth tax was levied 
in 1942, which aimed to place the burden on the profiteers, intermediaries and 
businessmen who had benefited most from the war economy. Non-Muslims were 
assessed at ten times the Muslim rate and the converts at twice. The wealth tax 
and the proposed land reform brought the urban commercial groups and large 
landowners together. Between the years 1940 and 1942, the state further 
expanded its control of economy by the introduction of new laws. For example, the 
expropriation of industrial and mining enterprises and lands of over 500 hectares, 
in return for suitable compensation, was allowed if the government saw it to be 
necessary. All these were, of course, open to spoils. The bureaucracy, which was 
involved in private transactions itself, had the power to canalize the concentration 
of wealth in selected hands and to create monopolies. All possible oppressive 
apparatuses were used to maintain order. The Democrat Party was formed by 
dissidents from the RPP in 1946 under these above-mentioned circumstances. 
4.2.2. The Democrat Party 
The Democrat Party sought electoral support on two grounds: religious and 
economic. The issue of religious freedom and democracy became almost an 
obsession in the years after 1945. Ahmad points out that the secularist policies of 
the RPP could be presented as anti-democratic, since the freedom of conscience 
of the Muslim majority was being violated. However, there was no call for an end 
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to secularism (1991: 9). The DP did not devastate the foundation of the Republic, 
but it obviously adopted the policy of secularism, though a moderate one. There 
was no question of returning to Islamic law, for instance. It was demonstrated then 
that true secularism had never been implemented in Turkey, and that what the 
country had experienced was the control of every aspect of religion by the state. 
This, in fact, has been the central argument of Islamist discourse in Turkey. 
However, given growing opposition to the ruling party, the RPP began a 
programme of religious liberalization during the transition to competitive party 
politics in the late 1940s. This included the establishment of Prayer Leaders and 
Preachers' Schools (Imam Hatips) to teach Islam and train the modern clergy, the 
opening of the Faculty of Theology in Ankara, the reopening of sacred tombs to 
the public and making foreign exchange available for the pilgrimage to Mecca. 
Under the rule of the DP, one significant religious gain was made by the so-called 
"Islamic opposition": the permission to re-recite Ezan in Arabic. The DP's liberal 
attitude towards religious issues led to, for example, an increase in mosque 
building, the publication of religious books and the overt revival of the religious 
brotherhood organisations which had gone underground during the single-party 
regime (Karpat, 1972: 353). It can clearly be argued that such changes affected 
neither the secular character of the Republic nor the essentially secular character 
of political discourse. It seems that society used religious issues to challenge the 
legitimacy of the state and express disaffection with and hostility to the single-party 
regime in religious terms, since almost every possible means of publicly 
expressing opposition had been forbidden or censured. Religion or religious issues 
appeared in the political agenda as the voice of people who had been excluded 
from the political system. 
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With respect to economic issues, the leaders of the DP represented either the 
interests of commercial capital or those of agricultural capital. The DP demanded 
the opening up of the Turkish economy to world markets and believed that the role 
of the state should be confined to the provision of infrastructural services. The DP 
attempted to win the support of the masses, most of whom were engaged in 
agriculture, by offering economic incentives such as credits, subsidies and road 
building programmes. The leader of the DP, Menderes, appeared to reflect the 
chief interests and fears of the leading social groups in small towns and among big 
farmers. These groups, in comparison to the urban bureaucratic stratum, which 
had undergone an ideological and cultural transformation, had maintained their 
cultural and religious roots and felt a strong sense of continuity with their past 
(Karpat, 1988: 138-9). Elite opposition to the etatist policies of the bureaucracy 
therefore converged with popular discontent. The peasantry and urban worker 
class, who had borne the burden of economic policies, were more than willing to 
support a new government promising new policies such as a free market economy, 
democratic rights and religious freedom. In other words, the DP brought together 
various constituencies of opposition who rejected the monopoly of the RPP, 
although in the long run, the interests of those would be in conflict with each other. 
The DP policies were geared to increasing the power and influence of emerging 
new entrepreneurial groups and of the special class of countryside merchant 
landowners. On the one hand, under the rule of the DP throughout the 1950s, the 
economy was experiencing a rapid change in its character from an agrarian 
economy to one in which commerce and industry were becoming dominant. The 
DP policies gave incentives for the improvement of the means of agricultural 
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production. The countryside was opened up with roads, buses, tractors and 
credits. A liberal model was put into effect and a national economy was created 
for foreign goods. But the agricultural expansion, aided by the favourable price 
conjuncture of the Korean War, was undermined by fluctuations in agricultural 
output due to weather conditions and a decline in foreign demand by 1954. It 
became clear that exclusive dependence on agricultural exports would be an 
insufficient base on which to finance an increasing demand for imported goods. 
There was a decrease in the usable component of foreign grants, credits and aid, 
since a large percentage of these were used for debt servicing. This led the DP to 
opt for inflationary finance of agriculture via credits, price support programmes and 
growing public investment, in order to extend the economic boom. The liberal trade 
regime was abandoned due to difficulties in balancing external payments, and 
some of the statist measures of control were readopted in 1954. The political 
authority, through complicated systems of tariffs and quotas controlled the nature 
and quality of imports and therefore decided on the extension of market privileges 
to chosen manufacturers. In the short term, under the import restrictions and 
protections the industrial sector began to grow faster than agriculture. Yet in the 
long term, the industrial capital was not happy with the petty bourgeois market 
ideology of the DIP. In the post-war years, a new model of accumulation was 
needed by the nationally based manufacturing bourgeoisie and its international 
links. Though the DID government had always denounced any statist policy, it 
agreed to implement a stabilisation programme, set by the World Bank and the 
OECD. This meant a policy of import substitution by planning, in exchange for 
continuing aid. In fact, an overt policy of industrialisation accompanied by the 
import-substitution model began to be implemented by its central planning 
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organisation after the military coup in 1960. Therefore, military intervention 
promised a planned allocation of scarce resources in the service of rapid 
development, and responded to foreign pressures as well as to discontent among 
various strata of urban public opinion, all of which served to promote the project 
of industrial capital (Keyder, 1987: 132-5). The rise and fall of the DP marked a 
new stage in the transformation of Turkish capitalism. By the 1950s politics was 
opened up for an overt class struggle among the different factions of the capitalist 
class, industrial, financial, commercial and agricultural. Given the rapid 
accumulation of industrial and financial capital, these factions had been able to 
establish their economic dominance, although they had to share state power with 
the agricultural and commercial factions at the political level. 
On the other hand, the policies of DP led to a rapid growth in the size of the new 
economic middle class, and to inflation that not only reduced purchasing power, 
but also diminished the prestige and influence of the military-civilian bureaucracy. 
It is important to emphasise that the DP's actions vis-a-vis the military were not 
sufficient in themselves to provoke a military takeover, although there was an open 
display of hostility toward the military's informal linkage with the RPP. The DP did 
not try to downgrade the role of the military and bureaucracy. Yet one important 
issue is that much of the political history of the 1950s is marked by a steady 
decline in the bureaucratic stratum and a rise in the representation of the 
professional and economic contingent in the parliament. Frey shows that when the 
DP first challenged the RPP in 1946, there were very significant differences in the 
social background of deputies between the two parties. Whereas only 6 percent 
of the DP's deputies were bureaucrats, the figure for the RPP was 39 percent. In 
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1923, approximately 55 percent of the RPP deputies were bureaucrats, with this 
figure declining to 45 percent by 1943. (1975: 56-60). 
The removal of the DIP's government from the power has certain parallels with later 
incidents in 1971,1980 and 1997 in terms of the rhetoric applied. For example, the 
RPP accused the DIP of destroying the legacy of AtatCjrk. The argument against 
the DIP was that it was unfit to govern, despite the preferences of voters for the 
party, because it was "anti-democratic, reactionary, conservative (in terms of 
attitude towards religion), and anti-secularist". The RPP challenged the DIP through 
political demonstrations, in which the students of the military academy also took 
part. The DIP's attempts to silence such opposition and its threats to close down 
the RPP led to a covert call in 1960 by the leader of the RPP, ismet in6no, for the 
military to intervene in politics to "save democracy". Soon afterthe intervention, the 
DIP's deputies were arrested and tried; some landlords were put into special 
detention camps; a committee was established to inquire into the sources of the 
wealth of the DIP members and its sympathizers; and finally the prime minister, 
Menderes, and two of his ministers were hanged. Within a few months of the 
intervention, the government was once again in the hands of the RPP. The military 
rule of 1960 was from the beginning a great example of wide cooperation and 
intercourse with civilians who overwhelmingly belonged to the cadres of the RPP. 
The old ruling coalition was restored to power and expected to gain legitimacy in 
the election of 1961. However, the Justice Party (JP), the successor to the DP, 
won the majority but was not allowed to form a government until 1965. Instead, the 
RPP formed a series of weak governments. The JP's elected governments in 1965 
and 1969 were effectively prevented from exercising their mandate by a series of 
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measures by the RPP's statist-elitist intelligentsia. The JP was designated unfit to 
govern, as it framed the concept of "modernity" and "progress" in empirical and 
economic terms while its opponents had an ideological-cultural concept of 
.1 modernity" associated with Westernisation (Karpat, 1981: 14). In the meantime, 
the military stood by as the faithful supporter of the RPP, which was still regarded 
as the only party that could implement the new Constitution in 1961 and maintain 
the principles of Kemalism. Since the 1960s, military interventions have been 
justified as necessary to reestablish order and stability as well as to safeguard 
democracy and the state from self-serving and corrupt politicians. Therefore, the 
crucial question to be answered is "under what circumstances and in whose 
interest does the army break the democratic rules to which it claims to be 
committed, and act on its own initiative? " 
4.2.3. The Military as a Political Functionary 
The Turkish military has overtly intervened in politics three times since the 
establishment of the Republic either by direct takeovers as in 1960 and 1980 or 
by issuing ultimatums to the elected government and replacing it with the one of 
technocrats appointed by the military directly as in 1971. The recent intervention 
in February 1997 through the National Security Council may be called a covert 
military coup, since the military, without overtly seizing the reins of government, 
exercised a power of veto behind the scenes and pioneered the establishment of 
a new government by political parties which were trusted with the state ideology. 
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The military involvement in politics and the patterns it employs after seizing power 
are often explained or justified within the literature from a culturalist point of view, 
with reference to the history and tradition of military institutions and the legacy of 
Atatürk. For example, Tachau and Heper argue that 
the Turks are heirs to Muslim culture which recognizes and accepts the 
legitimacy of the military as an arm of the community... the Quran declares 
that those who are martyred in defence of the community of the faithful are 
guaranteed automatic and immediate accessto eternalparadise (1983: 18). 
The legacy of Atatürk, the formal separation of the army from politics, which also 
permits military action against elected authority on behalf of the "welfare of the 
people", is somewhat contradictory. It forbids serving army officers to play any part 
in the legislature, on the one hand, though, on the other hand, it encourages them 
to think of themselves as the ultimate guard of the Atatürk reformism (Hale, 1988: 
160). In fact, the former does not seem to have validity. In fact, the channels for 
the military to reach the highest authority of the state were kept intact during the 
single-party era since the regime was assured of the military backing for its reform 
programme and the power of the military has been constitutionalised since the 
1960 coup. 
The military interventions in Turkey cannot be understood in terms of cultural 
peculiarities or the tradition of the military. Some of the highlighted issues which 
are supposed to have provoked any military takeover are: economic crisis; rapidly 
increasing foreign debt; intra-elite conflict; political polarization; and political 
violence. But it is important to emphasize that these can be contributory, but not 
suff icient conditions for any coup d'etat. The shortcoming within such explanations 
is that the use of state power by the military, as a political actor, is tied to its 
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alleged pursuit of "collective goals", or modernisation. The mode of modernisation 
is set by Kemalism, and therefore it has legitimate authority, which is asserted by 
its tradition, culture and position in the modernisation process as the initial receiver 
and implementor of reform programmes. Such an approach dissociates the use 
of power by the military from conflicts of interests, and therefore conceives it as the 
most committed institution for the effective pursuit of the "general interest", which 
is conceptualised upon an assumed consensus on the behalf of society . 
The 
linking of the primary use of state power by the military to authority and "collective 
goals" assumes that such power is a system property. This ignores the fact that 
the "collective goals" are the outcome of a negotiated order based upon conflicts 
between parties holding differential levels of power. They serve to reinforce the 
position of the military within the power structure by granting it a functional 
explanation. " However, any analysis should take into account the mode of 
capitalist development and the role andtheposition of the militarywithin the ruling- 
class structure. 
The military has been committed to the preservation of the undisputed dominance 
of industrial and financial capital at the political level, despite the fact that this 
44 
45 
meant the suspension of the democratic regime in almost every decade since 
1960.45 
. 
Since the early 1950s, the military itself has had growing commercial and 
industrial interests and has become a significant interest group. The 0 YAK (Army 
For a discussion of the conceptualisation of power, see S. Lucas (1974) Power: A Radical View. 
The mode of economic development that secured the economic and political dominance of 
industrial and financial capital, but were challenged by other factions of capital from the 1960s 
onwards is analysed in the next chapter with reference to the rise of the National Salvation Party 
in the 1970s. 
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Mutual Aid Society) was initially set up after the 1960 intervention to create a 
pension programme that would protect officers from the economic insecurity they 
had suffered during the rapid inflation of the 1950s. This was soon transformed 
into the country's largest and most diversified industrial corporation, investing in 
automotive, cement, insurance, communication and more (Bianchi, 1984: 70-1). 
The integration of the top officers into the Turkish military-industrial complex was 
further strengthened with the establishment of an arms industry. By the time of the 
1971 and 1980 interventions, the senior commanders were an integral part of the 
ruling structure (Ahmad 1987). Since then large resources have been allocated to 
the development of a defence industry. Its establishment has been costly to a 
great extent, since it has relied heavily on the importation of technology and 
essential components, and has had a limited export market, although it was 
justified on the grounds of its spillover effects on other sectors of the economy in 
46 thelongterm. Although a number of private firms have been allowed to enter the 
sector, the military has monopolised the industry. More than three quarters of the 
23 leading companies in arms production are controlled by the various 
departments of the military bureaucracy For example, ASELSAN (Military 
Electronic Industry), which was established in 1975, is largely owned by the Armed 
Forces Foundation. Sezgin (1997) indicates that the defence industry, as one of 
the developing sectors in the economy, will be an essential part of the industrial 
sector and production in the future. 
46 
The growth rate of defence expenditure has averaged 6.2 percent annually, although the GNP in 
recent decade has been 5.2 percent. Turkey has allocated 5 percent of her GNP to the defence 
expenditure since the 1960s, although for health and education, the figures have been just about 
2 percent. The figure for the defence expenditure is 21.7 percent of the central government 
budget. However, this does not include other sources outside the central government budget 
(Sezgin, 1997: 384). 
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The military interventions have reenforced the fact that politics is not only 
constrained, but is also under the control of the state. All military interventions 
since 1960 have displayed the similar aim of delineating an arena for the state 
(bureaucrats) as opposed to the realm of politics. For example, the Constitution 
of 1961 legitimized the political influence of the bureaucratic intelligentsia by 
prohibiting sole emphasis from being placed on the "national will". It pitted the 
civil-military bureaucratic elite againstthe representatives inthe parliament, which 
ended its theoretical supremacy. A juridical concept of state, placing greater faith 
in the rule of law, replaced that of one in the rule of parliament (Heper, 1988: 6-7). 
The 1982 Constitution, which was written under the military regime, has also 
asserted the supremacy of the state over the realm of politics, and placed 
constraints on the political system to prevent it from losing control of the state over 
to the governing institutions. The state has been unquestionably represented by 
the military elite, the so-called "principal interpreter of the general interest", and 
has been restructured in accordancewith the restructuring of the economy in order 
to allow the dominant interest to monopolise state power and limit the access of 
the commercial and agricultural factions to power (Ramazano§lu, 1985: 235). 
Accordingly, the execution of state power is located in the office of the President, 
by granting enormous direct power. The presidential post had almost traditionally 
been seen as the top echelon in the army career until the presidency of Ozal in 
1990, with the exception that of Celal Bayar, who was the leader of the DP in the 
1950s. The judiciary was restructured to complement the reorganisation of the 
state apparatus, which meant the demolition of the means of controlling state 
power by citizens through legislative and judicial process. Ultimately, the political 
choice of citizens has been subordinated to "the needs and existence of the state". 
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Such dominance meant the further incorporation of the military into the political 
decision-making process after each mi I itary intervention, i. e. the institutiona I isation 
of power. As Ozbudun (1996) indicates, each military regime had prepared the 
ground for an "exit guarantee" under the new constitution after its departure from 
power. The National Security Council, granted constitutional status by the 
Constitution of 1961, has reached the stage of continuing interference and 
influence in politics to an important extent and attained a constitutional office for 
its Secretariat (NSCS). The NSC was set up after the 1960 intervention to act as 
a consultative body to civil authority on matters concerning national security, 
internal and external. It was dominated by civil members. However, the 1971 
intervention and the Constitution of 1982 improved the status of the NSC in terms 
of its status vis-a-vis the government. The new constitution balanced the numbers 
of civilian and military members. The NSC is therefore composed of five civilian, 
including the President, and five military members. The recruited members of the 
NSC have the same status as the elected members. It is an authority over the 
government since its recommendations to the cabinet are not "advisory" but 
"mandatory". The NSC provides an institutionalized channel for the military access 
to the top level of political authority. What is important is that the military is 
dominant in the Council in comparison to its civilian members, who include the 
president, the prime minister and the ministers of interior, defence and foreign 
affairs. Besides the well-established guardian role of the army, the post-1980 
pattern in particular appears to be one of, in theory, "shared" decision-making in 
"security matters", the framework of which is principally drawn up by the military. 
This, therefore, gives it a ieadership position in working out its response, with a 
near-remote possibility of being questioned about that role by civilian politicians. 
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The existence and nature of the NSC and the NSCS indicate that the top military 
officers are not only bureaucrats in their own rights, but also constitutionally 
recognised political actors with a stake in the economy. Accordingly, the NSCS 
was granted autonomous status within the civil authority by the Constitution of 
1982, and given enormous legal authority over the legislative and executive 
bodies. For example, the Secretary has the mandate to act independently from the 
prime minister and command public as well as private institutions in order to 
enforce policies drawn by the NSC, the content of which can override security 
matters. The concept of "national security" matters is defined in very abstract 
terms, and is therefore open to interpretation under existing circumstances. The 
military was directly involved in the maintenance of the social and political order, 
which included a dense traffic between the senior levels of military bureaucracy 
and high political offices when the Welfare Party was in power. This is explained 
with the two case studies in chapters six and seven. 
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Chapter 5: The Rise of an "Islamist" Party to Power in Continuing Capitalist 
Development: The Welfare Party 
The preceding chapter gave an overview of the divergence of capitalist classes 
within the development of state capitalism, and their relation to the state with 
reference to the Democrat Party. This chapter continues to look at capitalist 
development since the 1960s, in order to show that, though the phenomenon of 
"Islamism", as a product of modernity, is a multi-faceted phenomenon, an analysis 
of the emergence and relative success of an "Islamist" party which has run for 
power in a relatively democratic political setting, albeit under different names, 
should concentrate on the competition over the allocation of public resources 
within a national developmental model, and identify the strains and inequalities of 
the ongoing development process. This chapter answers the question "why did the 
right-wing politics once represented by the Democrat Party split when capitalist 
development gained significant momentum? ", as signified by the establishment of 
an Islamist party that would eventually become an important part of opposition to 
conventional politics in the decades after the 1960s. It is argued that, although the 
NOP and later the NSP have been identified with the struggle upon the allocation 
156 
of public resources of so-called "Muslim" (Anatolian) bourgeoisie or petty 
bourgeoisie, the Welfare Party, with its populist discourse that employed an 
Islamist rhetoric and focussed upon a harmonious and "just" society promoted by 
an egalitarian approach to social welfare and economic development, managed 
to capture the votes of trans-class based electors in a period in which the 
shortcomings of the developmental state in general and the failures of mainstream 
political parties in particular, in meeting popular demands (of urban and rural lower 
classes) for economic redistribution, social justice and freedom, created 
widespread dissatisfaction. Since the general thrust of development policy has 
been on immediate "sacrifice" in order to achieve higher rates of savings and 
investments, the social welfare of lower classes has been a neglected issue. The 
chapter argues that the articulation of demands for "equality" within a framework 
of religious rhetoric helped the Welfare Party to differentiate itself within the right- 
wing; to identify the experiments with state capitalism with hegemonic classes; and 
to represent its stance as one working from below against oppression, corruption 
and exploitation. This draws attention to the fact that it was not religion which 
determined the course of political action, but vice versa. 
47 
Before moving on further, a few remarks on the right and left division should be 
made. It is not easy to divide parties in Turkey into groups between or within the 
left or right wings of politics, such as centre-left or centre-right, and extreme left 
or extreme right. Though such divisions may be convenient for the purpose of 
comparison, it does not accurately represent the parties. 47 Diminishing ideological 
See Schmuelevitz (1996) "Urbanization and Voting for the Turkish Parliament", for such a 
classification without sufficient explanation as to why the political parties are divided along such 
lines. 
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differences, populist manifestations and a trans-class base for electoral support 
of political parties make it difficult to associate parties with either wing of the 
political spectrum. The populist claim by political parties that they represent all 
strata of society is reflected to an extent in their electoral support, which comes 
from various social groups, though each does not have a homogenous character 
and has conflicting interests with regard to the allocation of public resources. " 
This is to say, there are certain overlaps in the classification of parties. For 
example, in some studies, such as Schmuelevitz (1996), while one type of 
nationalism (Turkish) is identified with the extreme-right (NAP), another type 
(Kurdish) is often associated with the extreme-left (PDP). Similarly, though 
religious parties are classified as extreme-right (WIP), it is not clear to what extent 
parties could make use of religious issues, and still be strictly acknowledged 
within the centre-left or centre-right (RPP or TPP and MP). With reference to 
economic policies, considering the relations of production for an open and 
dependent periphery economy, the difference among parties lies mainly in their 
populist rhetoric rather than their policy implementations while in office. 
4K 
Additionally, it should be emphasized that political parties could and do change 
their position by moving towards either direction within the political spectrum. They 
can seek or break alliances with power blocks in their political struggle, for 
For example, a study which used a nationally representative sample and was carried out before 
the 1977 election found that the perception of the respondents as to whom each party represented 
provides interesting findings. Though the JP was associated mostly with the landlords (77.2 
percent), merchants (76.4 percent), industrial capitalists (60.1 percent), and small business and 
craftsmen (51.3 percent), it also received considerable attention (about 40 percent) in terms of 
representing the peasantry, while the RPP scored 45percent in the same category. In the case of 
workers and public servants respectively the JP scored 27 percent and 31 percent, while the RPP 
had 59 percent and 56 percent (ErgOder and (5zgediz 1977, in Saribay, 185: 180). It is important 
to emphasize that the timing of the survey was crucial since it was carried out when the RPP, 
under the leadership of Ecevit, had been campaigning on social democracy and its "left of centre" 
identity, claiming to represent lower income groups and attempting to break its ties with large 
landowners. 
158 
example as the MP has moved towards the left and the DLP towards the right in 
the 1990s. 
It can be argued that the position of party ideologies on the political spectrum 
depends in general on their attitude towards two central features of modernity: 
how favourable they are to "the rise of the masses", or the role of the people in 
political and social life; and how positively they evaluate the schema of rational 
and radical construction of society. Ideologies that give a positive value to popular 
power, to extending the bounds of participation in political (and later economic) 
life, and to giving affirmative answers to the projects of rational social 
reconstruction, can be assigned to the left of the spectrum (Schwarzmantel, 1998: 
67). When this definition is applied to Turkish politics, there is no clear-cut division 
between the right and the left. Although populism has been given various 
interpretations and approaches, as mentioned before, the populist nature of 
Turkish politics, leads to a conclusion that rhetorically both the right and the left 
have a positive approach to the expansion of political participation and the rise of 
the masses. However, this does not necessarily mean the democratization of 
politics. For the right, mass participation has been instrumental in gaining 
legitimacy for its political struggle. Therefore, since the 1946 election the right has 
claimed to represent "the will of the people", while the left has envisaged its 
legitimacy within the principles of the Republic, except for the late 1960s and the 
1970s when the left attempted to differentiate itself from Kemalism. It can be 
stated that the conventional right and left division in Turkey finds its expression to 
an extent in the empirical and economic concept of modernity versus the 
ideological and cultural concept of modernity. The latter is articulated in the policy 
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of "laicism", which in the Turkish context means the strict control of religion by the 
state as outlined before. As the left associates itself with Kemalism, which has 
been redefined after each military intervention in order to provide such takeovers 
with legitimacy and is now exclusively equated with republicanism (rather than 
democracy) and the strict implementation of secularist policies, it willingly or 
unwillingly overlaps with the "militant" secularist approach. This denies any 
meaningful participation of heterogenous identities in social and political life, and 
represents an aspiration to (primarily culturally) transform society according to 
11 modern values", which is mainly understood to mean Westernization. The left 
therefore finds itself in collaboration with bureaucratic modernising projects which 
are concentrated over the transformation of cultural (or religious) lifestyles, rather 
than the relations of production in society. In this context, the right claims to have 
traditionally represented "what belongs to the people" (identity and culture), i. e. the 
people's will, against "the general will" formulated by the modernising elite, and 
sees this as the basis for its legitimacy in its search for power. However, this does 
not mean that the right unconditionally accepts plurality within the people's culture 
and identity, and aims to inclusively represent them in the political sphere. Rather, 
these are unilaterally and exclusively defined from one perspective to another. In 
addition, the right often overlaps with the left in terms of social-engineering, 
although they diverge on aims. Therefore, for both the right and the left, politics 
is to a larger extent about the justification of elitist and authoritarian tendencies. 
In this context, mass participation in politics is the means of claiming justification 
for such political actions. 
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5.1. The Route that Led to the Welfare Party 
In the aftermath of the 1960 intervention, the Justice Party to a large extent 
replaced the Democrat Party, to compete with the Republican People's Party, 
which was popularly identified with urban intellectuals and bureaucrats (Ozbudun, 
1987). Although, there was more than one party on the right-wing (see Table 2), 
the Justice Party served until 1970 as the mass party of the right, embodying 
many interest groups including urban businessmen, industrial workers, and big 
landlords as well as small farmers and landless peasants. However, the right 
experienced its first split prior to the 1950 election. The Nation Party (NP) was 
formed in 1948 by a group of dissident Democrats, although it did not gain any 
electoral success. It changed its name first to the Republican Nation Party, and 
then to the Republican Peasant Nation Party (RPNP) in the 1950s. After the 
military takeover in 1960, a group within the party left due to intra-elite rivalry and 
reestablished the NP. The RPNP changed its name and its orientation under the 
leadership of Alparslan TCirke§ in 1969, and was known afterwards as the National 
Action Party (NAP), whose ideology combined ethnic nationalism and anti- 
communism with strongly etatist policies. Secondly, the New Turkey Party (NTP) 
was established in 1961 by a number of former Democrats and competed with the 
Justice Party (JP) for the votes of the Democrat Party. The split between the JP 
and the NTP did not signify any ideological conflict. The NTP claimed to represent 
the same social groups as the JP. Yet it finally merged with the JP in 1973 after 
the general election. Lastly, both the Democratic Party (DeP) and the "Islamist" 
National Order Party (NOP) were formed in 1970. Though the DeP did relatively 
well in the election of 1973, especially in provinces where commercial agriculture 
had developed, its later electoral strength declined sharply in favour of the JP. As 
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the short-lived NOP was banned from politics by the Constitutional Court after the 
1971 military intervention, on the grounds that it violated the secularist principles 
of the Republic, the National Salvation Party (NSP) in 1972 took its place with the 
same leadership group. 
Table 2: The Distribution of Votes Among the Parties in the General Elections, 1950-1977 
Election 
Years 
THE RIGHT BLOCK THE LEFT 
BLOCK 
DP* NP/RNP/ 
RPNP/NAP 
jp NTP RReP NSP DeP RPP TLP 
1950 53.3 3.1 --- --- --- --- --- 39.9 --- 
1954 56.6 4.8 --- --- --- --- 34.8 --- 
1957 47.3 7.0 --- --- --- --- 40.6 --- 
1961 --- 14.0 34.8 13.7 --- --- --- 36.7 --- 
1965 --- 2.2 52.9 3.7 --- --- --- 28.7 3.0 
1969 3.0 46.5 2.2 6.6 --- --- 27.4 2.7 
1973 --- 3.4 29.8 --- 5.3 11.8 11.9 33.3 --- 
1977 --- 6.4 36.9 --- 1.9 8.6 1.9 41.4 0.1 
*Political parties of the both left and right are ordered according to their first appearance in politics. 
Source: Complied from General Election of Representatives, Results by Provinces, 1977, by the 
State Statistics Institute (1978). 
In the 1960s, the developmental state pursued the implementation of import- 
substitution policies (ISI) within the statist mode of expansion. The mode of 
development was heavily dependent upon the initiative of the state and coercive 
power of the state. The general thrust of development policy, which previously was 
concerned with increasing "social justice" through immediate improvements in 
living standards, was on immediate "sacrifice" in order to achieve higher rates of 
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savings and investments, and therefore was on the "trickle down" approach 
(Bianchi 1984: 142). The introduction of comprehensive five-year development 
plans, and the establishment of the State Planning Organisation (SPO), in the 
framework of a mixed economy put the main emphasis upon industrialisation and 
initiated a major attempt at extending import-substitution through protectionist 
policies into the intermediate and capital goods categories. The ISI policy was 
instrumental in the creation of an expanding industrial sector and effecting a 
transition from a mercantile to an industrial economy, which aimed at the 
generation of a gradual structural change against agriculture. The ISI policy relied 
on the administrative allocation of scarce economic resources, such as credits, 
foreign exchange, import quotas and subsidies. Therefore, the role of the 
government was crucial in this process. Through the ISI policy, for example the 
formulation of various importation lists, the bureaucracy, which had a long tradition 
of state intervention, was brought into closer contact with private sector 
representatives. The SPO was the central body for the allocation of resources. 
The state emerged as the main arbiter between the various competing factions of 
the bourgeoisie, especially industrialists and merchants. It sought to encourage 
cooperative interest group leaders in the major economic sectors to share the 
responsibility for implementing development programs. The state attempted to 
foster collaborative class relationships and coordinate nationwide collective 
bargaining through vertically structured, quasi-monopolistic associations in the key 
economic sectors. A collection of weak associations was eager for official 
recognition and privilege in order to improve their political and economic positions. 
Therefore, the political activities of voluntary associations were restricted to a 
considerable degree in order to hinder the emergence of strong bodies that were 
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outside state control. Accordingly, labour policy constantly sought to delay or 
control the development of collective action among workers and to isolate the 
labour movement from all other associations. The use of suppression was one of 
the means working against the labour movement. Trade unions were incorporated 
into the state structure as semi-official hierarchical occupational associations, 
since they were created by legislation. They were supposed to subordinate their 
own economic and institutional interests to national goals. Official recognition of 
an association as the authoritative spokesperson for a given factor was granted 
from above (Bianchi 1984: 143-5). As the state was becoming a major distributor 
of benefits that invariably accrued to specific private interests, the determination 
of the main beneficiaries became a major public issue. The daily functioning of the 
ISI mechanism was transformed into a spoils system. In this context, the Turkish 
Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchange (TOBB) was the scene for the 
initial struggles within the private sector, since it possessed the right to allocate 
foreign exchange and quota lists, and determine the selling price of imported 
items. The TOBB, which established close links with the JP, regarded import 
controls as fairly crucial for industrialists, although the merchants within this 
organisation continued to advocate the liberalisation of the import regime and the 
prioritisation of agriculture in the economic development strategy. Entrepreneurs 
who had import permits were able to obtain scarce foreign exchange at the official 
rate, which was much lower than the market price. They were able to import 
intermediate goods at prices lower than their market values, with the state 
subsiding the difference. They enjoyed monopolistic privileges in a protected 
market. Consequently, large scale production began to develop due to the heavy 
concentration of resources on the small base of the manufacturing sectors, which 
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was mainly concentrated in Western Turkey where the infrastructure was found 
to be more convenient for investment. This was to change the character of 
industry, which had been dominated by numerous small units scattered across the 
country, and to deprive the agricultural sector. The conflict between merchants 
and industrialists in their competition to benefit from the spoils was exposed in 
terms of opposition between Istanbul and Anatolian capital, which saw itself as the 
locus of real development (the production of capital goods with indigenous sources 
of finance), since it relied on national capital and resources, condemned the 
development policy as favouring an assembly-type inclustrialisation. Nevertheless, 
large monopolies and holding companies dominated the economy in a very short 
time, and economic power was soon concentrated in the hands of the industrial 
and financial bourgeoisie. The large manufacturing sector became well- 
established in the economy with healthy returns on investment. Although the 
programme of the JP included transforming artisans and craftsmen with limited 
opportunities into medium and big industrialists through a favourable credit 
system, its governmental performance did not meet the emerging demands of its 
collective electoral base. Rather, the result was that many small local firms in 
Anatolia became sub-contractors to larger firms or completely went out of 
business. Workshop production, however, remained an important sector (Keyder 
1979). 
Conflicts among the various factions of the bourgeoisie led to the establishment 
of splinter parties that were to compete for the traditional electoral base of the JP. 
The splinter parties namely the Democratic Party (DeP) and the National Order 
Party (NOP), which, with its "Islamist orientation", was the predecessor of the 
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National Salvation Party (NSP) and the Welfare Party (WP), occurred in this 
context as an example of increased functional differentiation in order to provide 
those factions of the bourgeoisie with concessions, while at the same time being 
able to mobilise various centres of opposition. Emerging political demands which 
had not been aggregated and integrated by the policies of the JP in the process 
of a rapid socio-economic development were reflected in secular trends in the 
fragmentation of the Turkish party system. However, it is important to emphasize 
that the political aspect of social behaviour was and is not completely 
institutionalised, organised and instrumental (class-based). For example, in 
provinces where party loyalties are weaker and independent candidates gain a 
larger portion of the vote than organised political parties, it is clear that 2 close 
community-based personalised style of politics is dominant. Therefore, it is 
possible to observe sudden changes in party alignments in some provinces from 
one election to another. 
The establishment of the NOP was a result of the intra-elite rivalry that took place 
at the TOBB. Necmettin Erbakan, a professor of engineering, who was to lead all 
three parties, the NOP, the NSIP and the WP, was elected as chairman of the 
Industry Office in the TOBB in 1966. For Erbakan, the aim was to provide 
Anatolian business (the rising petty bourgeoisie) with favourable credits, import 
quotas and investment incentives. However, his perspectives and proposals on 
economic policies were disapproved of by the Chambers of Istanbul and Izmir. 
Finally, his officewas vetoed bythe Ministry of Trade of the JP's government and 
Erbakan had to resign. In addition, his candidacy for the JP parliament was also 
vetoed. But Erbakan managed to be elected as an independent candidate for 
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Konya in 1969. This was followed by the establishment of the NOP on 26 January 
1970. The NOP gained significant weight with its technocratic face of Islami SM. 49 
The NOP's manifesto was mainly shaped by the social, economic, political and 
historical contexts of Turkey, although, it was also influenced by Islamist 
movements at the time. Erbakan's religious outlook was influenced by the leader 
of the Nakshibendi religious order then. It is important to emphasise that although 
the NOP was unable to declare its Islamist identity in print, since all political parties 
in Turkey had to conform to the secular principles of the Republic, its first 
congregation was opened with the words "God is great". This was rather 
unacceptable to secular forces. The NOP drew attention to the fact that there had 
been a growth in petty bourgeois trade and artisan associations with religious bias 
as a means of self-defence against the new capitalism of the 1960s. Erbakan 
articulated their perspective that the opening up of the economy was undermining 
the traditional socio-economic base of Anatolian society. The NOP's opposition to 
the JP was not based on industrial isation itself, but on the mode of industrial isation 
since "development and progress by heavy industrialisation" was one of the 
preferred measures of the NOP, and later of its successors. It argued that 
investments in the assembly industry could not break the ties of a satellite 
economy. It pressed for an even development across the country to diminish 
regional imbalances. However, the NOP's programme was, in a sense, 
contradictory (Saribay, 1985; 129). Considering that it articulated the views of the 
diminished traditional middle class, aiming for heavy industrialisation would 
necessarily mean their degradation. Yet the solution, despite its vagueness, was 
presented as the insertion of such groups as peasants, workers, civil servants, 
4) 
A structural analysis of the Welfare Party's Islamist manifesto will be given in Chapter seven. 
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artisans and low income earners into the economic process, by their becoming 
shareholders in the newly established industrial complexes. 
The import-substitution strategy reached its saturation point by the early 1970s, 
when the expansion of the domestic market had developed as far as possible. 
Further growth was possible by opening up to the world markets. Therefore, the 
implementation of an export-oriented strategy in accordance with the restructuring 
of the international division of labour was the next step. The dissatisfaction of 
Istanbul-based industrialists with the performance of the TOBB led to the 
emergence of the Turkish Industrial ists'and Businessmen'Association (TCJSiAD), 
a voluntary organisation, in 1971 in order for them to be able intervene in larger 
political processes. The TOSiAD aimed to promote the rapid accumulation of 
finance capital under industrialists' control at the expense of merchant, banking 
and agricultural interests, which distinguished their position from that of the multi- 
functional TOBB. Agricultural and commercial interests and the growing working 
class were perceived to be obstructing the opening up of the economy. The 
TOSiAD campaigned for integration with the world market, although this process 
of transformation would have further negative effects on the domestically based 
nascent industry and on the material well-being of the traditional middle class base 
of the JP, such as artisans, craftsmen and merchants (Ramazanoolu, 1985: 84-7). 
The TOSiAD's views reflected the interests of the largest and most prosperous 
firms, which are less labour intensive and have greater access to foreign capital 
and technology. For the dominant capitalist class, "the opening-up of the 
economy" meant increased state assistance for exports, the easing up of 
exchange control regulations and the encouragement of foreign investment rather 
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than any systematic reduction in the degree of protection it enjoyed in the 
domestic market. The new strategies were aimed to attract a steady flow of foreign 
capital for investment, and restructure the Turkish economy through foreign 
competition. The insistence of the JP on acquiring associate membership of the 
European Economic Community (EEC) then was a part of this orientation. Yet the 
JP faced a dilemma in translating the coherent economic power of its electoral 
base into political practices, which aimed to gain monopolistic use of state power 
by the dominant faction of the bourgeoisie. This was because the middle class 
base of the JP had already started slipping away as a result of the primary 
allocation of public resources to industry in preference to landed interests and 
small business, where capitalist production was much less developed. 
As a result not only of the fragmentation of the right-wing but also of the challenge 
from the left, the JP lost a significant portion of its urban votes from the lower- 
classes in the'1970s, mainly because of its socio-economic policies and the 
increasing bottlenecks in the economy. There had already been a massive and 
rapid uprooting of labour from the land because of the processes of 
mechanisation, commercial development and the differentiation and 
reorganisation of production in agriculture in some parts of the country. This, in 
turn, led to the acceleration of the differentiation of the rural population, and 
widening rural inequalities. Dispossessed or impoverished peasants and petty 
commodity producers became wage labourers and started migrating from 
countryside to towns and cities. Although the growth of industry had led to an 
increasing demand for wage labour, the rate of urbanisation due to mass 
immigration from rural to industrial centres was far beyond that of industrial isation. 
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The result was increasing unemployment and subsequently the fall of many 
immigrants settling in shanty-towns to below the poverty line. The accelerating 
economic crisis since the late 1960s, which was partly due to increasing foreign 
debt, rising inflation and entry onto the world market on unequal terms, further 
reduced the living standards of low-level income earners. Consequently, the JP 
lost a significant portion of its urban vote from lower-classes in the 1970s. Growing 
popular demands for social justice and economic redistribution gave chance to the 
Republican People's Party, which, in the late 1960s, was struggling to become a 
party of the urban and rural lower classes. This led to the establishment of a 
splinter party from the ranks of the RPP, the Republican Reliance Party (RReP), 
which had strong ties to large landowners. But it had a relatively small impact at 
national level (see Table 2). Yet the movement was vital for the RPP, as the voting 
results of the 1950-65 period showed that the RPP had not been able to return to 
power electorally since it was defeated in the 1950 election by the DP. This was 
despite doing well in the least developed regions of eastern Turkey, where the 
sources of support were still tied to tribal chieftains. After the 1965 election, the 
RPP and its newly elected leader, BCjlent Ecevit, declared itself a social 
democratic party, left of the centre. Contrary to Kemalist populism, the populism 
of the RPP in the 1970s acknowledged the existence of classes and their 
conflicting interests. However, its basic goal was still a harmonious society 
promoted by an egalitarian approach to social welfare and economic planning. 
The RPP sought to take political power by encouraging the mass participation in 
politics of urban lower class groups and rural voters. This was to be the basis for 
a specific socio-economic program which included the need for agrarian reform, 
social welfare and improvement in the living standards of lower income groups. 
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Several references were made after the 1969 election campaign to the issue that 
the RIP P was no longer the party of the large-land owning class, but of the people. 
It was crucial for the left to turn to the peasantry as a potential force because they 
were a numerically important and rapidly changing group, although politically they 
had gone unrecognised. However, the peasantry was far from being a 
homogenous group, which included landed as well as landless peasants, share- 
coppers, and wage earners. This meant that there would be differential responses 
by these different parts of the peasantry to various types of political activity. This 
was very obvious in the election results. In any sense, the populist image of the 
RPP was instrumental in its attempt to distinguish itself from its authoritarian past 
and its identification with the 1960 military coup (Sunar: 1 974: 177). Yet the RPP 
had to compete ideologically with the far left, the Marxist Turkish Labour Party 
(LP), which was able to send MPs to Parliament in 1965 due to its relative 
strength among industrial workers. But apart from being subject to sustained 
harassment by government, the LP could not pose a real threat to the RPP 
because of its continual fragmentation, the absence of effective leadership and its 
identification by voters as an inte I lectua Is' club. Nevertheless, both the RPP and 
the LIP managed to raise opposition from industrial workers to the JP's 
government, by emphasising the fact that the workers, despite being given the 
right to collective bargaining and striking by the 1961 Constitution, were unable to 
obtain wage increases in keeping with rising productivity. Increasing opposition to 
government policies and a big strike by industrial workers in June 1970, described 
by the government as a "dress rehearsal for a revolution", led to the enforcement 
of the constraints of political actions and the declaration of martial law in the 
industrial provinces. The government was unable to respond to the increasing 
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demands of rising socio-economic groups, nor to provide political stabi I ityrequired 
by dominant capital in the transitional period, during which production was being 
restructured and money markets were being established. Finally, the alleged 
threat of communism to the Republic was used by the army to intervene for the 
second time, in 1971, with an ultimatum which demanded the dissolution of the 
J P's government. Freedoms granted by the constitution were suspended (Ahmad, 
1985: 203). The 1971 intervention obtained the dissolution of the NOP and the 
LP. The NOP was banned from politics by order of the Constitutional Court for 
violating the secular character of the Republic. The aim for the successive military- 
civilian government from 1971 to 1973 was therefore to secure the conditions of 
existence for the dominance of industrial and financial capital. 
The 1973 general election restored the civilian rule. Prior to the election, in 
October 1972 the banned NOP was re-embodied in the National Salvation Party. 
The election results demonstrated the extent of fragmentation in the right wing. 
The DeP and NSP were the third largest parties in terms of the size of their 
parliamentary delegations, followed by the JP and the RPP. The NSP remained 
a significant force in politics between the years 1974 to 1980 by taking part as a 
coalition partner in successive governments, while the DeP was soon dissolved 
in favour of the JP. The existence of various right-wing political parties gave the 
RPP opportunityto come to power in 1974, underthe leadership of Ecevit. Having 
received 33.3 percent of the vote, it formed a coalition government with the NSP. 
Being part of such a coalition, despite its Islamist outlook, was very important for 
the NSP because it gave them political legitimacy after the dissolution of its 
predecessor on the grounds of the secularist principles of the Republic. 
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However, the populist rhetoric of the RPP aimed to gain the support of the 
expanding working class, the government, which represented conflicting interests, 
did not provide the necessary framework for an open economy in accordance with 
what the dominant capital had desired. It may be argued that a rapid 
transformation of Turkish capitalism that was within the international division of 
labour and through democratic channels was not feasible. Turkey's position in the 
world capitalist system had to be restructured because of: the growing bottlenecks 
in the domestic economy; the steadily diminishing of international markets at a 
steady pace for Turkish products; the adverse effects of the 1973 rise in oil prices; 
the increasing unwillingness of centres of international capital to bail out Turkey; 
and the effects of the American embargo after the 1974 intervention in Cyprus. 
Political instability caused by the short-lived coalition governments, increased 
political polarization, the militant activities of both left and right and the widespread 
use of violence against each other, became the salient features of political 
activities in the late 1970s. After the resignation of the prime minister Ecevit in 
September 1974, the JP, the NAP and the NSP established the first National Front 
government in March 1975. The elections in 1977 did not bring enough votes to 
the RPP to establish a majority government. It was prevented from functioning by 
the JP and had to resign after failing to secure a confidence vote from the 
parliament. The same year witnessed the formation of the second National Front 
government under the leadership of the JP. Meanwhile, the economy was 
approaching a crisis position. In 1979, when the JP was in power as a minority 
government, the IMF's assistance, in order to extend credit facilities needed to 
service foreign debts and to tackle the economic problems, was on the agenda. 
Finally, on 24 January 1980 the government accepted an austerity package. The 
173 
measures suggested by the IMF aimed to transform the economic and political 
structures and bring them into line with the pre-requisites of the world capitalist 
system. It demanded the devaluation of the Turkish Lira, the lowering of wages, 
increases in taxes which gave priority to the export sector, the opening of the 
economy to international competition, the encouragement of foreign capital, the 
introduction of policies that would cause the transformation of the agricultural 
sector, and privatisation of the state economic enterprises, which owned 47 
percent of the industry. The state economic enterprises were the keystone of 
etatistpolicies and intime becamethefocus of political action, whichwas confined 
largely to competition over employment in the expanded state sector in exchange 
for votes. The last measure aimed to alter the powerful position of the (civil) 
bureaucracy. The government's lack of success in controlling inflation, removing 
shortages and countering terrorism gradually reduced its popular support. The 
austerity programme was welcomed by the TOSiAD and the Istanbul Chamber of 
Industry, since international credits had always been vital for their members. As 
the government was unable to provide political stability and order, it could not 
therefore implement such an extensive package, which caused widespread social 
unrest. The political stability needed for the implementation of economic measures 
to open up the economy without resistance from the lower classes was provided 
by the third military intervention on 12 September 1980. Therefore, the 
contradictions between the requirements of capitalist expansion and a liberal form 
of parliamentary democracy appeared to have been resolved by the military 
intervention, in favour of the dominant capital (Ramazanoglu, 1985; 92-4). It 
seems that the coup, which swept daily violence and terror away in a remarkably 
short time, was well planned in terms of timing by the military in association with 
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their national and international supporters, in order to provide the maximum 
possible popular support. 
The transformation of the political structure, which placed the emphasis on "the 
rule of law" rather than "the rule of parliament", was completed after this 
intervention (Heper 1987). By reenforcing and enlarging presidential power and 
the legal status of the National Security Council (NSC) as well as that of the 
Constitutional Court, the bureaucracy's access to state power was expanded at 
the expense of that of the parliamentarian system. The military regime ensured a 
ban on strikes and established a tight level of control over the labour force. All 
trade union activities were banned and strikes were made illegal. All political 
parties and civil organisations were dissolved and austerity measures were 
reintroduced in a climate in which there was no right of demonstration. Politicians 
of the preceding decade were charged with treason. The exclusion of peasants 
and workers from the debates about development policies was ensured. There 
was an effective censorship of the mass media and opposition was silenced by the 
detention of dissidents. The elimination of minor parties on both the right and the 
left by the military was thought to be crucial in order to built a two-party system 
whichwould end the coalition governments and provide constant political stability. 
However, this aim was not realised as the fragmentation of the Turkish party 
system further deepened in the 1980s and finally witnessed the accession of the 
Welfare Party to power in the mid-1990s. This took place in the context of 
continuing rapid social development and the restructuring of the economy in favour 
of big capital, which further intensified the dissatisfaction with mainstream political 
parties on both the left and the right. 
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The National Salvation Party and the 1973 Election 
The 1973 election had important impacts for both the NSP and the RPP. The 
former campaigned before the 1973 election with a manifesto which included: (a) 
a religious view of the world; (b) a call for rapid industrialisation; and (c) a re- 
distributive populist economic and social ethic (Mardin, 1977: 292). The NSP had 
an agenda which took industrialisation as its most important asset, alongside 
having an Islamic outlook in internal policies and an anti-Western attitude in 
international relations. It differed from the mainstream right-wing not in terms of its 
notion of "what constitutes the Turkish nation", but rather in terms of its attitude to 
Islam in the political sphere. In its view, Islam was an essential ingredient in the 
founding of the Turkish nation. This view strongly emphasized Islamic heritage, 
and therefore can be contrasted with the Kemalist notion of nationalism, which 
focuses upon the pre-Islamic past and avoids the Ottoman past. By and large, this 
view was close to that of the centre-right, the DP and the JP, although, it differed 
in terms of the use of Islamic principles in public policies. The centre-right, namely 
the IDP of Adnan Menderes and the JP of SCileyman Demirei, had represented a 
moderate secularist approach in comparison with Kemalist secularism (Landau 
1974). The governments of the IDP and those of the JP showed this by easing 
state control over religion, e. g. the overt re-functioning of religious orders and 
charity organisations, as these dervish orders were still illegal and their gatherings 
were liable to be raided by police; the foundation of two more higher Islamic 
Institutes in Istanbul and Konya, the first of which was founded in Ankara during 
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the RPIP's rule; and increasing the number of vocational schools (Imam-Hatips), 
set up originally by the RPP to train preachers, and later allowing their graduates 
to enter into science faculties. Such organisations have provided further religious 
education under the authority of the Ministry of Education. The NSP, however, 
advocated the incorporation of religious values into governmental policies, besides 
pressing for the extension of religious teaching at all levels of education. For 
example, in the economic sphere, the NSP aimed to redistribute governmental 
facilities, e. g. import quotas, credits and foreign exchange, from big businesses to 
medium and small business, i. e. to the rising petty capitalists of Anatolia, with 
reference to Islamic principles of social justice. It also argued for putting an end to 
lending money with interest, both on secular and religious grounds. Such a call 
was meaningful for small business as it attempted to gain access to public 
resources in favourable conditions in a system in which the political authority, 
through complicated systems of credits, tariffs and quotas, controlled much of the 
nature of economic functioning and therefore had the means to decide on the 
extension of market privileges to chosen manufacturers. On the issues of 
economic and foreign policies, the JP's government was equated with the loss of 
political sovereignty; the slavery of Turkey to Western powers through the NATO 
and the European Economic Community (ECC); and the degeneration of cultural, 
moral and ethical values. For the NSP, this was instrumental in mobilising various 
centres of opposition, that were economic and national as well as religious. The 
EEC was defined as a Christian club. Opposition to the Common Market was due 
to the NSP's protectionist attitude for small-scale nascent industry, which appealed 
to small businessmen and leftist intelligentsia alike. The academic left (Boratav 
1983) argued that economic independence and independent industrial isation were 
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interrelated and therefore opposed to the Common Market. The NSP advocated 
an independent and nationalist foreign policy, the main principle of which would be 
the defence of basic rights and justice as well as the institutionalisation of closer 
relations with (Muslim) nations with which Turkey had geographical, cultural and 
historical affinity (Landau 1976; Ozbudun 1987; Ahmad 1991). Its populist 
approach, which touched on democracy, distributive justice, freedom of 
conscience and other liberties, was geared to mobilise the various centres of 
dissatisfaction with the JP's policies. Apart from its hostility to freemasons, 
communists and Zionists, its opposition to family planning and birth control and its 
desire for the strengthening of national morals in educational institutions were 
quite familiar to Islamist ideology in general. 
It can be argued that the NSP gained support in different parts of country for 
different reasons. From the election results, it is clear that the NSP drew its voting 
strength not only from the former JP voters but from a variety of other sources. 
The NSP gained votes at the expense of both major parties, the RPP and the JP, 
in certain provinces. A positive correlation between the electoral gains of the NSP 
and the electoral losses of the JP or the RPP indicate a considerable amount of 
direct switching in some provinces (Ozbudun 1987). Such a correlation between 
the parties' provincial voting percentages means that they appealed to the same 
regions of the country. For example, in provinces like Sakarya, KCjtahya, Samsun, 
Nigde and Tokat, all of which are to some extent developed, the NSP seems to 
have received its votes at the expense of both the JP and the RPP. In provinces 
like Bitlis and GCjmCj§hane, the least developed regions, it managed to canalise 
former RPP votes, while in provinces such as Kocaeli, which is substantially 
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developed; Eskiýehir and Kayseri, which are medium-developed; and Erzurum, the 
least developed, the NSP received a portion of the JP's votes. In this sense, it is 
misleading to argue that the NSP in both the 1973 and 1977 elections received 
much of its votes from less developed provinces, and therefore from a less 
modernised section of the population, 5' because seventy percent of the population 
was still living in rural areas in the 1970s. Although, the NSP did relatively well in 
the eastern regions, where the strength of the Nakshibendi order and voting 
patterns are thought to be interrelated, its base of support was far from localised. 
Rather, it was much more diversified. Comparing the electoral strength of the NSP 
in the provinces in which it received its highest percentage of votes (see Table 3) 
with those where it acquired its lowest level (see Table 4), no significant pattern 
emerges when one considers the degree to which these provinces were 
developed, and the general qualities of voters, such as age, sex, and the rate and 
level of literacy. Therefore, a geographical analysis of the votes with reference to 
development level is not sufficient to show that the NSP was a party of less 
developed (or culturally less modern) regions or groups, in the absence of 
substantial survey data which provides which socio-economic groups voted for 
which parties. Rather, it can be argued that the National Salvation Party received 
a trans-class base of support at the electoral level, while at the leadership level it 
was not based on the traditional strata of Turkish society or marginal economic 
groups. From the backgrounds of its representatives to parliament, it is clear that 
the NSP consisted of middle-class people (Toprak 1981), such as engineers, 
lawyers, teachers, public servants and religious instructors, who demonstrated that 
elite culture was no longer as monolithic as it once was. 
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See for example, A. Y. Saribay (1985) TUrkiye'de Modemlqme, Din ve Parti Politikasi. 
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For the RPP, the 1973 election was characterised by a shift in big city votes. The 
JP lost heavily in the large cities, although in the elections of 1965 and 1969, it had 
received disproportional ly more votes from the gecekondu" areas compared to the 
RPP. Such predominant lower-class support for a party that was dominantly 
rallying for the interests of capitalists was not paradoxical, since the RPP had been 
associated with urban intellectuals, bureaucrats and landlords. Low-level income 
groups living in these areas might have seen the JP as the party which could apply 
policies geared to changing their position. Prior to the 1973 election, the RPP had 
done well in middle-class and upper middle-class areas, compared to its poor 
performance in the gecekondu settings. However, the 1973 election indicated that 
the urban poor felt alienated by the socio-economic policies of the JP. In this 
context, the switch of a significant portion of urban and/or rural votes between and 
within political wings needs to be highlighted. Such shifts in party alignment often 
take place when economic policies backed by the dominant economic groups 
prove to be detrimental to disadvantaged economic groups. Voters turn to 
alternative parties, which are expected to respond to the neglected demands of 
rising socio-economic groups. This is observable both in the rise and the decline 
of the centre-right and centre-left since 1970. To an extent it is demonstrated by 
the gains in 1973 and the losses in 1977 of the NSP; and the rise of the Welfare 
Party in 1995 and the six percent decline in electoral support for its successor, the 
Virtue Party, in 1999. 
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Table 3: The Distribution of Votes among the Parties in the General 
Elections in the Ten Provinces 
The term 'gecekond u' literally means those settlements illegally built (overnight) on unowned land 
in or around cities. It is often used in general to refer to buildings which lack the necessary 
infrastructure. 
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5.2. The 1995 Election That Brought The Welfare Party to Power 
The return to civilian rule after 1980 was marked by the establishment of new 
political parties. Prior the 1983 election, several parties, including the Welfare 
Party, were established as successors to the banned parties. However, only three 
parties, the Motherland Party, the Populist Party and the National Democratic 
Party, which was favoured by the military, were allowed by the military regime to 
take part in the 1983 election. The Welfare Party running under a care-taker 
leader, as Erbakan had been banned from politics, was vetoed from the election 
alongside a number of other parties. The general election in 1983, which resulted 
in the newly established "centre-right" Motherland Party52 (MP) coming into off ice, 
where they remained until 1991, was an important step for the re-establishment 
of democratic rule. Erbakan returned to politics as the leader of the Welfare Party 
in 1987, when the sanction on former leaders of political parties taking part in 
political activity was lifted by a referendum. 
There was a steady increase in the electoral base of the Welfare Party from 1987 
and it finally rose to power in 1995 with twenty-one percent of general votes at the 
expense of both the centre-right and to an extent the centre-left, especially in local 
government. It became a partner in a coalition government in 1996 due to the 
combination of several factors, economic, social and political. " It is necessary to 
emphasize that the decline of the centre-right and centre-left parties (see Table 5), 
52 
53 
The Motherland Party then claimed that it combined four political positions: liberal, conservative, 
nationalist and religious. 
Chapter seven explains the reasons behind the electoral success of the Welfare Party on the basis 
of small scale qualitative research. 
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except for the DLP in 1999, indicates a considerable level of dissatisfaction with 
the political system in general and a widening vacuum in the centre of politics. This 
in turn has been filled by so-called fringe parties moving to the centre, given the 
distribution of the votes among the parties in the three consecutive general 
parliamentary elections in 1987,1991,1995, and lately in April 1999. 
Table 5: The Distribution of Votes Among the Parties in the General Elections 
between 1969 and 1999 (in percentages) 
Election 
Years 
THE RIGHT BLOCK* THE LEFT BLOCK 
JP/ 
TPP 
NSP/ 
WPNP 
NAP MIDP MP RPP/PP/ 
SDPP/RPP 
DLP DEP/ 
PDP 
1969 46.5 --- 3.0 --- --- 27.4 
1973 29.8 11.8 3.4 --- --- 33.3 
1977 36.9 8.6 6.4 --- --- 41.4 
1983 --- --- --- 23.3 45.1 30.5 --- 
1987 19.1 7.2 2.9 --- 36.3 24.8 8.5 --- 
1991 27.0 16.9 --- 24.0 20.8 10.8 --- 
1995 19.2 21.4 8.2 19.6 10.7 14.6 4.2 
1999 11.9 15.3 17.9 --- 13.2 8.7 22.0 4.7 
Source: Compiled from General Election of Representatives: Results by Provinces, 1977: General 
Election of Representatives: Results by Provinces, 1995; and 1995 by the Statistics Institute and 
the General Election Results of 1999 on http: //www. tr-net. 
JP: Justice Party 
NSP: National Salvation Party 
WP: Welfare Party 
VP: Virtue Party 
NAP: Nationalist Action Party 
NDP: Nationalist Democracy Party 
MP: Motherland Party 
TPP: True Path Party 
RPP: Republican People's Party 
PP: Populist Party 
SDPP: Social Democrat Populist Party 
DLP: Democratic Left Party 
DEP: Democracy Party 
PDP: People's Democracy Party 
Certain characteristics related to the elections must be taken into consideration: 
firstly, the military interventions in 1960,1971 and 1980 and the ban on political 
186 
parties to some extent limits the analysis of election results. The usefulness of the 
results of the 1983 election, which resulted in the victory of the Motherland Party, 
is limited in terms of identifying continuities within party attachments. In this sense, 
the election of 1987 became a crucial point for comparison with the 1995 election, 
as the ban on ex-politicians' involvement in political activities was lifted by 
referendum in 1985. The leaderships were taken over by the old leaders, Demirel 
of the TPP, Ecevit of the DLP, Erbakan of the Welfare and TCjrke§ of the NAP. 
While the fragmentation in the right-wing was exacerbated by the split of the 
"centre-right", the "centre-left" was also divided between two parties, mainly due 
to intra-elite conflict. On the right wing, the Motherland Party (MP) and the True 
Path Party (TPP) were the successors of the Party of the JP. On the left wing, the 
Social Democrat Populist Party (SDPP) became the mass party. it merged with its 
splinter group, the (new) Republican People's Party (RPP), in 1994 and was 
named after it to claim traditional leadership of the left against the Democratic Left 
Party (DLP), of Ecevit, who was the leader of the Republican People's Party in the 
1970s. Ecevit declined all attempts to converge initially with the SDPP and later 
with the RPP. Secondly, there was a coalition in the 1991 election between the 
Welfare Party and the Nationalist Action Party in order to pass the 10 percent 
national threshold. As they split up after the election, it is impossible to evaluate 
the strength of either in this election. However, the strength of the Welfare Party 
in 1995 in the provinces where it increased its votes compared to the joint results 
of 1991, provides some insights. For the same reason the People's Democracy 
Party (Kurdish nationalist party) also signed an electoral deal with the Social 
Democrat Populist Party. Similarly, the Great Union Party had an election deal with 
the Motherland Party in 1995. Again, it is difficult to break down the votes between 
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the two parties. Thirdly, Turkey was divided into 67 provinces in pre-1 990 period, 
74 provinces in the 1991 election, and 79 provinces in the 1995 election. 
As seen above, from a national perspective, it can be said that the right with its all 
various parties has been able to keep its share of votes (about 60 to 70 percent 
since the 1950s). However, this does not mean that Turkish voters have remained 
totally conservative in their political views, contrary to what Schmuelevitz argues 
(1996: 167). It is important to emphasize that despite the conventional left and 
right division, there has been electoral movement between the two sides of the 
ideological spectrum. Given that 41 percent of general votes for the Republican 
People's Party in 1977 (compared to 37 percent for the JP, 8.6 percent for the 
NSP and 6.4 percent for the Nationalist Action Party) and 30 percent for the 
Populist Party in 1983 (compared to 45 percent for the MP and 23 percent for the 
Nationalist Democracy Party), it is clear that the left experienced a loss of 11 
percent of votes at the national level in favour of the either of two other parties in 
1983, and did not reach its 1970s level until 1999. A provincial level analysis 
shows the movement of votes within and between the right and left wings of the 
spectrum. The comparison of left-wing and right-wing votes over the three 
elections, 1987,1991 and 1995, in three big cities, Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara, 
shows that the right did considerably better than the left. For example, in Istanbul 
between 1987 and 1995 the right (including the TIPP, the MP, the WIP and the 
NAP) steadily increased its votes from about 58 percent to 65 percent while the left 
(including the RPP and the IDLP) experienced a steady decline from 40 percent to 
29 percent. In Izmir, while the right-wing votes went up from 47 percent to 61 
percent, the left-wing votes dropped from 48 percent to 37 percent. In Ankara it is 
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clear that the left lost around 5 percent of its votes, declining from 35% to 30%. 
However, the share of the vote for centre right parties steadily decreased from 
55.4 percent in 1987 to 38.8 percent in 1995 and to 25.1 percent in 1999, while 
that of the centre-left parties fell from 33.3 percent to 25.3 percent and rose again 
to 30.85 percent in 1999 due to the DLP's relative success in office, and to some 
extent due to nationalist causes, as the leader of the PKK was captured by 
security forces prior to the election. The Welfare Party increased its votes from 
7.25 percent to 21.4 percent, but it declined to 15.39 percent in 1999 for the Virtue 
Party, the successor to the WP, although it maintained its success in the local 
elections. However, the Turkish nationalist NAP, experienced an increase from 
2.9 percent in 1987 to 8.2 percent in 1995, and to 17.9 percent in 1999 at the 
expense of the MP and the TPP, and to an extent the VP. Another important 
implication is that the PDP, the Kurdish nationalist party, experienced an increase 
in its share of the vote especially in the south-eastern region. In some provinces 
it reached over 40 percent of the vote, though its national rating stayed under 5 
percent. It is clear that the centre-right parties lost a considerable amount of their 
votes in one decade to the "Islamist" Welfare Party and the Nationalist Action Party 
at national level, the centre-left to a great extent, and the WP to some extent over 
an election period, to the Kurdish nationalist PDP at regional level. This means 
that an average of about 30 percent of the vote shifted within the right-wing block. 
It can be argued that this signifies a reflection of the weakening party identification 
among the electorate and consequently, significant instability and fluctuations of 
votes among parties, given the increased electoral success of the so-called fringe 
parties. The party structure within the blocks and between the centre-right and the 
centre-left, which lost 8 percent of its voters in 1995, has declined from the points 
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of view of their supporters according to a nationwide survey conducted in 1995 
(Qarkoolu, 1998: 553). The major parties on both wings have similarly referred to 
universally popular issues, such as the market economy, a smaller state, 
democracy and human rights in their election agendas. In terms of party agendas 
which characterise the left- right dimension, Qarkoglu indicates that the relative 
stability of the left-right system came to an end in the 1995 election. The centre-left 
DLP moved to the right by emphasizing freedom, human rights and smaller and 
more efficient government, while the centre-right TPP moved to the left with issues 
on its agenda, such as education, social services, the European Union and 
democracy (1998: 558). As will be seen in the next chapter, the Welfare Party's 
agenda consisted of civil society issues, freedom, civil liberties and democracy 
with a focus on: oppressive attitudes towards minority groups and belief systems 
(27 percent of the agenda, the highest compared to that of other parties); general 
economic goals and growth; support for free enterprise; social justice; the need to 
combat corruption; decentralisation; administrative efficiency; morality and the 
protection of the national way of life as well as national independence and anti- 
imperialism. Although the Welfare Party had throughout the eighties and nineties 
been the furthest right party, it had a rapidly changing profile on its main issues 
between the elections. Given the fragmentation of the Turkish party system, it can 
be argued that the Welfare Party, as an untried alternative with increasing success 
in local governments, filled a vacuum by moving to the centre (1998; 558). Politics 
in the nineties is characterised with a "representation crisis", as there was a rise 
in the number of splinter parties while the MP, the TPP and the RPP have 
experienced a steady decline. 
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The election results of 1995 signified a high degree of dissatisfaction with the 
government policies undertaken by the major political parties of the centre-left and 
centre-right. A brief review of the social indicators of development, for example, 
demography, health, education, income and consumption, industry, labour, and 
communication suggests that although Turkey has changed greatly over recent 
decades, economic growth has tended to result in a very uneven pattern of 
development. The ratio of literacy rose from about 20 percent in thel 930s to 55 
percent in the 1970s and just over 80 percent in 1990 for the whole of the 
population. For the male population, that increased from 30 percent to 70 percent 
and to 88 percent, for the female population from 10 percent to 40 percent and to 
70 percent over the same period. If we accept the 1970s as a turning point for the 
development of Turkey, the economic indicators show that the composition of 
population in terms of occupation has been steadily changing. For example, the 
rate of total population engaged in agriculture fell from about 75 percent in the 
1950s to 67 percent in the 1970s and 54 percent in the 1990s, while the rate of 
those engaged in non-agricultural production rose from 9 percent to 24 percent 
and that of those in commercial, administrative and service sectors and 
professionals from 13 percent to 22 percent (The Statistical Yearbook: 1996). 
However, the impact of change has been differentially felt due to sharp imbalances 
between regions, economic sectors and social classes. The Constitution of 1982 
has excluded the subordinate classes from any effective participation in the 
political decision-making process. Any challenge to the status quo or attempt to 
broaden power sharing has been faced with the use of force and repression, which 
in the long term has deepened political conflicts and social unrest. The Motherland 
governments (1983-1991) and the coalition government of the True Path Party and 
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the Social Democrat Populist Party (1991-1995) had implemented economic 
policies based on restrictive monetary policies with successive devaluations, 
aimed at reducing domestic demand and increasing export under the supervision 
of the IMF. On the one hand, the aim of austerity programmes has been to 
consolidate economic power in the largest corporations or holdings, represented 
by the TOSM, with just over four hundred members. Accordingly, credits, 
investment and export promotion incentives have led to a distributional shift in 
favour of the private sector, as the privatisation of public corporations was on the 
agenda. However, within the private sector the bias against relatively small 
enterprises in the provision of government services and other incentives has 
continued, particularly in the allocation of credits and foreign exchange. High 
interest rates almost brought small firms to the brink of bankruptcy since increased 
costs and higher prices meant losing their customers who had reduced spending 
power. The austerity programmes have negatively affected small enterprises which 
were essentially home-oriented and dependent upon state subsidies. The 
stabilisation measures ended state subsidies to the smaller sectors of industry. 
This trend led to the establishment of the Anatolian based MOSiAD, the 
Association of Independent Businessmen (allegedly known as the Association of 
Muslim Businessmen) in 1990 by young businessmen, with an average age of 
under 33. It is the largest volunteer organization, with more than 3,000 members. 
The MOSiAD, whose headquarters is in Istanbul, has established branches 
throughout the country, although the largest membership is located in some of the 
major metropolitan centres, such as Konya, Ankara, izmir, Bursa, Kocaeli, and 
Kayseri. It includes medium-sized or small firms, which have managed to enter into 
international trade, mostly with the East and Middle East, with little or no subsidy 
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from the state. Most of these firms are located in centres with industrial and 
commercial potential, such as Diyarbakir, Balikesir, Gaziantep, Kahramanmara§, 
Samsun, Qorum, Malatya, Denizli, ýanliurfa, and ýankin. In most of these 
provinces given above, the Welfare Party received a significant portion of the vote 
in the 1995 election (see Table 9 at the end of this chapter). The MOSiAD's 
institutional aims, which are largely influenced by the successful models of East 
Asian capitalism, have shown significant correspondence with those of the Welfare 
Party. For example, it aims to create "a developed country with advanced 
high-tech industry..., but without sacrificing national and moral values, [a just] 
distribution of national income... Members of the organization... are dedicated to 
finding solutions to the problems of Turkey, Islamic countries in the region and 
mankind in generaf'(http: //mCisiad. com. tr). The mobilization of public resources for 
these purposes is essential, of course. It is important to emphasize that the rise 
of a "Muslim bourgeoisie" from the 1980s onwards has often been linked to the 
flow of "Islamic capital" into the country, especially in the financial sector with the 
establishment of so-called" Islamic banks". Although, its size has rapidly increased 
in the last two decades, the overall share of this capital in the economy has been 
minimal, since more than 80 percent of all foreign capital invested in Turkey comes 
from the EU and the OECD countries. 54 
The competition among various sectors of the economy for the statep2tron2ge, 
signified different party preferences within the right-wing. While other sectors of the 
economy have been alienated by the economic policies of the centre right, the 
54 
Statistics on foreign capital, on http: //www. spo. gov. tr. 
19 3 
preoccupation of the TOSiAD's elites, who own the largest corporations in Turkey, 
with stability that allows high profits rather than with reformist measures which 
would enlarge the internal market has been apparent in their party preferences 
and attitudes towards political issues. Given the linkage and dependence between 
the large industrial firms and foreign capital, and the high degree of concentration 
of economic power in the form of monopolies and oligopolies in industry, they have 
supported the centre-right parties, such as the JP, the MP or the TPP, which have 
made much of the danger of etatism. The TOSiAD has welcomed state 
intervention when it was used to support, subsidize or protect large enterprises 
within the industrial sector. In general, the smaller firms which have been denied 
access to state patronage have found it more difficult to gain a significant advance. 
Therefore, for nationalist-oriented groups within the smaller firms, party 
preferences reflected their economic interests, as the MOSM supported the 
Welfare Party. The conflict between MOSiAD's members and other factions of the 
economy was exacerbated when they showed an interest in the state economic 
institutions to be privatised, including some in the defence industry. The allocation 
by the Welfare Party's government of incentive certificates to some firms within the 
MOSiAD was met with outrage by the "secular faction" of the economy. In 1997, 
for example, within the military institution the Office of the Chief of Staff distributed 
a list identifying so-called "Islamist companies", and prohibited any commercial 
dealing with them. 
On the other hand, income distribution has become one of the major issue on that 
the ruling parties have been challenged in the1980s and 1990s. The policies 
conducted under the stabilisation programmes have aggravated the erosion of real 
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wages. The consumer price indexes give an average 75 percent of inflation over 
the decade since the late eighties, while the increase in average daily wages for 
insured workers has been substantially below the rate of the increase in the cost 
of living index. According to the consumer price indexes for the period between 
1988 and 1999, the rate of inflation has been as follows: 77 % in 1988,64 % in 
1989,60 % in 1990,71 % in 1991,65 % in 1992,71 % in 1993,125 % in 1994, 
78 % in 1995,76 % in 1996,99 % in 1997,68 % in 1998 and 61 % by March 1999 
(http: //www. die. gov. tr). Consequently, before the'1995 election, the disparity in 
income distribution had widened to the detriment of low-level income earners (see 
Table 6). Despite the fact that a substantial proportion of population has been 
elevated out of absolute property, the share of low-level income earners over three 
decades has not been improved. Rather, inequality has increased as a result of 
high inflation, rapid urbanisation and inclustrialisation. The rapid urbanisation and 
development of recent decades have widened both differences in development 
and wealth between regions and those within them. 
Table 6: Income Distribution Among Families, 1969-1994 
Income Percentages 
Household 
Percentages 
1969 1987 1994 
First 20% 4.2 5.24 4.86 
Second20% 6.4 9.61 8.63 
Third 20% 10.7 14.06 12.61 
Fourth 20% 17.7 21.15 19.03 
Fifth 20% 61.0 49.94 54.88 
Source: Compiled from Korkut Boratav (1969) Gelir Dajdffnl (income Distribution) andtheResults 
of Income Distribution Survey, State Institute of Statistics (1997). 
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Table 7: Comparison of Income Distribution between 
Urban and Rural Families, 1994 
1994 Urban Rural 
First 20% 4.8 5.6 
Second20% 8.2 10.1 
Third 20% 11.9 14.8 
Fourth 20% 17.9 21.8 
Fifth 20% 57.2 47.7 
Source: Complied from statistics on Income Distribution, Statistical Yearbook, 1996. 
Among regions the Marmara (istanbul) and Aegean (izmir) regions are the most 
developed ones and accordingly have reached the highest portions of income. 
They have enjoyed a virtual monopoly on industrial activity, because of the 
reinforcement of regional dualism, despite the increased emphasis placed on 
geographically balanced growth. Because of this private industry has 
reconcentrated resources in those areas that are already most developed. Central 
Anatolia (except for Ankara as it is in the same league with Istanbul and izmir), the 
Black Sea and the Mediterranean regions occupy an intermediate position in terms 
of both the rate of development and income. The Eastern and Southeastern are 
the most backward regions and have had the lowest level of income. However, to 
a significant degree there are imbalances within them. Provinces such as 
Gaziantep, Malatya, Diyarbakir, ýanliurfa and Erzurum rank better than some 
provinces in other regions. The increasing severe distributional imbalances 
between and within urban and rural areas and among different regions reveals that 
the fifth of the population with the highest income received nearly 55 percent of the 
total income while the lowest fifth received just about .5 percent (see Tables 6 and 
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7). In the agriculture sector, income is far more unevenly distributed. The largest 
landowners have received 30 percent of total agricultural income, although they 
constitute 3 percent of all land owners. Statistics on the sectoral distribution of 
income (see Table 8) show that the rate of degradation in the share of agriculture 
in the national income has been ahead of the decline in the rate of population 
engaged in agriculture (although this is still more than fifty percent of the whole 
population). 
Table 8: Sectoral Distribution of Income, 
between 1960 and 1995 
Years Agriculture Industry Services 
1960 38 16 43 
1970 30.7 17.5 51.7 
1975 24.5 20.6 55.0 
1980 24.2 20.5 55.4 
1985 19.4 23.6 57.0 
1990 16.3 25.9 57.9 
1990 14.4 27.7 57.9 
Source: Complied from statistics on Income Distribution, Statistical Yearbook, 1996. 
On the other hand, the increasing trend toward capital intensity together with the 
rapid pace of urbanisation has exacerbated the problem of unemployment and 
underemployment, which reached almost 20 percent of the labour force in both 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. Rising unemployment among the young 
and educated members of the labour force between the ages of 15 and 29 has 
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become an intensifying social problem of the 1980s and 1990S. 
55 Turkey has 
experienced a rapid population increase between 1945 and 1990, from 19 million 
to 60 million. Accordingly, the rate of urbanisation in terms of population living in 
the urban centres rose from 25 percent in 1950s to 59 percent in 1990. The 
census results indicate that the urban population rose by 3.6 percent annually 
between 1985 and 1990, while the rural population rose by only 0.9 percent. 
However, the significant factor to be emphasized is that due to migration from 
villages to the urban areas, cities and towns, the population of big urban centres 
such as Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir has rapidly increased. These metropolitan 
centres are magnets for the more dynamic elements of the population elsewhere. 
Neither the pattern of state investment nor the new incentives offered to private 
industrialists for locating in relatively backward areas have reduced the general 
flow of labour and capital from the less developed regions to more developed 
areas. Massive migration contributes to widening disparities in regional population 
structures. To a degree this causes the relative stagnancy of provinces where the 
rate of emigration is relatively high (see Table 9 below). While the annual rate of 
the population increase in Turkey between 1985 and 1990 was 2.4 percent, the 
rate was for Istanbul 4 percent. Between 1945 and 1990, the population of Istanbul 
was multiplied by eight while that of Ankara increased eleven-fold and that of Izmir 
nine-fold. However, the expansion in public services has failed to follow this 
increase, which was primarily shown by the growing gecekondu settlements 
without appropriate infrastructure around the cities. In addition, a high level of 
emigration from the eastern and southeastern regions due to the PKK's terrorist 
55 
activities and compulsory population shifts further contributed to such a rapid 
Statistics on Labour Force, the Statistical Yearbook: 1996, by the State Statistics Institute. 
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expansion. Given the growing rate of unemployment, many have had to subsist 
below the poverty line. The rapid expansion of such settlements has created 
severe social and political problems. The governments have been unable to 
respond to the demands of new urban arrivals for public services, such as 
infrastructure, water, transportation, education and health care. Out of the total 
population of three metropolitan cities, 75 percent of Ankara , 
55 percent of 
Istanbul and 50 percent of Izmir live in shanty-like towns, which have constituted 
a considerable source of votes for the leftist SDPP in the 1980sand early 1990S56. 
However, such support slipped away in the following years in favour of other 
parties, for example the Welfare Party, because of its poor performance in 
municipalities between 1987 and 1994, when corruption allegations against its 
leading members were at their peak, and in coalition government (1991-1995), 
when it changed its name to the RPP. The RPP was in power with the centre-right 
TPP in 1994 when one of the most severe stabilisation programmes of recent 
decades was signed with the IMF. 
Migration might have played a role in the strengthening of the Welfare Party in the 
1990s, but it is difficult to decide to what extent migration may have affected the 
voting pattern in the absence of detailed survey data on the district level. However, 
a comparison of election results on the provincial level where the rate of 
immigration or emigration is significantly high may indicate the degree of influence 
of demographic changes. This can show to an extent whether demographic 
changes were influential upon the electoral strength of the Welfare Party. The rate 
56 
Statistics on Housing and Migration, the Statistical Yearbook: 1996, by the State Statistics I nstitute. 
According a new study by the State Estate Agency, the total number of gecekondu houses in 
urban areas is over 2 million, and accommodate 35 percent of the urban population (Milliyet 
newspaper, 12 April 1999) 
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of socio-economic development" for each province, which consists of 
demographic, economic, financial, educational and health indicators, " is also 
given in order to show whether there emerged a clear pattern for the Welfare 
Party's votes with respect to the level of development (see Table 9). It is important 
to highlight that there has been both stability and change in political preferences 
in cities receiving a considerable amount of immigrants as well as in those with a 
low level of population increase or even no increase. The strengthening of the 
Welfare Party has been seen both in provinces with a high rate of population 
increase and in those with limited population growth either at the expense of the 
centre-right or centre-left or both (see Table 9). In provinces with a high rate of 
emigration such as Sivas, Erzurum, Erzincan, Qorum, Qankin, Yozgat, Tokat, 
Kahramanmara§, Siirt, Bingol, Aon and Kars, the Welfare Party significantly 
increased its votes over the three elections of 1987,1991 and 1995 and received 
its highest percentages compared to its performance at national level. Although 
in 1999, this decreased in most of the provinces in favour of the National Action 
Party; in Siirt and Agri, it lost to the Kurdish nationalist PDP; and in Kars, both the 
PDP and the DLP increased their votes at the expense of the WP. There have 
been changes within and between the power blocks, as indicated above. In 
provinces such as Erzurum, Qorum, Kahramanmaraý, Diyarbakir and Tokat, more 
than 70 percent of the population is engaged in agriculture, where the rate of 
57 
59 
The rate of socio-economic development clarifies the term "urbanisation" in terms of the 
percentage of population; the population density; the population growth; the rate of migration; the 
rate of literacy; the rate of primary, secondary and university graduates; percapita income; the rate 
of workforce and output in industry, trade, agriculture and service sectors; and the availability of 
such services and facilities as education, transportation, electricity, telephone, health, including 
the number of people per physician, dentist, chemistry and hospital bed. 
The rank of development from the most developed (1st) to the least (5th) is borrowed from a study 
by Dinýer et al (1996). They measured the indicators of socio-economic development for each 
province by the Principal Component Analysis, using the measuring factors given above. 
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hidden unemployment is high. Only 5 percent of the large and middle sized 
manufacturing is based in these provinces. In Kastamonu, Hakkari and Tunceli, 
where the rates of emigration are also very high, the Welfare Party did not show 
any success. In Kars, Siirt, Bing6l, Hakkari and Tunceli, which are characterized 
by stagnation because of massive emigration, on which the terrorist activities of 
the last fifteen years have had a big impact, 60 percent of the population lives in 
rural areas, and 75 percent is engaged in agriculture. Per capita income for these 
provinces is one third of the national average. However, in Diyarbakir, where the 
PDP received 45 percent of the vote in 1999, the WP's strength was not stable, 
though it regained its 1970s level at the end of the'1990s. Some provinces in the 
East and the Southeast, such as Erzurum, Diyarbakir, ýanliurfa and 
Kahramanmara§, constitute the first bases for westward (out-regional) emigration. 
Provinces with high levels of immigration, such as Istanbul, Ankara, Kocaeli, izmir, 
Bursa, Antalya, Adana, i9el, Aydin and Denizli, show different patterns. For 
example, in Istanbul, Ankara, Kocaeli and Bursa, which, with the addition of izmir, 
are the most developed provinces, the WIP considerably increased its votes at the 
expense of both the centre-right (MP and TPP) and centre-left parties 
(SDDP/RPP). Together these provinces make up of 30 percent of the total 
population, and produce 45 percent of the national income. For example in 
Ankara, a high rate of population increase was experienced in districts, such as 
GbIba§i, Etimesgut and Sincan, where the WIP did better than its average 
provincial level, and than those of the centre-right and the centre-left parties,. 
However, the WP's share was increased in districts with a low degree of 
population increase, such as Mamak, Altindag and Kegi6ren, where gecekondu 
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settlements are widespread, and where previously the SDPP/RPP held the 
municipal governments. In istanbul, apart from the WP's stronghold districts, 59 
there emerges no significant pattern with respect to the level of population 
increase. As in Ankara, the WP seems to have increased its votes in some districts 
with or without a significant rate of population increase. However, it is important to 
emphasize that the Welfare Party's municipalities to an important extent provided 
the poor living in shanty-towns with food,, clothing, and coal in the winter. This must 
have had an influence upon its vote. In Kocaeli, the WIP increased its votes at the 
expense of the MP, the TPP and the RPP. However, it is still difficult to determine 
whether migration can in itself be a decisive factor in explaining the rise of the 
Welfare Party, since in provinces such as izmir, Aydin, Mu6la, Tekirda6, Denizli, 
Eski§ehir and Antalya, the WP's share of the vote was notably lower than its 
national level. Substantial data is necessary to offer a more detailed analysis, 
which would be able to show the movements of votes between political parties at 
district levels. 
Contrary to the often given explanation which argues that new comers in the urban 
areas under the burden of economic and social difficulties seek refuge in religion, 
this chapter has argued that the rise of "Islamism" with its significantly "Islamically 
oriented" lifestyle and organisations coincided with the period in which the 
shortcomings of the developmental state created widespread dissatisfaction. 
Significantly, in the same period, the modernisation paradigm had been under 
heavy criticism and "Islamism" all over the Muslim world had begun to be 
59 
No statistical data is found on the rate of population increase in such districts as Sultanbeyli where 
the Welfare party received more than 50 percent of the votes. 
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presented as the only/final alternative. Its emphasis upon "equality for all" and 
social justice when contrasted with experiments with state capitalism, meant that 
it could be identified with hegemonic classes. Therefore, the Welfare Party could 
turn general dissatisfaction/reaction into votes, by presenting its stance as one 
working from below against oppression, corruption and exploitation. The increasing 
weight of Islamic symbols among those who voted for the Welfare Party in 
particular or have given support or been sympathetic to Islamist 
activities/movements in general, in fact meant the articulation of demands for 
"equality" within a framework of religious rhetoric and protest. However, it cannot 
be expected that the content and means of Islamism as an ideology would have 
the same meaning for the poor, the working class or the rising "Muslim 
bourgeoisie". In other words, "Islamism" in general does not represent a 
homogenous group which holds a common formulation of "what an Islamic/Islamist 
social and political order is about". From various vaguely worded interpretations, 
which are heavily dependent upon social position and applied references, even 
within the Welfare itself one can easily infer, a liberal, democratic position as well 
as a state-centred, authoritarian version of the supposed "Islamic order". This 
means that the trans-class base of Islamists converges in their reaction to and 
criticism of the "secular" policies of the developmental state, rather than their 
proposal on how to transform or reform the existing "unjust" order, given their 
conflicting interests as far as realpolitik is concerned. This is explained further in 
Chapter seven. 
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Chapter 6: A Clash of the Two World Views: Secularism versus Islamism? 
The preceding chapters gave an analysis of the rise of the Islamist Welfare Party 
not in term s of a unique feature of Muslim societies, but of an example of the type 
of response to the inequalities of national development model. This argument is 
further strengthened by Chapter seven. However, in order to show the explanatory 
strength of this standpoint in analysing Islamism as an example of modern 
ideologies, this chapter is designed to show the shortcomings of culturalist 
perspective, and its usefulness to those who have power to interpret social world 
and distort realities. This is done in the context of its representation in both secular 
and Islamist media. This analysis contributes to the argument on the relationships 
between ideology and economic within the framework of the propaganda model 
by looking at the ways in which newspapers function as ideological apparatuses, 
or a barrier which interprets the social world in the service of propaganda through 
the coverage of specific events, in this case the rise of the Welfare Party to power. 
They have a role to perform in the production, reproduction and distribution of 
knowledge in its widest sense of sets of symbols, which have a meaningful 
relationship to experience in the social. This chapter shows that selected ways of 
thinking through press coverage are translated by those in society who have 
political and economic power into "common sense" or "common desires", which 
appears as the patural, unpolitical state of things that should be accepted by 
everyone in order to seize/maintain and interpret social and economic space. In 
the literature on Turkey there has been no critical analysis of this process with 
reference to the press. There is also a neglect of the need to analyse the political 
economy of mass communication, to illuminate the socio-economic controversy 
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over Islamism when comparing the attitudes of two perspectives within the mass 
media, secularism and Islamism. 
The propaganda model means that the mass media in their function to serve as 
a system for communicating messages and symbols to the populace can employ 
means by which dominant interests are able to distort news and marginalise 
dissent in order to mobilize support for themselves. Therefore the purposes of the 
dominant elite are promoted in the name of the "national interest" (Herman and 
Chomsky, 1994: 1-2). It reflects the belief that, within this model, their choices, 
emphases and exclusions can best be understood by analysing them in such 
terms. It is not claimed that propaganda is all that the mass media does, but it is 
seen as a very important aspect of their overall service. The propaganda model 
is based upon slogans that are continually repeated to produce an instinctive 
reaction, or the translation of a highly complicated phenomenon into a set of ideas 
capable of being expressed in short phrases that could occupy the agenda day 
after day by every possible technique of propaganda (Hoch, 1974: 49). It may be 
difficult to identify a propaganda model in action where the media are largely 
owned by private companies; where the formal censorship is absent to a 
considerable degree; and where the media attack and expose from time to time 
corporate and governmental misconducts and present themselves as a 
spokespeople for free speech and the general interest. Nevertheless, an analysis 
of the political economy of mass communication within a propaganda model 
reflects the contradiction between the crucial underpinning idea of the "free press" 
and the economic pressures towards monopoly, and the relations between the 
interests, choices and behaviours of private media systems and ideological effects 
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of broadcasting and inequality in respect of the command of resources by the 
state. Such a framework aims to answer the following questions: (a) who controls 
the media, and in whose interests?; (b) who has access to the media and on what 
terms?; (c) whose version of social reality is presented?; and (d) how effective are 
the media in achieving their chosen ends? 
This chapter is based on a textual analysis of a specific case study: the 
representations of the two 'rivals' within Kemalist ideology, Islamism and 
secularism within press coverage of the legitimacy crisis of the Welfare Party 
within the Turkish political system. By defining political issues and the amount of 
importance to be attached to a specific topic, in this case Islamism, the mass 
media set the agenda for public discussion. Their political impact has been 
overwhelming in channelling and limiting discussion to distorted, stereotyped 
images of one or another socio-cultural entity, while largely excluding discussion 
on the essential social and economic restructuring of society. The media analysis 
coverstwo pro-secular newspapers, the mainstream Milliyet (Nationality), andthe 
radical left Cumhuriyet (Republic); and two pro-Islamic newspapers, both on the 
radical right, the Akit (Covenant) and the Milli Gazete (National Paper), which was 
regarded as the semi-official organ of the Welfare Party. Specific time periods 
between June 1996, when the Welfare Party rose to power, and June 1997, when 
the Welfare's government resigned, are chosen to indicate under what 
circumstances the content of newspapers and their direction were produced. The 
time period between February and June 1997 is of substantial importance since 
the first warning by the National Security Council (NSC) was issued in late 
February and was followed by a sequence of events that led to the end of the 
1 
Welfare's Party coalition government. The analysis of newspapers is organised to 
identify key themes and patterns in both parts of the media to offer a comparison 
and illustrate what is meant by terms like Islam, Islamism and secularism, and how 
the Welfare Party is related to them. It aims to show how a content can instruct its 
readers as to how to see the social world and to structure and limit their 
understanding about events which take place. It is argued that dichotomies 
between two sides of the media are part of the struggle between those who have 
economic power and those, not who do not, but who want to have a meaningful 
share in that powerwithin a wider context of the distribution of power. Yet it is clear 
that the dominant news media, as an offspring of the monopoly capitalism, has 
certain interests of its own that through a network of investments are bound 
together with other major capitalist corporations, and it seeks to have these 
particular interests accepted as the so-called "national interest". It is shown that 
the relative content of the newspapers, each with its own addiction to specific 
policies which determines what and in how they deserve to be treated, are often 
anything but "objective" and are constructed to sell one or another world-view. 
Undoubtedly there are variations between different papers on the amount and 
depth of distortion. 
6.1. The Political Economy of the Mass Media 
The news media in Turkey has to be explained in terms of the following factors: 
the size of ownership, the nature of distribution of publications, advertising as the 
primary income source and promotions as a means of profit orientation for the 
dominant mass media firms. Firstly, the Turkish newspaper sector is dominated 
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in terms of printing, publishing and delivery by the two big corporation, the Do§an 
Media Group (DMG) and the Media Holding (MH). Both are quite large businesses, 
despite the presence of numerous independent newspapers at local, regional and 
national levels. However, of the thirty-eight dailies published at national level, 
more than half are owned by the DMG59 and the MH". In other words, the total 
market share in terms of newspaper ownership of these two corporations is about 
70 percent compared to 30 percent for various otherS61 . 
DMG, the owner of the 
Milli . yet newspaper, operates in the areas of press, broadcasting, advertising, 
marketing, insurance services, automotive dealership, and leisure. It owns a total 
of eleven newspapers, thirty-five magazines, two television channels, three radio 
stations, three book publishers, and extensive printing facilities. MH has business 
interests in the areas of printing and publishing daily newspapers, magazines, 
books, broadcasting, advertising and marketing. It owns nine newspapers, two 
television channels and three radio stations broadcasting at national level. With 
regard to magazines, of which there are approximately 300 in Turkey, the two 
corporations dominate 80 percent of the market. 
59 
60 
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The DMG owns the following newspapers: (a) the high-priced and elite-targeted dailies such as, 
Milliyet, HUrriyet, Yeni YOzyil, Radikal, Son (ýaori, Finansal Forum; (b) the low-priced and easy-to- 
read dailies, GbzcU, Son Havadis, and iyi Gazete Posta; (c) the daily sport paper Fanatik; and (d) 
the weekly Pazar Postasi (www. dooanmedia. com. tr). 
DIVIG newspapers have an average daily circulation of about 2,700,000 copies in total. Milliyet is 
among the most circulated dailies, with an average of 630,000 copies, while HOrriyet sells around 
600,000 and Yeni YOzyil 350,000 (Turkey 1997, An International Comparison, DEIK Foreign 
Economic Relations Board). 
The MH publishes dailies such as Sabah, Yeni Asir, BugOn, Liberal Bakiý, FotoMac, Ate5, Ekip, 
Takvim, and Dedektif. Sabah has reached an average daily circulation of 600,000 copies, while 
other dailies in the group sell between 75,000 and 160,000 (www. media holding. com. tr). 
Among the independent newspapers, the conservative TUrkiye has a daily circulation of about 
550,000 copies and Zaman of 260,00. Forso-called radical newspapersthe rateof daily circulation 
is comparably low. Milli Gazete and Akit, both of which are pro-Islamic, have reached the 
circulation levels of 40,000 and just under 90,000 respectively. For the radical-left Cumhuriyet, 
daily circulation is about 40,000 (Turkey 1997, An International Comparison, DEIK Foreign 
Economic Relations Board). 
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An important consequence of the monopolization of newspaper ownership and its 
increasing integration with capitalist business is that editorial policy is bound to be 
influenced by advertisers and sponsors, which in turn enforces "self-censorship" 
and therefore does not provide a service adequate to the needs of society. News, 
therefore, as a commodity is supposed to be judged by the standards of the 
"guided" market. This means that commentators or reporters, with no need for 
direct instruction, adjust to the realities of source and media organisational 
requirements. Constraints are imposed by the leaders of the corporate community, 
top media owners and executives, and other markets and/or centres of state 
power. In this process, dissidents are threatened with the loss of their livelihood 
or are treated as irrelevant eccentrics. Herman and Chomsky emphasise the fact 
that: 
the elite domination of the media and marginalization of dissidents that 
results from the operation of ... 
filters occurs so naturally that news media 
people, frequently operating with complete integrity and goodwill, are able to 
convince themselves that they choose and interpret the news "objectively" 
and on the basis of professional news values. Within the limits of the filter 
constraints they often are objective; the constraints are so powerful, and are 
built into the system in such a fundamental way, that alternative bases of 
news choices are hardly imaginable (1994: 2). 
It is noteworthy that some journalists of the so-called'watchdog of the people'style 
develop intimate relations with particular state institutions, for example the 
Presidential office or the office of the Chief of the Staff, and become mouthpieces 
for such authorities. Statements like "a close friend in uniform" (implying military 
generals) often appear in the columns of some leading journalists. Therefore, 
journalists often act as sort of agentsor appendages of the state, and they do not 
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contest or even raise questions about state policies. This kind of reporting had 
62 
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especially significant effects between February 1997 and the resignation of 
Welfare Party government, which is discussed in detail below. Such a relationship 
indicates a sort of realpolitik division of power, in which papers are often seen as 
dominant institutions in which the state or government can have the initiative. 
Secondly, a monopolistic combination of trade restraints in the distribution of 
publications has been established since 1996 by a joint venture between the DMG 
and the MH. Though this has obviously violated the Competition LaW62, their 
monopolistic status has remained". The two companies, the Yaysat of the DMG 
and the Birle§ik Basin-Da§ifim of the MH, came together and set up the Biryay in 
1996. It was agreed that they would not compete with each other; not recruit one 
another's staff; control the delivery sector together; and hinder competition from 
any other corporation by price wars. They can unilaterally increase the rate of 
delivery commissions for papers out of their control or deny the delivery of any 
newspaper from which they face competition (TCjrkiye Gazeteciler Sendikasi 
Article 6 of the Competition Law states that establishing a monopoly by one or more company 
over any service or goods through joint ventures or agreements is prohibited. 
In order to hinder monopolisation, to increase competition and to encourage new investments in 
the distribution of publications, the Welfare Party government made an amendment to the Decree 
regulating governmental credits and aids on 19 September 1997, and opted for allocations of aid 
to newly established delivery companies. However, among companies who applied for respective 
aid, four were subsidiaries of either the DMG or the MH, such as the Yaysat, the Birlesik Basin, 
Simge Yayincilik and the Biryay. The first applications of the four companies were overturned by 
the Treasury on the grounds of the afore-mentioned principles. But after the resignation of the 
Welfare Party, while the new government had been in office for six days in July, the DMG and the 
MH handed in their second application. The same commission that refused the first application 
approved the second over a day and allocated approximately $250 million, half of the cost of the 
investments in question, although the respective regulation was already outdated by 31 March 
1997. It was ruled that: the credit would be provided by a public bank, Halkbank, at once; no 
repayment would be made for a year; the repayment would be scheduled for the next five years; 
the interest rate would be 50 percent, though the rate of inflation was 99 percent in 1997, the 
companies would not pay value added tax of about $30 million on their purchase of machinery and 
would be exempted from income taxes and other surcharges: and their imported computer work- 
stations would be exempted from custom duties. 
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Raporu, or TGS's Report on Media). As a result, while some newspapers have 
gone out of business or changed hands, others, such as Milli Gazete and Akit, 
have had to come to terms with new business dealings. 
The amount of cheap credits and incentives provided by the governments between 
1983 and 1997 to the two corporations deserves attention with regard to the 
governmental contribution to the monopolisation of the market. Until 1994, 
according to the inducements schedules, the governments agreed to financially 
contribute about 60 to 70 percent to investments by the DMG and the MH, and to 
make payments in cash 64 . However, government patronage was lowered to 40 
percent and cash-payments were cancelled in 1994 by Tansu Qiller, then Prime 
Minister and the leader of the TIPP. The MH received $195 million between 1985 
and 1994, and $5.5 million between 1994 and 1997. Comparatively, the DMG was 
given $407 million and $18 million respectively for the same periods. In total, they 
were over fourteen years provided with $625 million, which made up 90 percent 
64 
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of all the governmental incentives to the mass media. It can be claimed that, in a 
sense, monopolisation in the mass media has been encouraged by the 
governments of 1985 and to1997". With regard to the cheap credits provided from 
The figures on the governmental incentives to the mass media are presented in the speech 
delivered by Tansu Qiller, then the deputy prime minister, at her Party's Open Meeting on 10 May 
1997 in Istanbul, when the media campaign initiated by the military was already underway against 
the Welfare Party and the TPP' coalition government; and also in the report on the incentives 
given to the DMG and the MH by the Undersecretariat of theTreasury, read by Ufuk Sbylemez, 
then the State Minister, in response to a parliamentary question in May 1997. 
The Turkish Daily News, with reference to a report by the Parliamentary Investigative Commission, 
dated 20 March 1997, reveals that the two media corporations, the DMG and the MH, have 
committed fraud by the misuse of their incentive certificates, e. g., imported machinery having 
incentive certificates does not exist at the companies. The incentive certificates obtained with a 
commitment to make new investments were consistently used for the importation of used 
equipment instead of new ones, without paying customs duties or surcharges, and no investment 
had been made. Carpets, furniture and various construction materials were imported without 
paying customs duties or surcharges. Yet the term of the incentive certificates was still extended. 
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special public funds, " the two corporations were exempted from repayment for 
two years and then had to repay over the next three-year period at a low interest 
rate. What is interesting is that a public bank was to be the underwriter in credits 
to the DMG and the MH. Therefore, if they did not pay the loans back, the 
underwriting bank would be liable to do so. 
Thirdly, for both marketing and sales of advertising slots in papers, magazines or 
television channels at national as well as local levels, the DMG and the MH 
dominate the sector. The DMG newspapers Milliyet and Hurriyet, the dominant 
medium for print advertising, took 63 percent of the total newspaper advertising 
revenue in 1996. The same percentage was reached on the magazine side, and 
two television channels owned by the two corporations, Channel D and Atv, also 
gained more than half of the combined revenue of all the channels in Turkey. At 
present, the DMG alone acquires almost two-thirds of all press advertising in 
Turkey67. It can be argued that newspapers which are themselves units of vast 
money-making concern are expected to treat the other parts, for example, big 
business in general, or public companies that transfer considerable amounts of 
their advertising budgets to these newspapers, as responsibly as possible. Since 
66 
67 
Furthermore, there had been numerous sustained irregularities in the loans provided from special 
public funds. Although the maximum amount of soft loans would be 30 percent of the total cost of 
the investment projects in question, far larger amounts had been received by certain companies 
(Scandals by Kemal Balci, July 1997). 
The number of special funds was about 80 until 1994 and these were totally under the control of 
the prime minister and exempted from administrative or judicial supervising. 
The Wirriyet magazine group alone received 48 percent of total magazine advertising revenue, 
earning $16,3 million in 1996. Channel D earned $65.2 million in advertising revenue, which 
increased by 30 percent or more in 1997. Net advertising revenue for the Bimas, an equal 
partnership between Channel D and Atv, was $130 million in 1996, which was 56 percent of the 
total advertising revenues of television channels, across more than fifteen channels broadcasting 
at national level without a membership fee (www. doganmedia. com. tr). 
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advertisements are kept separated from articles, it is hard to determine how far 
advertising shapes the entire content of newspapers. An examination of 
advertising budgets transferred from public institutions to the dominant media 
reveals significant results. For instance, between the years 1995-96, three public 
banks, Emlak, Halk and Vaklfbank, paid $6.5 million to the MH and $8 million to 
the DMG, a total of $14.6 million, or 45 percent of the total advertising spending 
budget of the three banks. 
Finally, promotions of a wide variety of goods, e. g., from household appliances 
such as television sets, hi-fi's, and irons to kitchen gadgets, have become central 
to newspaper publishing since 1995. Newspapers were restricted to the 
educational give-aways before this day". Along with the introduction of new titles, 
existing papers began to be printed in two copies, with and without promotion 
vouchers. When this proved to be costly for publishers, readers were given two 
options: (a) to buy papers at a low price with no promotion; or (b) to pay three or 
four times as much for the same paper with a small card "certificate" attached to 
it. The sales price of newspapers continued to climb rapidly. The MH reports that 
after the introduction of promotions, the net sales of its papers rose by 105 percent 
6X 
in 1997 compared to the figures for 1996. Yet due to regulatory restrictions on 
newspapers' promotion introduced by the Welfare Party government, the 
circulation figures for newspapers experienced a steady decline in 1997 and never 
reached its previous level. That meant loss of a substantial revenue for the 
marketing companies of the DMG and the MH. Their papers criticised the 
The DMG reports that a total of 1,752 promotions were run by 14 newspapers in 1996, and 30 
million products were distributed to readers through the marketing companies of either the DMG 
or the MH (www. doganmedia. com. tr). 
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government for imposing new terms of censorship. After the Welfare Party 
government resigned the news corporations found another way under the new 
government to escape the restrictions of the previously imposed regulations by the 
introducing highly priced supplements to their newspapers (TGS's Report on 
Media). 
6.2. The Representations of Secularism and Islamism in the Media Content 
The textual analysis of newspapers is organised as follows: (a) the occurrences 
and definitions of themes, such as the Welfare Party, Islam, Islamism and 
secularism, are illustrated in tabulated form, which represents the relevant content 
in three separate periods (see tables at the end of this chapter); and (b) an 
analysis of the content on the nature of the relationship between Islam and 
modernity, with reference to the construction of identity in terms of "we" and 
"others". Both sides of the media differ in their world-views, and present the other 
as the worst possible alternative. However, what is striking is that there is a 
convergence in terms of their attitudes. Similarities are vital. Prejudice about 
"others", misconceptions, misrepresentations and misuses of terms are some 
examples. Issues tend to be framed in terms of a dichotomized world of modernist 
and anti-modernist powers, with gains and losses allocated to contesting ideas. 
The main conflict is presented in terms of a sense of "clashes of two rival cultures": 
one is Western, linked to rationality and progress, and adopted by the secular 
media, and the other is Eastern and associated with irrationality and 
backwardness. Both groups often tend to define themselves, "we", with reference 
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to "others", and present the population of Turkey in two polar sides, "modern 
versus traditional (reactionary)" for the secular media, or "Western-oriented versus 
Muslims" for the Islamist media. We are given two groups of people: (a) those who 
think of religion as a taboo subject; and (b) those who perceive any religious ritual 
as "reactionary" (a backward force) and use ideas of democracy, human rights and 
secularism in their attempts to discredit religion. In other words, one can either be 
secular or religion oriented, or in more pejorative terms "anti-religious or a religious 
fanatic (fundamentalist)". In the process, each side considers their own practices 
as entirely legitimate. A sense of "threat", either to secularism or to religion, 
shapes much of the dispute in the media. Prejudice leads attitudes different ways: 
it either perceives religious as people hostile to the "modernising state" and 
democracy, or secular people as hostile to religion. Belief that a clash of world- 
views and values would lead to an imminent and destructive confrontation between 
Islam and modernity, on the one hand, and between Islam and the Western 
oriented attitude, on the other hand, underlies much of the media propaganda 69 
6.2.1. Historical Context of the Media Campaign 
In the general election of December 1995, the Welfare Party received 21.4 percent 
of the votes, the highest share in comparison to the centre-right parties (19.6 
percent for the Motherland Party, 19.2 percent for the True Path Party), and the 
centre-left parties (14.6 percent for the Democratic Left Party and 10.7 percent for 
69 
For a general argument of the media approach to Islam and Islamist movements, see J. L. 
Esposito (1992) The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? 
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the Republican People's Party). Such a distribution of votes brought a fragmented 
balance of seats in the Parliament and prevented any single party from coming to 
power without forming a coalition. After the election, despite opposition from 
secular parties and the media, the Welfare Party was assigned the duty of forming 
a coalition government by the President, but its attempt was rejected by both of the 
centre-right parties. In March 1996, the Motherland Party (MP) and the True Path 
Party (TPP) established a coalition, although that collapsed a few months later. 
That gave the Welfare Party a second opportunity, in June 1996, to try to form a 
new government. Finally, a coalition with the True Path Party under the leadership 
of Necmettin Erbakan was announced. 
Soon after taking office in June 1996, Erbakan set the stage for closer relations 
with Islamic countries, including for example Iran and Libya. However, this was 
widely criticised by the army generals, opposition parties, some factions in the 
TPP, the minor partners in the coalition, and the secular media, as it was 
perceived as being politically motivated. Later, however, the policy was justified by 
the Welfare Party on the economic grounds that Turkey could increase its exports 
by selling goods to Islamic countries, as Turkey's exports to the West had reached 
saturation point and Iranian natural gas would help to both narrow the energy gap 
and reduce the level of dependence on Russian gas. Subsequently, a multi 
billion-dollar natural gas deal was signed, which included the construction of a 
pipeline between Turkey and Iran and the supply of Iranian natural gas. The deal 
was agreed despite allegations reported in the secular media that Iran had been 
helping the Kurdish separatists, the PKK. It was also instrumental in creating the 
so-called Developing-8, whose members included: Egypt, Libya, Iran, Pakistan, 
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Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria and Turkey. This group aimed to develop economic, 
political and military relations among their developing Muslim countries. 
Subsequently, tensions escalated when the army sent tanks into action through 
Ankara's Sincan district, a stronghold of the Welfare Party, early in February 1997 
after an Islamist protest took place to mark Jerusalem Day, which was attended 
by the Welfare Party's mayor of the district and the Iranian ambassador. Later, the 
mayor was tried and imprisoned for violating the secular establishment. 
The decisive moment came when the National Security Council (NSC) issued a 
20-point proposal to the government at the end of the month. This heralded the 
intensified campaign by the military, the judicial system, political parties, big 
business, the media, trade unions and "secular" women's organisations against 
the Welfare government. It largely reflected the will of the army. The NSC, an 
advisory body, is an effective vehicle for immense army influence on politics, as 
explained earlier. The Council's role, in theory, is to "advise" the politicians on 
matters concerning security, but its advice is rarely disregarded by governments. 
Moreover, the economy, education and foreign policy have become the domain 
of the NSC. Its wide remit is claimed to be designed to hinder the growing 
" Islamisation" of the bureaucracy. The plan included improvements to the judicial 
system, a ban on'pro-Sharia propaganda on so-called Islamist television channels 
and radio stations', tighter restrictions on religious dress, and measures to prevent 
"Islamists" from entering the state institutions. It was clear that this was directed 
at graduates of the Imam Hatip Schools, since a comprehensive inquiry was 
started after the Welfare Party stepped down into district governors who were 
alleged to be "Islamists", were graduates of administration, economics or law 
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faculties, but had their high school education at the Imam Hatip Schools. The 
military also called on the Welfare Party to stop recruiting officers expelled from 
the armed forces because of their'Islamist sympathies' in local government. The 
closure of Quranic teaching institutions controlled by Islamists was to go ahead. 
The strict surveillance began of those financial organisations that were controlled 
by religious fraternities. The proposal also sought strict application of the law on 
the secular principles, which initially referred to "dress code". The government was 
told not to stray from the path of democracy and official secularism, although the 
emphasis was on secularism as understood by the generals. 
Until the resignation of the Welfare Party government, the usual monthly 
congregation of the National Security Council was given greater attention than 
ever before by the media and a'possible military intervention'to save the secular 
and democratic state from the Welfare Party coalition government had very often 
been mentioned. The pilgrimage of Erbakan and some Welfare Party's ministers 
to Mecca while in office was widely criticised as the exploitation of religion for 
political aims, and a violation of the secular principles of the Republic. During the 
period of pilgrimage, the crisis escalated as the generals unilaterally declared the 
"internal" threat (read Islamist activities) to the integrity of the state to be the key 
security threat rather, than the external one (the PKK). Erbakan had been 
subjected to a sustained political assault by senior generals, who complained that 
he was undermining the secular basis of Turkey's modern republic by aiming to 
establish a "Sharia" state with its pro-Western stance in foreign and military 
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affairs. 70 In the time period between April and June 1997, the Welfare Party 
experienced its elimination from power while in office. A significant reason for crisis 
between the government and the army was the generals' pursuit of military and 
security cooperation with Israel, which was officially announced later in May. The 
military's expanded alliance with Israel without the apparent consent of the civilian 
government exacerbated the tensions between the military and the Welfare Party's 
representatives, while the Welfare Party looked increasingly to the Muslim states 
for economic and security assistance. However, when Erbakan tried to cancel the 
military's joint exercise with Israel, the generals insisted that they would proceed 
and took military initiatives without consulting him as the Prime Minister. 
In the meantime, the twelfth proposal for the dismissal of the government since the 
rise of the Welfare Party to power, was placed before Parliament by the 
opposition, although it was rejected. Despite the Welfare Party's opposition, the 
arrest of those in so-called Islamic dress by the police went ahead. This was 
accompanied by TV cameras. Some managers of religious endowments who were 
charged with organ ising irredentist activities were also arrested. A vital blow for the 
future of the Welfare Party was taken in May 1997 by the Chief Republican 
prosecutor, who applied to the Constitutional Court for its closure on the grounds 
of violating the secular and democratic regime. This was followed by the dismissal 
of 166 junior and senior military officers, who were blamed for taking part in 
"Islamist movements", by the Higher Military Council, whose judgements are final. 
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The decisive moment came in mid-June when the Office of the General Staff 
It should be noted that the secular faction avoids using the term "Islamic state" so as not to 
challenge general Islamic feelings. They prefer "Sharia", from their point of view, to imply a 
backward social and political system by drawing attention to incidents of chopping off of heads or 
arms under Sharia law, e. g. in Saudi Arabia. 
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announced the "internal enemy", the Welfare Party. It started its briefing on 
"reaction", named as the internal enemy, and called for protest against some 
commercial firms, named as "Islamist", which were accused of providing the 
financial resources for "reactionary movements". Upon invitation from the army, 
hundreds of and selected members of Turkish and foreign media attended the 
briefing at which the Welfare Party was charged with crimes against the 
Constitution. Of these, the most critical one was the charge that "the Welfare was 
aiding the terrorism of the Kurdish Workers' Party, the PKK". The Welfare 
government was accused of turning a blind eye to military evidence that 
neighbouring powers, Iran for instance, were supporting Kurdish separatism and 
Islamic fundamentalism. The Office of the Chief of Staff pronounced that "we [the 
military] as every responsible citizen would react to any internal threat [read 
Islamism]... since we have the power of the gun we would not hesitate to use it 
according to the wishes of people". 7' The real message from the generals at the 
briefing was regarding what they expected from courts of law in dealing with "the 
cases of Islamic threat". That was already preceded by prosecutors, acting on the 
mandate of the secular establishment, demanding the dissolution of the Welfare 
Party on the grounds of promoting a civil war between religious and secular Turks 
and undermining the country's secular foundations. The mobilisation of symbols, 
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such as Kemalism with its emphasis upon modernity, republicanism and 
secularism, was necessary to cater to and enforce the undisputed privileged image 
The reactionary, threatening developments reported in the media comprised of the following: (a) 
a theatrical performance, the language of which was accused of attempting to mobilise society 
against the state ( the defendants were later charged with imprisonment); (b) a vandal attack on 
a bust of Ataturk, for which "radical Islamists" were blamed; (c) the twenty-seven students of a 
Preachers'school who shouted "'We want Sharia law", (d) a broadcast against the president of the 
Constitutional Court and; (e) the arrest of eight members of the illegal IBIDA-C (Islamist terror 
organisation), though the charges were not mentioned. To these is also added a steady increase 
in religious dress in some parts of Istanbul. 
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and the position of "born-again" Kemalists in the struggle to protect the "national 
interest". The concept of a 'real threat', or the claimed 'new source of internal 
terrorism', provided the rationale for the military through the National Security 
Council (NSC) unilaterally to set the political, administrative and even judicial 
agendas. The importance and utility of pressing the terrorism issue, by linking it to 
the PKK, attempted to create hatred in the public mind, which has been 
experiencing terrorism since 1984, and therefore to legitimise and justify the 
means of the guardianship. By uttering the magic word "democracy", any decision 
or action was legitimized in attempting to "avert the Islamist attack and save the 
Republic". The restructuring of an "exclusionary regime", the outlines of which 
were initially drawn by the military, secured more latitude from the early 1980s 
onwards for the military to display its authority without resorting to a coup, as the 
'democratic opinion' in society had entrusted the military with the duty of 
maintaining national unity and state security. The motives of the military and their 
policies through the NSC were presented by the media organs of the DMG and the 
MH as always noble and directed to the "national interest". It is important to note 
an informal rule considering press coverage of the army: the military has been very 
sensitive to threats or challenges to its authority and this is basically respected by 
the press. While the press attacks parliamentarians, presidents or executive 
branches, the unaccountable nature of the military remains unquestioned. When 
the secular media and 'democratic organisations' lean on the military, as far as 
Islamists are concerned this enforces further the status of military as the primary 
political agents. 
The military was able to engineer change by pressuring the President to appoint 
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a new cabinet. Under the threat of a possible military takeover, the government 
resigned on 19 June 1997 and a new coalition government was soon established 
by the Motherland Party, the Democratic Left Party and two splinter centre-right 
parties which both had very few seats in the Parliament. This coalition was backed 
by the ex-members of the True Path Party, who were either transferred to the 
Motherland Party or remained independent, and by the members of the 
Republican People's Party, although it stayed out of the government. Soon after 
the "Mother-Left" coalition took office, the bill on reforming compulsory education 
was passed by the Parliament. That increased compulsory education to eight 
consecutive years, as against the Welfare Party formula of five-plus-three years. 
That meant the closure of the mid-level of the Imam Hatip Schools and the 
limitation of the prospects of their graduates, as it ruled that they could only get 
places in Theology Faculties. 
The Constitutional Court commenced the trial of the Welfare Party in September 
1997. Finally, the generals' campaign against the Welfare Party resulted in its 
closure by the Constitutional Court on 16 December 1998, and six members, 
including Erbakan, were banned from politics for five consecutive years for 
violating secular laws. However, the members of the Welfare Party had announced 
the establishment of a new party, the Virtue Party, a month earlier to save their 
political lot, although they argued that the closure of the Welfare Party, which 
represented 20 percent of the voters, would have disastrous consequences for the 
future of Turkish democracy . 
It is clear that politics in Turkey have been played out under the close supervision 
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of the army. It is undeniable that the self-perceived guardians of the secular 
legacy, with the considerable backing of the secular faction, wanted to 
permanently eliminate the Welfare Party from government and to maintain the 
status quo in determining state policies. The military was successful in keeping its 
grip on setting the domestic and foreign policy agendas. It has acted not only as 
the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, which grants the generals amnesty and 
protects their preeminent place in Turkish politics, but also as the authority that 
discreetly sets the boundaries of political activity. Being thus unaccountable, the 
military is the strongest institution in Turkey, as demonstrated by its public 
humiliation of an elected government. 
6.2.2. Secularism, Islamism and Representations of the Welfare Party: 'A 
Fundamentalist Threat to Modernity' 
The dominant media played a crucial role in discrediting the Welfare Party until 
its removal from power in June 1997, and in its closure by the Constitutional Court 
in January 1998. The press hysteria started by fanning the fears of an approaching 
threat of 'Islamic fundamentalism'. The Cumhuriyet daily summarised the threat 
with the headline: "the Welfare is coming ! ". 7' This equated it with a kind of evil 
force, just before the 1995 general election was held. This viewfound wide support 
among the leaders of other political parties, from Tansu Qiller of the TPP and 
Mesut Yilmaz of the MP on the right-wing, to BCjlent Ecevit of the DLP and Deniz 
Baykal of the RPP on the left-wing. The main theme in the election agenda of 
these parties was the policy of secularism, and inevitably, Kemalist ideology. 
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Cumhuriyet, 19.12.1995 
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Almost the whole election was identified as a struggle between secularism and 
"fundamentalism", or between a secular and democratic regime and a theocracy. 
A secular pole agreed on with the statement that "the Welfare was the party of 
religious reactionaries, or'religious fundamentalists', who would turn Turkey into 
73 darkness". Therefore, the choice for the electorate as dutiful citizens was as if 
between republicanism and theocracy. Despite all warnings from the media and 
political parties, when the election results to an extent favoured the Welfare Party 
and nearly six months after the election it had opportunity to come to power after 
the failure of the TPP and the MP coalition, the second round of the media 
campaign began. The propaganda themes of the secular media, which aimed to 
manipulate the public through a form of psychological exploitation quickly became 
established as true even without real evidence in the process of campaigning to 
discredit the Welfare Party, and to invite and support military involvement in 
politics as a means of saving "the secular and democratic establishment". A 
mythical 'fundamentalist-directed' plot, originating either from Iran, Saudi Arabia 
or Libya, to overthrow the Republic with the help of the Welfare Party was 
disseminated as a 'true' fact. Facts were selected to fit the dominant framework. 
It was claimed that the threat was 'real' and gui It was fixed: the traitors organised 
themselves through the Welfare Party by utilising the means of democracy, and 
would do anything to achieve their destructive aims. The Milliyet stated several 
times as established fact that "the Welfare is ready to do anything to achieve its 
aims, [the establishment of a theocratic-despotic regime], at the expense of 
democracy and... secularism,... would even chop millions of heads off over night 
in order to stay in power", which was also speculated by Deniz Baykal of the RPP. 
73 
Cumhuriyet, 8,10,18,28,30.12.1995. 
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Such prototyped views, with no news content whatsoever but consisting of 
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somebody's opinion or speculation about the case by drawing conclusions from 
what happened in Afghanistan or in the Algerian conflict in 1997, which involved 
the Algerian Islamist party, were widely reported in secular newspapers, reaching 
the daily circulation of about five million along with the viewers of television 
channels, and largely owned by the DMG and the MH, as mentioned before. No 
question was raised about their validity. For example, the personal opinions of 
BCjlent Ecevit, the leader of the DLP, on the Welfare Party and its supporters were 
presented as an evidence of its allegedly destructive aims. His remarks on the 
backward nature of the Talibans and their politics, and subsequently their claimed 
resemblance to the Welfare Party contributed to 'the mythical plot of 
fundamentalism' to destroy secularism in the name of democratic rights and 
freedoms . 
7' This kind of reporting occupied the newspapers for days with the 
exclusion of alternative opinions and sources inclined towards other ways of 
A widely disputed example came from an army general when Necmettin Erbakan went on a 
pilgrimage in April 1997. The general, pictured in his uniform and mainly referred by the secular 
media asonewho had fought againstthe PKK, publicly criticised Erbakan's pilgrimagewhile prime 
minister on the basis of the principle of secularism and accused him of being in collaboration with 
Saudi Arabia for establishing a Sharian state in Turkey. He claimed that there was political 
pressure being generated within society regarding the military to intervene and therefore maintain 
the secular and democratic establishment. As bureaucrat, he emphasised that the principle of 
diversity of thought could be acceptable if any group or political party complied with the principles 
of the Republic. He believed that the Party took over the Republic by means of democracy, but 
aimed at disestablishing it. In the general's view, Erbakan would stay in power by oppression, even 
by chopping off heads like in Algeria. His last remarks drew the most attention: he said"I have 
fought against the PKK and will do so against them [the Welfare Party], too" (All papers, 
19.4.1997). 
The general's speech received wide criticism from the Islamist media, which asked for disciplinary 
action against the general for his insulting words, among which the most insulting was the word 
pimp". But the general's speech was applauded by a wide audience from the President to the 
leaders of political parties, such as the IDLP, the RPP and the MID, some trade unions, the Chief 
of Staff and even ministers from the TPP. While President, Demirel, announced that it was an 
example of general dissatisfaction with the Welfare Party, BUIent Ecevit, the leader of the IDLP, 
appreciated it as the democratic reaction of a responsible citizen to irrational, irresponsible and 
backward fanatics. 
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looking at the issue . 
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great conspiracy of Islamists to overthrow the secular 
republican regime was an extremely useful strategy for the dominant interest. In 
May 1997, "the Day the Religious Fanatics (Fundamentalist) Revolt" was spread 
across the front pages of several papers of the DMG and the MH. The same 
photographs of demonstrators, including a little girl with a head-scarf, a little boy 
with a band reading "God is great" on his forehead, men with beards and religious 
caps, and women in head-scarfs or some in garsaf, all protesting the proposal to 
close the first grade of Imam Hatips in Istanbul, covered several pages of the 
papers with comments on the danger of a highly likely armed uprising and 'the 
bloody struggle of fundamentalists'. The choice of the adjectives such as "religious 
fanatics" and "fundamentalists" meant that a lengthy description of the issue was 
avoided and the situation was defined in terms of a national security matter, as 
referred by the generals, although the concept of this was left to the imagination 
of readers. The contents of the newspapers hardly urged their readers to ask why 
that protest had taken place, or to by take into account its socio-economic and 
political environment. Cliches were dealt with rather than news. 76 By the words 
they used and the way these words were linked together, the newspapers of the 
DMG and the MH presented the public with a certain stereotyped view of 'reality'. 
The 'danger' was at the doorstep and should be stopped through every possible 
75 
76 
The concept of 'fundamentalist threat'can be observed more than fifteen times in the same month 
in the Milliyet. See for example the issues of 7,8,9,10,11,19,24,26.4.1997; and the Cumhuriyet 
for 26,30.3.1997 ; 24,25.4.1997; and 11,12.5.1997. It is noteworthy that the reports on Algeria 
were presented with reference to either no source at all or exclusively to the French or Algerian 
official sources. 
For a similar view, see A. Mango (1990) "The Consolations of Religion in Turkey". With reference 
to a number articles published in Milliyet daily between 25 April and 2 March 1988, he argues that 
secularist journalists in Turkey often have a fixed opinion on the dangers of "religious reaction". 
Analyses based upon reports picked from mainstream newspapers converge on a premise that 
"religious reaction represents a threat to the way of life of the more or less secularised Turkish 
middle class". 
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means. Choices of stories and the volume and quality of coverage reflects a 
systematic and highly political dichotomisation of news coverage based on its 
serviceability to important domestic power interests. The deliberately fermented 
media hysteria contributed to some controversial prosecutions in judicial history, 
for example, the arrest of civilians with "unapproved clothes", such as religious 
caps or long-loose dresses worn by men, in public. Some prominent figures within 
the "Islamist community", such as the chairperson of the MOSiAD, were 
prosecuted for various reasons, for instance because their speeches were claimed 
to have violated the principle of secularism or they were found to have undertaken 
financial wrong-doings. Furthermore, the media hysteria contributed to the closure 
of the Welfare in the Constitutional Court in January 1998 on the basis of 
speeches given by six of its members. The speeches by members of the Welfare 
Party, as described in the Indictment by the Chief Public Prosecutor for its closure 
included the following: (a)a speech made by Necmettin Erbakan on 13.1.1991, 
which included the sentence "this party [the Welfare] is the army of Islamic war"; 
(b) another speech by Erbakan on 3.4.1994, which read "The Welfare ... will come 
to power A just order will be established .... Will the transition be harsh or smooth, 
will it be bloodless? "; (c) a speech by ýevkiYilmaz when he was mayor, that refers 
to jihad and says that "Jihad is the activity which is carried out in order to raise the 
notion ofjustice and to spread the notion of Islam", (d) a second speech by ýevki 
Yilmaz after he was elected as a representative, as follows "religious lessons at 
school are not enough. The preparation for the next world must also be 
included 
.. 
One and a half billions of Muslims are establishing a Liberation Army" 
(e) a speech by Hasan HOseyin Ceylan, a deputy, on 14.3.1993 when he said that 
"this country is ours, but the regime is not ... 
The regime and Kemalism belong to 
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the others... Turkey will topple over" (Refah Partisi iddianamesi ve MCitaalasi, 
1997). In the Indictment, four more speeches along with those mentioned above 
are presented by the Chief Prosecutor as the clearest proof of the violation of 
secularism. Regardless of the content of the speeches, what was controversial 
about the Indictment was that for the first time in judicial history a chief prosecutor 
submitted his request to the owners of the dominant media to distribute the text of 
the Indictment as a supplement with their newspapers to readers, before it was 
read out before the Constitutional Court, despite the fact that such a pre-trial press 
disclosure is prohibited by Turkish Press Law. The'facts', the'problems', and the 
words that are used and the way they are put together in the Indictment do not 
seem much more than ideological props for a world view without which they may 
not be 'facts', 'problems', or valid words. It is rather a text based upon a trial of 
Islam as a religion, as it allegedly examines, for instance, the principles of equality, 
democracy, human rights, the principle of retaliation, the use of slaves, and the 
social position of women according to the verses of the Quran, with reference to 
writings in the Islamist press, the views, interpretations and behaviours of which 
were somehow attributed as the expressions of the official line of the Welfare 
Party and were presented as evidences of its violation of secular principles. 
Secularism Versus Islam 
The content of the secular newspapers, the Milliyet and Cumhuriyet, is dominated 
by a defence of the implementation of secularist policies in the name of 
safeguarding the values of democracy and rationality, and a rejection of the 
Islamists' so-called demand for the establishment of an Islamic state. What is 
common in secular media is the emphasis of pre-Islamic Turkish history in their 
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attempt to prove that Islam is not the only core essence of the "Turkish" identity, 
and the use of the Enlightenment language of secularism, nationalism and 
scientism. A particular concept of secularism is favoured. The main themes are 
that: (a) Islam is incompatible with secularism and consequently with democracy 
and modernity; (b) secularism means the separation of the religion and the state; 
and (c) secularisation is a necessary component of modernisation and 
democracy, and is often pronounced as synonymous with democracy. These 
themes occur in the content of the Milliyet and Cumhuriyet no less than sixty times 
throughout the periods chosen. The Western experience is used to emphasise that 
the Western model of secularisation has global relevance. However, the 
problematic of secularisation is constructed and thought of within a shallow outline 
of the story of Western democracy, commencing with the Renaissance and 
extending through the Enlightenment. For the secular press, secularism is 
associated with the rule of reason against dogma and the absolutist authority of 
religion. What is salient in this view is the reproduction of the schism between the 
cognitive universe of knowledge based upon reason and that of religion based 
upon faith. Once this is put forward, a comparative approach is applied to argue 
that a "Muslim Enlightenment" is inevitable, and will lead to a change in the 
attitudes and values of traditionalists who are unable to adapt and integrate 
themselves into modern life. In turn, the influence of religion will be degraded in 
order for Turkey to become a modern society. Subsequently, the idea of 
secularism, articulated within the problematic of Renaissance, gains sacred value. 
In this context, any appeal to Islam in politics or social life is devalued as 
retrogressive or inappropriate to modern political and social relations, and Islam 
is strictly limited to the private sphere of life. A narrow concept of secularism is 
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repeated like a slogan: the respective areas of jurisdiction of two institutions of 
authority, the state and religion, should be maintained separately. In fact, this 
means a strict control of religion by the state, which has included the dress codes 
not only for public servants, but also for civilians. This represents a moralistic 
position by teaching and imposing a modern (ultimately Western) way of life. For 
instance, the support of leading journalists within the secular media for the ban on 
students wearing head-scarves demonstrates that they widely share the belief that 
the head-scarf is the symbol of Islamism, i. e. of reactionism, and therefore 
political, but not a strictly religious object. However, it is clear that such a 
classification is based upon assumptions to a great extent. This tendency 
perceives the national education system primarily in terms of creating "modern and 
republican elite". The central focus of this view of secularism still revolves around 
the question of women, a terrain of contestations for demarcating "modernity" and 
"tradition", "self' and "other". Milliyet has noted that secularism is "the guarantee 
of human rights ... of women rights and equality ... necessary component of 
democracy' (10,11,24.4.1997). It seems that at the first instance, secularism, 
democracy and reason are understood as inherently interrelated features of 
contemporary civilisation, which is the aim and end of history for the secular press. 
In fact, a kind of obsession with secularism as the foremost sign of modernity 
suspends the notion of democracy in the sense that it is utilised to claim a 
monopoly over truth and dismiss the plurality of identity. It is strongly asserted that 
secularism should be protected by any means against those who are charged with 
violating it, which is exclusively interpreted by those who claim to have symbolic 
capital, in this case Kemalists. As a result, secularism is considered to be the 
prerequisite not of democratization, but of Westernisation, in ascribing the mode 
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of Western life. Within media propaganda initiated by the military, no deviation 
within which is tolerated, it was undertaken in the name of safeguarding secularism 
and democracy by disseminating a fear of a highly likely possibility of the military 
take-over against an elected government. The possibility of military take-over to 
protect democracy was justified in terms of the "common interest", which elude 
public opinion and are claimed to be only understood by a specific class of 
responsible men or women who hold undisputably symbolic power over others, as 
they claim to be committed to Kemalism. In this sense of (guided) democracy, only 
those who represent the symbolic culture should be making decisions and running 
things in the political, economic and ideological systems. Such reasoning, first of 
all, through disseminating the "official ideology", dictates and legitimates the acts 
of a "vanguard" to protect what has been done and leads the masses towards a 
future that they are unable to see for themselves. Secondly, it sanctions those who 
are unfit to take that position. Finally, as Durgun (1997) describes, it gives the 
majority of the population the function of spectators, not participants in public 
affairs. As it is a 'democracy' they are allowed to lend their support to one or 
another party, but that does not mean they can meaningfully participate in 
managing their own affairs. 
The secular press view Islam as an absolutist oppressive religion that in principle 
as well as in practice offers no guarantees for the protection of civil and human 
rights. Islam is defined as: "a threat to democracy and women rights", "an outdated 
garment as far as modem life is concerned", and "incompatible with democracy, 
development and contemporary civilisation" (Cumhuriyet 26.3.1997; 12.5.1997). 
Islam is conceived as inherently irrational, aggressive, oppressive, violent and 
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inimical to modernity. In this context, Islamism, exclusively in terms of "threat", 
means "terrorism and a totalitarian challenge, which replaced the threat of 
Communism, to the West and the contemporary civilisation" (Milliyet); or "a black 
ideology of reaction to modem life and the ideology of religious fanatics who are 
irrational, backward and anti-dernocratic" (Cumhuriyet). Islam and Islamism are 
reduced to a cliche of Islam against democracy, or Islam's war with modernity and 
terrorism. The claim of the homogeneity of Islam on the whole comes from such 
phrases as "Islam opposes" or "Islamists killed again", when they actually mean, 
for example, the Talibans in Afghanistan or the opposition forces in Algeria. This 
approach leaves no room for distinctions between different interpretations of Islam 
or the activities of Islamists, and defines all as one type of fundamentalist in its 
pejorative terms. Such headlines were used to establish a link between Islam and 
terrorism and to capture public attention: "religious fanatics chopped off the heads 
again". "they killed in cold blood again", "blood in Algeria is like a stream" or, "the 
hell in Algeria" 77 
The choice of adjectives, such as'fanatic', 'irrational' and 'backward', illustrates a 
radical mental boundary which separates "we" and "they", and shows the re- 
determination of "self"with reference to "other". For example, in Cumhuriyet, two 
faces of Turkey are referred to: "the one is progressive, humanitarian and open- 
minded... the other is despotic, backward and fanatic... we [seculars] represent the 
light, but they [Islamists] represent the darkness". As this shows, the creation and 
reinforcement of the "self' include from the very beginning the devaluation of the 
11 other" on the basis of disapproval, phobias, and distrust. That assumes a superior 
77 
Milliyet 7,8,23,25.4.1997 
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posture and dismisses that which challenges and questions one's beliefs or 
interests by labelling it as inferior, fanatical or irrational. Distorted portraits or 
caricatures of Muslims, in long black dresses with round beards, are created with 
little concern for accuracy. A stereotypical image of 'fundamentalists' is of them as 
spider-like headed, which connotes ignorance, irrationality and backwardness, and 
is a well known description of Islamically-oriented people. The notion of "we" 
suggests a fictive unity of the self and the essentialism entailed in the production 
and reproduction of such an identity. The construction of the "self' a focussed 
social self, in order to maintain established interests effective in politics, draws 
attention to the question of "who" as the discursive "we" write, how, to whom and 
with what purposes? Otherness requires particularity and difference since the "self' 
is usually constituted in terms of the identity of the "other" (Said 1979). What we 
are presented with here is a reapplication of Orientalist thought. Seculars think of 
themselves as the "Occidental Self', the modern man and therefore the model to 
the rest, in comparison to the "Oriental Other", which is associated with 
irrationality and fanaticism. Such an approach to identity in turn disseminates the 
desirability of the policies of the'modernising state', considering cultural modernist 
projects, and its version of Westernisation. In this sense, the press is used as a 
strong instrument of political socialisation, which emphasises a cultural 
transformation of the society that mostly concentrates upon the education system, 
consumption habits, art, film, entertainment and relations with the opposite sex, 
i. e. a shallow interpretation of Western values. The role of the media in 
indoctrinating people with a certain conception of "contemporary civilisation" or of 
modernity, which is seen as incompatible with Islam, revolves around a partial 
reading of Western civilisation. The general population is faced with indoctrination 
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through a political socialisation process which involves the propagation of a top- 
down, one-dimensional view of modernity, while authoritarian control of the 
economy and the media itself continues relatively unchallenged. The self-image 
of the secular media as progressive, humanitarian and democratic in their 
representation of 'truth' did not serve the societal purpose of contributing to the 
functioning of democratic processes by providing a wide range of sources of 
information needed to enable the public to assert meaningful control over the 
political process through their elected representatives. The public was exposed to 
powerful messages from above and was unable to communicate meaningfully 
through the media in response to these messages, except for cases that remain 
faithfully within the presuppositions and principles which constituted media 
propaganda. On the contrary, it served to inculcate and defend the economic, 
social and political agenda of privileged groups that dominate the state and the 
society. They do this within a propaganda model through the selection of topics, 
framing of issues, emphasis and tone and by presenting the debate as a matter 
of "life and death", therefore approving the enforcement of bureaucratic power in 
the name of noble ideals over parliamentary power. As noted above, the role of the 
secular media in the removal of the Welfare Party from power is held to be a most 
remarkable display of the one-dimensional functioning of the secular media, who 
promoted their interpretation of the world, which depends on one's point of view 
and reflects the interests and concerns of the sellers, the buyers to a limited 
extent, and the state and private institutions which are dominated by these groups. 
6.2.3. The Defence and Discourse of Islamism as Represented by the Islamist 
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Media 
The discourse of Islamist newspapers shows that Islamist intellectuals constantly 
struggle with both external and self-imposed tensions, partly because of their 
perceived role as narrators and promoters of a counter culture. Their discourse is 
produced in relation/reaction to that of secular newspapers on the Welfare Party, 
Islam and Islamism. The equation of Islam in general and the Welfare Party in 
particular with anti-modernism, authoritarianism, despotism and irrationality by 
secular newspapers, as described above, receives much attention. Their 
discussion is grounded in the familiar discourses of Islamism, such as the question 
of Muslim identity; a quest for returning to the universal and eternal values of Islam 
for the well-being of the Muslim community; the reaction to oppression, imperialism 
and enslavement; the failure of the secular system in delivering its promises of 
welfare, democracy and justice for all; and the condemnation of corruption, 
exploitation and unjust distribution of national wealth. In the process, they exhaust 
all universally appealing themes, e. g., justice, human rights, democracy, 
sovereignty of the people, pluralism and the struggle against oppression, at every 
level of consideration in their populist discourse. How is the Welfare Party 
interpreted within the framework of Islam in this production and promotion of 
counter-cultural codes in interaction with the discourses of secular newspapers 
which are mainly based on the notion of a threat? 
6.2.3.1. The "Oriental We" in the Person of the Welfare Party with Reference 
to Islam 
Surprisingly, Islamist discourse borrows the basic ontological premises of 
Orientalism: there exists a radical ontological difference between the nature, 
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cultures and people of the Orient and the Occident, but with opposite conclusions. 
The prevalent emphasis on rationality, normality and appropriate social behaviour 
with reference to Kemalist secularism by the secular media occurs through the 
subjugation, devaluation and marginalization of the "otheC, Islamists. Islamist 
newspapers encleavour to respond to, describe and devalue the Occidental other 
in the need and search for a definition of "self"within a framework, the borders of 
which are drawn and imposed by the encounter with Western civilisation. A strong 
sense of xenophobia towards the West results in attempts to dismantle it as the 
"antagonistic other', while at the same time drawing inspirations from the thoughts 
of its leading thinkers and its economic, social and political progress. The same 
assumption that there is a confrontation between Islam and the West outlines the 
discussions on the "we" and "they" dichotomies, which is mainly based upon the 
difference and degree of religion belief. The general discourse represents the 
world in two civilisation blocks, the Judeo-Christian and the Islamic. In the 
identification of "self', Islam is the culture of reference and a vantage point from 
which Muslim societies should be examined in order to diagnose their cultural and 
historical illnesses, which suggests an instrumentalist view of religion. A very 
shallow classification of "Islam and the West" or "the Welfare Party and Others" 
is employed to offer all-exclusive identities of the "self"and the "other". Asimplistic 
approach, that seems to allow only for "right" and "wrong" with nothing in between, 
attempts to concentrate the attention of readers on the issues of imperialism, 
oppression and exploitation, despite the absence of any sociological analysis of 
these themes. The West is treated as homogenous, total entity. Mixed feelings 
towards the West on behalf of the Westernised elite show themselves in related 
contexts. On the one hand, a populist discourse, rooted in Third Worldist ideology, 
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is very much sceptical of what the West has to offer and calls for the awakening 
and resistance to the hegemony of an alien culture which is charged with the 
domination of the intellectual, social, political and economic life of Muslim 
societies in general. The phrase the "World of Crusade", which primarily refers to 
the US, Western Europe and finally to Israel, is often employed to blame the "neo- 
imperialism" of the West and Zionism. The "Others" "are friends of Armenians and 
Jews; they are collaborators of Western imperialism, and immoral and 
exploitative". In contrast, Islam is the alternative power against the imperialist West 
and Zionism". For example, the result of the 1995 general election is evaluated as 
follows "Turkey made her choice and signified her Muslim identity by refusing 
imperialism" It is argued that those millions who voted for the Welfare and the Just 
System were aware of the fact that the regime in Turkey had made us the slaves 
of the USA and Israel , 
78 though the percentage of votes they considered to be 
against imperialism and for the Just System was only 21 percent of the general 
votes if they were all given for the claimed reasons. Such a populist perspective 
shares the national independence goal of Third World movements: the utopia of 
a totally sovereign state fully controlling its resources and competing on a global 
scale with advanced countries. In this context, "Islamic revival" means awakening 
against oppression, exploitation imperialism and cultural alienation; a search for 
authentic cultural codes and values; and a return to authentic identity. 79 
On the other hand, the West becomes the source of reference for considering the 
7X 
79 
implementation of secularist policies, despite contradictory views. The Milli Gazete 
Milli Gazete, 1.6.1996. 
These themes were often repeated in the contents of both Milli Gazete and the Akit in all periods. 
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argues that Western secularism and materialism undermines religion, morality, 
and social and family life by emphasising the rates of divorce and crime in some 
leading Western countries. 'O in contrast, the Western implementation of 
secularism is championed in relation to freedom of religion. The Akit has argued 
that 
secularism is not implemented in the Westernian sense [which] means the 
prohibition of church interference in governmental affairs in Europe and the 
US, though that does not rule out the fact that some rules can be originated 
from religion as long as consensus upon them is reached. [Rather] it is a tool 
of oppression in the hands of state in Turkey. It is used to extend to control 
of the state over society and represents the status quo and recognises no 
places for Islam in social life. It means hostility to religion and religious 
people and therefore turns a blind eye to democratic principles and 
institutions [in the Turkish context]. "' 
Similarly, the Milli Gazete agrees that secularism should be understood in the 
Westernian sense, that is the separation of religion and state, but not the 
repression of religion by the state". It continues that secularism does not mean 
irreligiosity in the West, ratherit guarantees freedom of conscience and is not used 
as a tool by the state to intervene in the personal and religious lives of 
individuals". 82 
xI 
X2 
Milli Gazete, 10.6.1996. 
Akit, 24.4.1997; 17,20,23,28.5.1997; 2,19.6.1997. 
Milli Gazete, 11,246.1996; 12,23.5.1997; 2,10.6.1997. 
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The characteristics of this real "self' in the person of the Welfare Party within the 
wider context of Islam as a religion are described as follows: a force of liberation, 
of struggle against oppression, imperialism and enslavement; the guarantor of 
human rights, democracy and secularism; and a fighter against inequality, 
corruption, and bribery. "Islam is a universal religion that bringsjustice, peace and 
salvation to human beings, not a monsterorabout terrorism; the mostprogressive 
religion that supports science and technology; compatible with development and 
democracy; providesjustice and freedom versus anarchy and oppression". These 
themes dominate the content of Islamist papers for all periods chosen for the 
analysis. The themes of progress, justice, salvation and oppression in reference 
to human rights, exclusively cited in terms of freedom of religion and secularism, 
occur in the content of both the Milli Gazete and the Akit more than ninety times. 
The Milli Gazete notes that the Welfare Party "is the most progressive party in 
Turkey... is a liberation force for Muslims against imperialism and oppression... 
stands for democracy and the rule of law... freedoms, human rights, development 
and peace". 133 For the Akit, it "is not about despotism and violation of human rights 
X3 
x4 
[referring mainly to the right to profess one's religion], but about freedoms and 
protection of human rights... [it] stands for equality for all, freedoms and 
democracy... (and] is a proof of that Islam is compatible with democracy". 84 What 
is important is that the Welfare Party is either overtly or covertly equated with 
Islam or represented as an agency that unites believers with Islam. The Milli 
Gazete argues that "the Welfare is not an ordinary party, but an army of 
Milli Gazete, 1,4,8,10,11,30.6.1996,3,7,16,30.3.1997; 12,15,23,28.5.1997; 2,8,10,17, 
24.6.1997. 
Akit, 2,9,13,22.6.1996; 2,5,6,24,30.3.1997; 24.4.1997; 10,17,19,20,23,28,30.5.1997; 10, 
19.6.1997. 
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Mohammedian movement... an Islamic bridge that professes and helps the 
universal revival of Islam... and a movement that struggles to establish the system 
of God to bring justice and happiness to human beings". "-' The features of the 
system of God that the Milli Gazete refers to can be captured in the context of the 
definition of Islam and its role in society. What Islam has to offer is often discussed 
in a wider framework of modernisation and the status, authority and hold of the 
religion within. 
6.2.3.2. Modemism and the Concept of an "Islamic State" 
Two attitudes towards modernism are distinguished: (a) to argue the complete 
self-sufficiency of Islam and the comprehensiveness and totality of the Islamic 
world-view; (b) to explain Islam in the framework of Western values, such as 
democracy, in orderto prove the compatibility of Islam with democracy by referring 
to counterparts in Islamic terminology including consultation (shura), consensus 
(ijma) and oath of allegiance (baya). The former is often expressed in the words 
"Islam is a way of life which sets rules for every sphere of life, e. g., economic, 
social and political, and therefore cannot be restricted to personal conscience 
only". There seem to be constant attempts to distinguish the notion of 
modernisation from the notion of Westernisation and modern values from Western 
values, though apart from the claimed relevancy of religion in modern life, these 
attempts go without clarification. The condemnation of the Westernisation of 
Muslim society and its model for modernisation is mainly based upon the argument 
that they have failed and thus are responsible for political corruption, social 
injustice and spiritual malaise. Islamisation is understood as a process by which 
95 
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Islamic principles and values are re-applied to meet the needs of a changing 
society. The goal is to establish a synthesis which is both Islamic and modern. Yet 
variations in interpretations of "Islamic values" make it difficult to offer a detailed 
picture of "Islamised, yet modern", but not Westernised, society. As Munson 
argues (1988), it is noteworthy that the view that Islamists are opposed to 
modernisation is not entirely accurate. If the "modern individual" is defined as one 
who is better educated, more urbanised, more engaged in industry and connected 
to non-traditional occupations, and more exposed to the newer media of mass 
communication (Inkles and Smith, 1974), then Islamists in the twentieth century 
are included within that definition, as argued above. The technological tools of 
modernisation, such as radio, television, print and the internet, serve to reinforce 
traditional beliefs and practices. Pulled toward such modernist goals as 
democracy, freedom and social justice, yet still sceptical of their historical 
precedents and contemporary problems, modernisation for Islamists implies more 
than the replacement of the old with the new. They reject the idea of social 
modernisation, which entails the diminishing role of religion in society and state, 
but not in the life of the individual. One of the principal arguments of Islamists that 
"Islam encompasses all aspects of life" contradicts this view of social 
modernisation. Moral outrage, provoked by the violation of "traditional Islamic 
values", is frequently articulated. Yet they do have no condemnation of 
technological or economic innovation, but support modernisation in these fields 
through selective adaptation. Nevertheless, they are unwilling to acknowledge that 
modernity as a culture is the by-product of modernisation as an economic process. 
It is in the nature of the state that the former attitude establishes its links with the 
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latter. The concept of an Islamic state, as argued before, deals more with general 
principles and ideals than specific details, though there are contradictory views. 
Divergent views on the nature of the Islamic state are mainly related to the 
interpretation of the divine text. There is more agreement on what is not an Islamic 
state than on what is one. It is neither a hereditary succession, nor a monarchy, 
a dictatorship, or a military rule, though these are historical facts. "Islam prescribes 
not a personalised or despotic form of authority, but an institutional and 
constitutional one since the divine law draws the outline of the rights and 
obligations of the ruled and rulers" (Milli Gazete). The question of divine will is the 
key to explaining the various positions of Islamists. The content of the Islamist 
media offers a "secular state which admits divine will" and argues that "Islam does 
not prescribe any particular form of government or give any detailed instructions 
on political matters" (Akit). Such an approach can be summarised as "democracy 
with Islam", given the experience of Islamists under the circumstances when the 
Welfare Party had been outlawed, as mentioned above. While Islamist ideology 
aims to give shape to each and every sector of human life, such an ideology 
comprises few Quranic laws, while the rest are broad principles given in the Holy 
Book. It is argued that as long as the moral basis of good government is not 
ignored, e. g. the issue of social justice and the Muslims conduct their affairs in a 
way that appeases Allah, they are free to adopt any structure or organisational 
form for the state. It is argued that the ultimate sovereignty rests with Allah, but the 
political domain is left to the discretion of the religious community according to the 
necessities of time. In other words, it is out of the question to change or replace 
the immutable core set in the Quran, though Allah leaves a vast range of areas to 
His Caliphs to interpret His word, legislate on temporal matters and establish the 
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structures of state according to the general rules and principles in the Koran and 
the Sunna. It is the religious community rather than clergy or the political 
leadership that has the last word (Akit). This view emphasizes the principle that all 
Muslims are equal and have a direct relationship with Allah. Thus, final decision- 
making belongs to the religious community, which responds to the sovereignty of 
people versus rulers. Freedom is an inalienable right. Among basic human rights 
are: right to property, equality of all before the law, the right to secure basic needs 
of life, right to believe, freedom of opinions, freedom of movement and freedom 
of association. The acceptance of the message of God is a free choice of the 
individual (Akit). However, the status and rights of non-Muslims are legitimate and 
correspond to the protected citizenships which constitute their own community. 
The concept of an Islamic state is explained in terms of: its divine task, its source 
of legitimacy, and the succession and limits of ruler. Firstly, it is argued that an 
Islamic state based on doctrinal values conceives its task primarily as a medium 
for spreading, establishing and preserving divine truth. "The state exists to create 
a model society based on Islamic social justice and ensure an Islamic life". 
Secondly, "the state derives its legitimacy from to what extent it acts within the 
tenets of Islam, which are given by the eternal message of Islam. The Quran 
stresses that the believers should obey those who are entrusted with authority as 
long as they maintain divinejustice andpublic consent"(Milli Gazete). Thirdly, the 
consensus of the community is the source of authority regarding the particular 
form of government as well as the selection and removal of the head of the state. 
"The government through consultation [shura] is given in the Quran and has to be 
observed. The ruler is elected on the basis of the widest suffrage" (Akit), which 
includes all in the Turkish case. Fourthly, the ruler is to govern according to and 
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assure implementation of the Sharia, to which the ruler and the ruled alike are 
bound. A notion of popular rule, since political power is considered basically a 
temporal matter, suggests proximity with democratic practice. There is a definition 
of the rational-legal modern state within Islamic limits and elected government 
based on the parliamentary system. "The state should be based on democracy, 
free legislation and accountability. This is a secular state based on the rule of law 
and the separation of power between the three branches of the state. The 
existence of multi-parties, freedom for all, equality before the law and sociaIjustice 
should be the fundamentals upon which the society is based"(Akit). Parliamentary 
democracy is presented as a broadening and elaboration of the democratic Islamic 
spirit of government through consultation, election and accountability. 
As seen above, a modernist approach to Islam conceptualises it as a rational faith 
which includes democratic notions of liberty, equality, tolerance and coexistence. 
It advocates a future in which political and social development are more self- 
consciously rooted in Islamic values, though it is left to readers to figure out the 
ways by which to achieve this inspiration. Despite the use of universally appealing 
themes, such as parliamentary democracy, with Islamic principles, including the 
equality of all and human rights, it is not still clear on either the theoretical or 
practical level that how "the unity of the religious community" is combined with the 
"diversity" through which parliamentary democracy gains its meaning. The 
ambiguity in terms, which are mostly applied in response to accusations by the 
secular media, gives rise to controversy. For example, how free will is combined 
with divine will is still vague. It is argued that, in theory, no Muslim has the right to 
claim a monopoly on the interpretation of the divine texts, but given the self- 
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claimed "comprehensiveness and totality of the Islamic world-view", one concludes 
that power relations within society rather than free debate would establish "one 
truth" over diverging interpretations. 
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Chapter7: Islamism: Voices of Reaction to the Failures of the Developmental 
State 
This chapter contributes to the argument set up in Chapter five by producing a 
case study. It argues that in the Turkish context, Islamism developing from the 
critiques of modernity and deriving much of its strength and appeal from its 
perception of the disruptive effects of modernity provided the terminology for a 
reaction to the failures of developmental state, with reference to the rising 
expectations of the new middle strata, which have been stimulated in particular by 
the acquisition of higher education and the move to the urban centres. It shows 
that Islamism as a political ideology in the 1990s easily established links with the 
dissatisfaction of lower classes with the mode and pace of the development 
process, and therefore reflected a multi-faceted phenomenon with diverse 
interpretations, expectations and interests as far as those who advocate and 
formulate an "Islamist" ideology and those who lend their support to such ideology 
are concerned. Orthodox belief disregards the time dimension and attempts to 
label any'religious upheaval', if it can be called such as an example of the same 
phenomenon. In contrast, this chapter argues that religious rhetoric, which 
constantly re-adapted itself to changing circumstances, provided an "Islamist" party 
with means to distinguish its identity from centre-right parties. It shows that in a 
political system in which party structures have become increasingly fragmented, 
the Welfare Party underwent a significant transformation by changing its fringe 
position, showing a tendencyto moveto the centre-right by attracting a trans-class 
based electorate. It managedthis byemphasising universally popularthemes, e. g., 
development, democracy, equality, freedom and social justice, rather than by 
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promoting a well-reasoned programme with a strong doctrine or class base. 
This chapter critically examines the concepts provided by both the Welfare Party's 
manifesto, the Just System, and the interviewees, to assess the merit of their 
claims and of the arguments advanced to justify them. Contrary to conventional 
approach, it draws attention to the similarities between Kemalism and the Islamism 
of the Welfare Party in terms of their attitude to politics, economy, state and 
society. This is done by analysing the Welfare Party's manifesto, the Just System, 
in the context of modern ideologies from the points of e. g., the criticism of existing 
society and its inevitable or unconditional transformation towards the desired "good 
society". In this context, the chapter assesses the relevancy of the central 
arguments of the Just System to contemporary politics, and highlights the dilemma 
of the totalising ideals of the approved good society, although this is claimed to be 
for emancipation. 
Two significant questions remain to be answered though, within the limits of a 
small-scale qualitative study. The first question therefore is who are those who 
seek for and formulate Islamist policies, and which social groups do they get their 
support from? The second question is why Islamism as a political ideology became 
an alternative within the case of the Welfare Party's rise to power? In other words, 
what kind of message did the Welfare Party give to its voters, and how did the 
Welfare Party propose to deal with the existing socio-economic problems which 
had not been overcome by the "secular" parties in the eyes of the voters? One 
particular approach, qualitative interviewing, has been employed in this chapter to 
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search for answers as to why the respondents sought to support the party, and at 
the same time, to focus on the party's approach to politics and what its supporters 
understood the terms to mean. It is crucial to mention that the findings of 
qualitative study are supported by evidences from other sources such as scholarly 
works, the WP's manifesto and its election programme. 
The chapter looks at the socio-economic backgrounds of three groups selected as 
the interviewing sample: the Welfare Party's members of Parliament, the party 
workers; and the voters. It is important to note that the first round of interviews with 
all three groups, ten MPs, four party workers (Workers 1) and twelve voters 
(Voters 1), was conducted when the Welfare Party had been in power for 
approximately nine months since July 1996. The second round of interviews was 
undertaken with ten ex-party workers (Workers 11) and fifty-three voters (Voters 
I I) when the Welfare Party had been banned by the Constitutional Courtin January 
1998 after being out of power for about seven months. Such a time difference 
seems significant in terms of the issues given priority by the respondents in their 
answers to the same questions. For example, compare Figure 2 with 3 and Figure 
4 with 5 below, as far as the social and political context is concerned. An attempt 
was also made to clarify the party attachments of the respondents since they first 
started voting in order to be able to illustrate the histories of the party affiliation of 
the respondents. The chapter analyses the policies of the Welfare Party in terms 
of the following questions: (a) what do you think the three most important policies 
of the Welfare Party were?; and (b) what reason/s led you to vote for the Welfare 
Party? Apart from the information gained from the interviews, the official view of 
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the Welfare Party is also represented through reference to its manifesto, "the Just 
System". This was altogether abandoned by the successors of the Welfare Party, 
the Virtue Party, after the Welfare Party's closure by the Constitutional Court in 
January 1998. The manifesto is examined in the context of modern ideologies, 
while the policies of the Welfare Party are compared with the expectations, 
interpretations and demands of the voters to show that voting for an Islamist party 
did not necessarily mean to support its vague ideology. 
7.1. The Socio-Economic Backgrounds of Interviewees 
The cadres of Islamist parties in the Muslim world and the Islamist masses are the 
products of modern society. Being among the intellectual sources and/or 
supporters of Islamism, they are not alien to modernity. "/t is a group that is 
sociologically modem, issued from the modemist sectors of the society. Rather 
than a reaction against the modernisation of Muslim societies, Islamism is a 
product of it" (Roy, 1994: 50). Islamism is a movement of the intelligentsia, which 
includes students, the new middle class of officials, professionals and technocrats. 
(Ayubi 1991). Their "Islamist" mode of life in Turkey bears the characteristics of 
modernity with its "alternative" economic and social organisations, such as 
business corporations, charity organisations, schools, associations, newspapers, 
and broadcasting corporations with a religious dimension. Therefore, their reaction 
cannot be reduced to a "religious reaction" to" the "secular" features of life or 
politics. The respondents who lent support to the Welfare Party represent a more 
trans-class base. In terms of their geographical, demographic and social position, 
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they are part of the urban population which cannot be defined as "traditional", such 
as rising "Muslim capitalists" (by their own definition); well educated professionals, 
e. g. engineers, doctors, lawyers and teachers; workers; the urban poor; and 
university educated, professional urban women with their "head scarves", which 
significantly differentiates them from women who wear the so-called traditional 
covering. 
In our case study, the socio-economic background of the" Islamists" who are either 
members of the Welfare Party or who voted at least once for it have been 
represented using two characteristics, namely education and occupation (see 
Appendix 2). The sample corresponds to the national trend that has shown a 
gradual rise in literacy and the expansion of non-traditional occupations as a result 
of the development process, which subsequently have brought about 
intergenerational as well as intragenerational mobility. Most of the respondents are 
graduates of engineering, economics, administration, finance, law, or medical 
faculties. That is followed by high school or vocational school certificates. For 
example, all of the members of Parliament in our sample have a university degree. 
Their level of education, compared to that of their parents represents a high level 
of upward mobility (see Table 2A in Appendix 2). Most of their parents are either 
illiterate or are only graduates of primary school. The data on all of the Welfare 
Party's members of Parliament indicates that 21.8 percent of them have either a 
master's or a doctoral degree, 67.3 percent are university graduates, 8.2 percent 
have a high school certificate and 2.7 percent have secondary school education. 
Most of the respondents can be classified either as middle class or upper middle 
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class by occupation, while their parents have traditional or lower level occupations. 
There is no doubt that they have benefited considerably from the development 
process. With regard to the occupations of all members of Parliament of the 
Welfare Party, 21.4 percent are graduates of engineering faculties, 20.6 percent 
of theology, 14.5 percent of law, 13 percent of economics, 9.1 percent of medical 
and 21.4 percent of other faculties, e. g. education or science. In terms of their 
party aff iliation, the members can be classified into two groups: (a) those who were 
the members of other right-wing political parties, e. g. the JP, the MP and the TPP, 
or even of one the left-wing parties, and later involved with one or all, depends on 
the age of the member, of the Islamist parties, the NOP, the NSP and the WP. 
Necmettin Erbakan, who led all three parties, and his companions are the best 
examples; (b) those who initially were the members of one of the three Islamist 
parties (see for example Table 213,3B and 5B in Appendix 2). 
Having said that, it is not easy to put the respondents in one social group either 
demographically or geographically, or to draw clear cut social boundaries among 
them. For example, most of the respondents are geographically part of the urban 
population, though some still have their parents living in rural areas (see Tables 
113,213,313,413and5l3inAppendix2). Rather, they represents a fluid class map. " 
Supports for an "Islamist" agenda tends to be expressed in terms of the moral and 
cultural expression of developmental crisis, for example, cultural identity, freedom 
of religion/belief or national aspiration for economic development, rather than 
X7 
See N. Ayubi (1991)for a discussion of the class association of Islamist groups in some Middle 
Eastern countries. 
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class-specific social and economic objectives, as will be seen in the next section. 
7.2. The Manifesto of the Welfare Party Compared with the Perceptions and 
Expectations of the Respondents 
This section analyses the policies of the Welfare Party, which were declared 
before the 1995 election, and the perceptions and expectations of its voters with 
reference to its approach to politics. The examination is done in the context of its 
manifesto, the Just System, a form of Islamist ideology. This section demonstrates 
how the respondents perceived the Welfare Party and why they voted for it in the 
1995 general election. 
The responses of the interviewees are given in figures to provide a base for 
comparison between the three groups of respondents and between the two 
periods, as mentioned earlier. The categories used below are created according 
to the answers given by the respondents to the question "what do you think the 
three most important policies of the Welfare Party are? " Corresponding codes are 
put into the same category. These categories are: 
a) economic policy or economic development. This consists of such themes as: 
privatisation; anti-inflation policy; economic growth and development; infrastructure 
investments; and industrialisation. 
b) the just economic system. This was a component of the WP'manifesto, the Just 
System. It is explained in detail in this chapter. 
c) abolition of interest. This refers to the policy aiming to abolish interest in 
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economic dealings in accordance with its prohibition by the Quran. 
d) education policy. This includes reforming school curricula with an emphasis on 
national/cultural way of life and values (read Islamic); and improving material 
conditions for education, e. g. the allocation of more resources from the general 
budget. The debate over the Imam Hatips, Prayers and Preachers' School, was 
at its peak at this time, and formed the main context of the education policy for 
most of the respondents, especially for the MPs and the party workers. 
e) social justice. This involved addressing the issue of unjust distribution of 
national income between different income groups, and the widening gap between 
the poor and the rich. 
f) honesty. This referred to the need to put an end to bribery, corruption and fraud 
in the public sector; and the quest for transparent government. 
g) foreign policy. This emphasised the principles of sovereignty and national 
independence. Conventional Turkish foreign policy was criticised for being 
submissive to the US and the West, in disfavour of national interests, and ignorant 
of Turkey's geopolitical position in the Eastern World. 
h) reconciliation with Islam or history. This referred to an "identity crisis", and the 
destructive effects of Westernisation. There was a strong emphasis on 
differentiating modernism from Westernism. The cynical attitude towards the 
Ottoman history and Islam was deplored, and demands were expressed for 
establishing a correspondence between authentic culture and modernity, although 
the term, e. g., "authentic culture" was not explained, except insofar as Islam was 
one of its core elements. 
i) freedom of belief, freedom of thought or human rights. This referred to close 
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state surveillance of religious practices, life and institutions. Prosecutions of those 
who pray or pray on Friday in office hours by some authorities, or regulations on 
the prohibition of head-covering for women in the public workplace and 
educational institutions were the central issues raised by most respondents with 
reference to the implementation of a militant secularist policy. Each concept is 
used where they were raised by the respondents themselves. 
j) democracy. This was employed when respondents mentioned respect for public 
choice, meaning the respect for ballot results, and civilian politics, which refers to 
a firm opposition to any kind of military intervention in politics. 
k) cooperation with Islamic countries. This referred to the establishment of an 
Islamic Union or Islamic defence organisation, expressed mostly by the members 
of the Welfare Party, similar to the European Union which would turn Muslim 
countries into an economic and political powervis-a-vis imperialist Western powers 
and within the United Nations. 
1) Islamic state. This was used by only two voters in terms of the reintroduction of 
Sharia law. Speaking about an "Islamic state" is not easy given the legal 
restrictions in Turkey. The respondents avoided giving any explanation, but 
emphasised that religious laws would accompany secular laws, and regarding their 
religion, individuals would have the right to choose between judicial systems 
concerning civil rights, e. g. marital rights, despite some hesitation concerning 
criminal regulations. 88 
99 
The Nokta, a weekly magazine, reported with reference to a survey that only 7 percent of the 
Welfare Party's total electorates would like to see the establishment of an Islamic state in Turkey 
(26 June- 2 July 1994). 
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m) moral values. This was employed when the respondents talked about the 
degeneration of social or family values, and evaluated this as a result of the 
increasing dominance of a material culture which ignores the spiritual needs of 
individuals. 
Figure 1 
The Members of Parliament' 
Respondents Policies 12 3 
1 foreign policy democracy human rights 
2 foreign policy democracy human right 
3 foreign policy democracy education 
4 foreign policy economic development education 
5 foreign policy economic education 
6 foreign policy abolition of interest freedom of belief 
7 democracy economic reconciliation with the history 
8 democracy human rights economic 
9 democracy freedom of belief education 
10 honesty reconciliation with the history no answer 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Respondents 
1 
economic development 
economic development 
education 
education 
Respondents 
1 
Figure 2 
The Party's Workers, I 
Policies 
2 
honesty 
education 
economic 
abolition of interest 
Figure 3 
The Party's Workers' 11 
Policies 
2 
3 
freedom of belief 
foreign policy 
human rights 
foreign policy 
3 
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1 freedom of belief just system democracy 
2 freedom of belief democracy social justice 
3 freedom of belief/thought democracy foreign policy 
4 freedom of belief/thought democracy social justice 
5 freedom of belief Sharia honesty 
6 freedom of belief/thought foreign policy coop. with Islamic countries 
7 freedom of belief democracy economic development 
8 freedom of belief just system human rights 
9 democracy just system foreign policy 
10 democracy just system human rights 
Figure 4 
The Voters' 
Policies 
Respondents 
1 2 3 
1 freedom of belief honesty economic 
2 freedom belief/thought social justice abolition of interest 
3 freedom of belief education economic development 
4 freedom of belief foreign policy education 
5 freedom of belief social justice no answer 
6 honesty reconciliation with Islam just system 
7 honesty human rights just system 
8 honesty human rights no answer 
9 honesty human rights no answer 
10 human rights education social justice 
11 foreign policy reconciliation with Islam social justice 
12 foreign policy economic education 
Figure 5 
The Voters' 11 
Respondents Policies 
1 2 3 
1 freedom of thought honesty democracy 
2 freedom of thought honesty democracy 
3 freedom of thought honesty democracy 
4 freedom of thought honesty democracy 
5 freedom of thought honesty democracy 
6 freedom of thought honesty social justice 
7 freedom of thought honesty economic development 
8 freedom of thought honesty economic development 
9 freedom of thought/belief honesty secularism 
10 freedom of thought/belief honesty just system 
11 freedom of thought/belief honesty just system 
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12 freedom of belief honesty just system 
13 freedom of belief honesty just system 
14 freedom of belief democracy foreign policy 
15 freedom of belief democracy secularism 
16 freedom of belief democracy just system 
17 freedom of belief democracy secularism 
18 freedom of belief democracy human rights 
19 freedom of belief democracy toleration 
20 freedom of belief democracy social justice 
21 freedom of belief foreign policy just system 
22 freedom of belief foreign policy economic development 
23 freedom of belief foreign policy local governments 
24 freedom of belief foreign policy secularism 
25 freedom of belief just system coop. with Islamic countries 
26 freedom of thought/belief economic social justice 
27 freedom of belief just system economic development 
28 honesty economic secularism 
29 honesty social justice human rights 
30 honesty just system coop. with Islamic countries 
31 honesty just system economic development 
32 honesty just system social justice 
33 honesty democracy coop. with Islamic countries 
34 honesty democracy human rights 
35 democracy social justice economic development 
36 democracy just system economic development 
37 democracy human rights economic development 
38 democracy human rights economic development 
39 democracy human rights coop. with Islamic countries 
40 democracy human rights secularism 
41 economic development foreign policy social justice 
42 economic development local governments social justice 
43 economic development toleration coop. with Islamic countries 
44 economic development moral values no answer 
45 economic Islamic state toleration 
46 economic Islamic state no answer 
47 sociaIjustice just system coop, with Islamic countries 
48 social justice economic coop. with Islamic countries 
49 social justice human rights foreign policy 
50 social justice human rights local governments 
51 social justice human rights economic development 
52 social justice just system economic 
53 foreign policy human rights secularism 
Recalling the historical background given above, most of the voters identified 
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freedom of belief/thought, human rights and honesty as the first and second most 
important policies of the Welfare Party. The third most important policy selected 
by most of the Voters in group I was social justice, economic development or 
education policy. Others in group 11 prioritised democracy, followed by economic 
development, and the Just System, although they did not have a clear 
understanding of it, and social justice. Foreign policy received by and large similar 
attention from both groups. One important result gained from some of the Voters 
in group 11 is that of secularism. Though the Voters in Group I mostly seemed to 
avoid the issue of secularism, given the historical circumstances under which the 
first round of the interviews was conducted, or it came up in the context of freedom 
of belief, it was identified by some in group II as one of the important policies of the 
Welfare Party. However, for the MPs it was foreign policy and democracy which 
shared equal weight as the most important policies. The second grouping was 
concerned with economic development/policies and human rights. However, 
human rights were mostly identified in terms of freedom of religion. Economic 
development or economic policies were the most important policy for the party 
workers in group 1, although this was replaced by freedom of belief in the answers 
of the workers in group 11, and similarly education policy with democracy. That 
classification bears similarities to those of the Voters in group 11, reminding us of 
the fact that the second round of interviews was undertaken when the Welfare 
Party had already been banned from politics. 
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7.2.1. Dissatisfaction, Corruption and Honesty 
The voting pattern of respondents corresponds with the general trend that the 
decline of the centre-right and the centre-left parties in the 1990s indicates that 
dissatisfaction with those parties led many voters to welcome a new alternative 
(see Table 1B and 4B in Appendix 2) . More than half of the voters in the case 
study said that they had usually voted for the centre right parties, the DP, the JP, 
the MP, and the TPP before they voted for the Welfare Party either in the local 
election of 1994 and/orthe general elections of 1987 and 1995. As seen in Tables 
1B and 413, the Welfare Party canalised votes from both the centre-right and far- 
right (NAP) and the centre-left parties, the RPP and the Democratic Left Party 
(DLP). It is important to highlight the fact that most of the Welfare Party's members 
have been associated with the Welfare and/or its predecessors, namely the 
National Order Party (NAP) and the National Salvation Party (NSP) in the 1970s. 
The rest voted or worked for the centre-right Justice Party (JP) until its closure by 
the military rule just after the 1980 takeover, or for one of its successors, namely 
the Motherland Party (MP) and the True Path Party (TPP) in the 1980s, until they 
started working with the Welfare Party. 
The Welfare Party's agenda, as outlined before, consisted of civil society issues, 
equality, social security, welfare and social justice, freedom, liberties and 
democracy. There was a focus on oppressive attitudes to minority groups and 
other belief systems, general economic goals and growth, the need to combat 
corruption, administrative efficiency, morality and the protection of the national way 
of life, as well as national independence and anti-imperialism with a heavy dose 
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of Islamic Ottoman sensibility at the cultural level, that was identified with wealth 
and power. " With regard to the interviews, dissatisfaction with major political 
parties, their anti-democratic tendencies as far as the issue of secularism or 
minority rights are concerned, and corruption, bribery and fraud in the public sector 
were the reasons most often given by the respondents for voting for the Welfare 
Party as an untried alternative. Fifty-five out of sixty-three voters used the words 
"dissatisfaction with... and corruption" within other political parties likely to rise to 
power. An interesting case is Respondent 12 in Tables 1A and 1B (Appendix 2), 
who is over fifty years old and has voted since 1960. He had voted for three of the 
mainstream right-wing parties, the JP, the MP and the TPP, until he voted for the 
first time for the Welfare Party in the local elections of 1994. He strongly 
expressed his disappointment with the others on the grounds that they did not 
provide enough public services, such as infrastructure, education, and health 
services for the region (Southeast) he has lived in, although the mayors of the 
Welfare Party had offered good works in local government. As this case illustrates, 
the Welfare Party's performance in local government led some respondents to 
vote for it in the general election. " White (1997) also outlines how good grass- 
roots work in municipalities held by the Welfare Party turned into political support 
from a wide range of voters. Congested transportation, shortages of water and 
natural gas, insufficient housing, and environmental pollution had been prolonged 
X9 
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For a similar argument see N. Pope and H. Pope (1997) Turkey Unveiled. 
The number of the local government seats held by the Welfare Party rose from 10 in 1984 to 100 
in 1989 and to 327 in 1994, which included the greater city municipalities of Istanbul and Ankara. 
These cities are still being run by the Virtue Party, which managed to keep most of the 
municipalities in the April 1999 local elections. 
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burdens for residents of the big municipal centres, like Istanbul and Ankara. 
However, under the Welfare Party's controlled municipalities, social services had 
improved in general. 
"Rubbish is collected regularly [in Istanbul]... Trees have been planted and better 
coal has been introduced to replace the foul lignite responsible for the Istanbul 
winter smog" (Pope and Pope, 1997: 333). 
Most voters see other parties as exhausted, unable to respond to their demands 
and, more importantly corrupted. They said that when in power, the other parties 
had wasted time and the resources of the country, and had hindered the 
development process. Honesty rises as an issue in this context. A middle-aged 
voter stated that: 
"... Honest, accountable government and openness to the public are among the 
most important things the Welfare Party promised to deliver if it came to power 
Bribery, fraud, corruption have become the characteristics of public administration. 
Other patties when they came to power used public resources for their own sake. 
My dissatisfaction with other parties / had voted for [the MP and the TP P] led me 
to vote for the Welfare as the best among the worst. " 
What is crucial to consider here is that most of the respondents voted for the 
Welfare Party for the first time either in the local election of 1994 or in the general 
election of 1995, shown in Tables 1B and 4B. These were the years when the 
fraud allegations against the three major parties, the TPP, the MP and the RPP 
were at their peak and the trials of some of the leading members of the governing 
centre-right and centre-left parties resulted in imprisonment. This was summarised 
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by voters as follows: 
"... corruption and bribery are synonymous with most of the majorparties which are 
likely to come to power. " 
What the Welfare Party was perceived to offer in this context was an end to 
corruption in public administration, measures to secure equality, public service for 
all and respect for religious beliefs, Henze (1998) emphasises that Erbakan's party 
in general gained a reputation for honest and clean government. 9' It is clear that 
these demands cannot simply be identified as a call for an Islamist polity on the 
part of the voters. 
7.2.2. Freedom of Belief or Human Rights and Secularism 
The issue of freedom of belief or human rights was mainly expressed in terms of 
the "right to live according to one's belief'by the respondents. The most cited case 
was the situation of female students and lecturers at universities and female 
employees who are not allowed to cover their hair in educational and other public 
institutions. That was an issue spoken about with reference to violation of human 
rights, e. g. right to education, right to profess one's belief, right to learn religion and 
right to express opinions, by "militant" secularism. 
The issue of head scarves is not simply confined to the personal sphere in the 
91 
Though the Welfare Party eliminated bribery to some extent, a variety of corruption allegations, 
including providing business opportunities to the activists of the Welfare, were made against its 
mayors, and were reported by the secular media. Among those, most attention was given to the 
mayors of Istanbul and Ankara. See Yeni Yuzyil 27 March 1998 and 9 July 1998 and Hurriyet 31 
March 1998 and 5 June 1998. 
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Turkish context. It is one of the most controversial symbols, along with education, 
of the long-term conflict between two major ideological systems, a secular versus 
an Islamic society or Turkish nationalism versus Muslim identity. However, the 
case should not be viewed in terms of two poles since both have evolved not in 
isolation but in interaction with each other. The roots of such highly charged 
symbolism attached to dress and appearance go back as far as the nineteenth 
century when Turkish nationalism had developed under the influence of European 
models of modernity, with its emphasis on a unique form of secularism. In this 
context, the appearance of women as objects of political discourse was intimately 
related to the changing nature of Ottoman/Turkish polity. "The woman question 
emerged as a hotly contested ideological terrain where women were used to 
symbolise the progressive aspiration of a secularist elite or a hankering for cultural 
authenticity expressed in Islamic terms" (Kandiyoti, 1991: 3). Issues relating to the 
position of women were ideologised by both Islamists and Westernists on the 
sole paradigm of Islam against a more distant background of Western notions of 
progress. For Westernists, Islam's peculiar practices with respect to women were 
the cause of subjugation, which also formed some element of the European 
narrative of Islam. This argues that the custom of veiling and qar. 5ýaf, a black 
overgarment covering a woman's head and body, was proof of the inferiority of 
Islam. The emancipation of women from such symbols of Islam became a 
significant aspect of Westernisation (G61e 1991). In contrast, for Islamists, the 
extensive rights and independent status that Islam accords to women were the 
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centerpieces of their narrative. 92 Both linked the issue of women with the struggle 
over culture to a great extent, though Ahmed (1992) assigns this position to only 
Islamists. It was this understanding of secularism on the part of Westernists that 
led to the laws on the adoption of the European dress in the early years of 
Republican regime, with "a strong implication of progressiveness". In 1925 wearing 
the fez was outlawed and the hat became the official headgear of men. The 
wearing of religious garments, except for religious officials in places of worship and 
during religious ceremonies, was also prohibited by law, as mentioned earlier in 
this study. For women it was encouraged and celebrated in public by the leaders 
to adopt "European" dress, though no item of "traditional" women's dress was 
prohibited by law. For example, there was and has been no clear law prohibiting 
the wearing of the qarsaf, veil and 5alvar (baggy trousers). It is true that the 
majority of Turkish women, especially peasant women, had never been veiled 
(Olson, 1985: 164). 
The "head scarf dispute"gained its uppermost position after the introduction of a 
number of quasi-legal prohibitions during the 1980s, which represents movement 
simultaneously forwards and backwards. The "Dress and Appearance Regulation" 
was introduced by the military government in 1980. It prohibited public employees 
while on duty, from wearing, in the case of men, beards and long-hair, and in the 
case of women, mini-skirts, low-necked dresses and head scarves. This was 
92 
For a detailed analysis of the methodologies and assumptions of both supporters and sceptics of 
Islam, see H. Afshar (1993) (ed. ) Women in the Middle East: Perceptions, Realities and Struggles 
for Liberation. 
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extended to students in 1982 by the Turkish Council of Higher Education (YOK) 
following pressure from the NSC. The increase in the number of female students 
wearing headscarves over the years was met with outrage, since it was seen to be 
practically amounting to a rejection of and resistance to the "progressive and 
developmental" project of the Republic, i. e. Kemalism. The "re-veiling of young 
women" with a considerable amount of educational capital, who therefore had 
already become an integral part of modern society (Ozdalga 1997), was 
contradictory in itself for those who advocated this regulation. In this sense, 
tightening regulations on female dress meant the reassertion of the ideals, 
success and identity of the nation-state, given the Islamic revolution a year earlier 
in neighbouring Iran within which the political aspect of the head scarf reached its 
peak. Afshar, in relation to the Iranian revolution, comments that: 
"Women have become the majoremblem of Islarnification andtheirdress code the 
most significant identifier of revolutionary success... The veil has become one of 
the non-negotiable elements governing women's lives... " (1998: 197). 
The reverse was and has been the case for Turkey. A voter recalls the beginning 
of that dispute: 
"... I was an undergraduate student when the controversy over head-covering was 
at its peak. They were girls [students] who were discriminated against because of 
their head scarves. They were given two options by the university administration, 
to leave, or to stay but uncover their hair. That was the violation of Constitutional 
rights..., for example, equality for all before the law. Their right to education was 
violated by authoritarian measures at universities which are supposed to be 
conveyors of democratic principles... " 
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Many students chose to resist and consequently be expelled rather than to 
uncover their hair. Subsequently, there was an amendment to allow the wearing 
of head scarves, which would be tied at the back of the head but not cover the 
shoulders, defined as 'contemporary clothing', for religious reasons in higher 
institutions in 1984. However, under pressure from Kenan Evren, who led the 1980 
military intervention and was President throughout the 1980s, the YOK opted 
against such relaxation in 1987, yet left the implementation of this to the discretion 
of each university. As the issue became more controversial, a few months later the 
YOK agreed upon the gradual lifting of the ban on head scarves over a number of 
years. Later, in 1989 when the Motherland Party was in power, a proposal to 
loosen the ban on certain types of religious clothing was passed by the Parliament. 
However, it was vetoed by President Evren. As the same proposal passed through 
parliament for the second time, Evren took the issue to the Constitutional Court. 
It was outlawed by the Constitutional Court on the basis of violation of the principle 
of secularism. Consequently, the YOK reinforced the 1982 regulation, although 
upon individual applications by students against the violation of liberties 
guaranteed by the Constitution, another higher court, the Council of State, decided 
in favour of students on the basis of individual liberties in 1989. The Constitutional 
Court stated that legal rules cannot be based an religion, but reason. Religious 
rules which are matters of personal conscience cannot be legalised. Therefore, it 
is necessary not to allow any symbol related to religion in educational institutions 
and classrooms as such an action is incompatible with secular education. In 
addition, the Court expressed its view that any action against secularism or secular 
education [e. g., wearing a head scarf] cannot be defended in terms of democratic 
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rights (cited in Refah Partisi MCitaalasi, 1988: 16). 
The head-scarf dispute gained greater momentum when the Welfare Party was in 
office. A proposal by the Welfare Party to lift the ban on the head-scarf was placed 
before the Parliament in 1996, but withdrawn when leading members of the True 
Path Party, then the coalition partner, refused to endorse it. Conversely, the ban 
on head-scarves was tightened after the NSC issued the 20-point proposal in 
February 1997, which as explained above, has been brought to its 1982 rigidity 
since then. Academics who protested alongside students against the ban were 
expelled from universities on the basis of taking part in reactionary activities 
against the integrity of the state. The most controversial case was observed when 
a female member of parliament from the Virtue Party attempted to claim her 
representative rights while wearing a head-scarf after the April 1999 general 
election. Being the first woman with a head-scarf in the Parliament, she was 
prevented from professing her oath, a prerequisite of being officially declared as 
a representative. She was forced out of the Parliament by an informal sanction, 
literally by physical force, by the "secular faction" in the name of the principle of 
secularism, despite the absence of any legal restriction on head-scarves for 
female representatives. In addition, the Council of Court, which acted in favour of 
individual liberties in the late 1980s, changed its position in 1998 and began to 
treat cases relating to head-scarves as a violation of the principle of secularism. 
It also granted the executive branch the authority to sack any employee accused 
of violating secular principles without any initial disciplinary action. 
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From the justification of the prohibition of head-scarves by the Constitutional Court, 
the decisive factor seems to lie in from what point, and why, different principles of 
the Constitution of 1982 are interpreted. That is why the imposition and 
reimposition of the ban on head-scarves by quasi-legal prohibitions could either 
be seen in harmony or in conflict with the Constitution, bearing in mind that the 
importance of hierarchical relationship between different stages of law-making, 
from the most general principles to ones related to more specific and limited areas 
of societal life. In addition, it is important to emphasise that Turkey is bound by the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as international agreements are not 
subordinated to the Constitution. What comes into conflict over the issue of head- 
scarves is not the principle of secularism (paragraph 2), but its interpretation, from 
the point of views of secularists, as the Constitution only mentions the "secular" 
character of the Republic without any further explanation, and the principles of 
liberty (paragraph 24), from the point of Islamists, from the 1982 Constitution. A 
conflict between the rights and obligations of the individual according to the 
Constitution is not necessarily a conflict between principles, but between their 
interpretations, as they are often contingent upon the political climate. Article 2 of 
Constitution states that : "the Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and 
social state governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public 
peace, national solidarity and justice; respecting human rights, loyal to the 
nationalism of Atatark ...... 
While article 24 confirms that everyone has right to 
freedom of conscience, religious belief and conviction, such freedoms are limited 
within article, which states that 
"None of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution shall be exercised 
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with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and 
nation, of endangering the existence of the Turkish state and Republic, of 
destroying fundamental rights and freedoms, of placing the government of the 
State under the control of an individual or a group of people, of establishing the 
hegemony of one social class over others, or creating discrimination on the basis 
of language, race, religion or sect, or of establishing by any other means a system 
of government based on these concepts and ideas. " 
In addition, article 10 states that "all individuals are equal without any 
discrimination before the law, irrespective of language, race, colour, sex, political 
opinion, philosophical belief, religion and sect, or any such consideration". 
The secularist point of view can be summarised as follows: religious values 
cannot, in any sense, constitute the basis of any legal practice in a secular 
society. This denies the fact that religious or moral values or customs could be 
among the sources of laws. It goes on to state that the ban on head-scarves is 
compatible with human rights, since it prevents discrimination against other belief 
systems while not favouring one particular religion. It claims to hold the true 
interpretation of "equality before the law", though exercising discrimination in the 
sphere of right to education. It is claimed that the ban is about liberating women 
from the control of an oppressive religion for their own sake and providing them 
with rights to conduct a "contemporary" lifestyle. However, exactly how "allowing 
head-scarves" for female students and public employees would intrude upon the 
legitimate rights of others" is not stated. As to what constitutes discriminatory 
action on the part of individuals, especially relating to religious activities, it is not 
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clear in the Constitution or in respective laws. How a piece of speech or cloth is 
easily charged with disintegrative or discriminative tendencies, depends upon the 
discretion of official interpreters, for example judges, prosecutors or administrators. 
The rhetoric of "emancipation" does not rescue women from objectification, but 
rather treats them as means. Furthermore, it confines those women who attempt 
to take part in "modern life" with the "sacralization of their femininity" (Ozdalga, 
1997) to the sphere of family life, by driving them away from professional careers, 
as students or professional women often choose to quit public life rather than 
uncover their hair. Secularist argument does not contain "dejure" justification, with 
the help of legal rules which are open to various interpretations, but instead 
ideological justification for what they advocate. It is clear that such rules manifest, 
legitimate, and reinforce the dominant ideology by linking ideological 
representation with authority. But, rules gain legitimacy and prescriptive force not 
only from their embeddedness in structures of authority or from their hegemonic 
relation with other institutions. Rules must also be perceived emotionally satisfying, 
culturally relevant, socially useful or otherwise appealing (Milne 1983). In fact, the 
notion of"transferring the society toward one ideal position" is the underlying factor 
behind such restrictive attitudes. As "modern" is interpreted in accordance with 
how Westernist elites perceive it, mostly in terms of lifestyle and aesthetic values, 
the implementation of secularist policies is not a prerequisite of democracy in this 
context, but the enforcement of ideological hegemony and that ideal lifestyle, i. e. 
the commitment of the "state" to a particular way of life, a single formula. This 
means precluding a neutral position on moral or religious values and diversity. 
That, in turn, leads to the refusal to accept aspects of reality, as ideology demands 
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the complete commitment of both adherents and non-adherents to its 
programmatic prescriptions without the questioning of its merit. This favours an 
approach to politics in terms of leadership, where rigid conservatism lies, rather 
than in terms of resolving conflicts. 
From the "Islamist" point of view, such restrictive implementations in the name of 
secularism mean the violation of human rights, specifically religious belief, and of 
democratic principles. The theme "the violation of human rights" was one of the 
main issues on which the Welfare Party based its election campaign. This point 
can obviously be traced within the responses of its voters. Some voters gave their 
only reason for voting for the Welfare Party as being its campaign against "the 
violation of human rights", though it was exclusively expressed in religious terms. 
Here are some examples: 
"... one of the most important policies of the Welfare Party is to stop the violation 
of human rights, such as right to education, freedom of thought, freedom of belief 
and right to live according to one's belief, e. g. for women to have the right to cover 
their hair... " 
"... the Welfare Party emphasizes democratic rights, forinstance freedom of belief, 
and campaigns against the violation of religious life. This cannot be labelled as the 
exploitation of religious sentiments or anti-secularism. " 
". -- the Welfare Party campaigns for human rights, such as freedom of opinion and 
freedom of belief. / wish we lived in a country that is ruled to its greatest extent by 
democratic rules. " 
The justification of the ban on head-scarves on the basis of the principle of 
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secularism leads Islamists to question the implementation of secularist policies in 
the Turkish context and to demand a clear definition of secularism. Secularism is 
interpreted by an MP as being that: 
we do not have any definition of it [secularism] given in the constitution, even 
though it says the Turkish Republic is secular If we had one, then we would have 
a consensus on its definition and common grounds to be discussed. Everyone 
defines it differently. If I was provided with what is meant by it, then I would know 
what constitutes offense against it. In my view secularism includes the right to 
believe, the right to profess one's belief and the right to receive religious 
education. We ask for respect for democratic values. We do not want to see 
secularist policies manipulated against belief We have not witnessed an 
implementation of secularist policies in the Western fashion. The state has to 
guarantee the right to believe and provide services for believers whatever religion 
you are in. " 
What the Turkish implementation means to another IVIP is that: 
".. People must have right to receive religious education, being a Christian or a 
Muslim or a Jew, and to profess their belief Secularism is understood as hostility 
to religion... Legal codes have violated Islamic belief.. Secularistpolicies are very 
convenient tools in the hands of an oppressive state to be used against civil 
society. It violates human rights and religious life. We support the European or 
American implementation of secularist policy, that suggests toleration and the 
freedom of religion from the state, but not anti-religiosity. " 
It is true that such expressions have validity. However, this does not mean that 
Islamists have a more mature understanding of democracy or human rights. With 
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regard to their approach to politics explained below, which also is understood in 
terms of leadership, their reluctance to recognise the plurality of identities and 
sources of values and their persistence in the "homogenous we" from their point 
of view do not rank them any better than their secular counterparts on the issue 
of democracy or human rights, though diversities within both should not be 
ignored. The announcement of tahwid at the political level can also be the sole 
source for refusing divergences of opinions, criticism or opposition to the dominant 
doctrine once it is restored in power, on the basis of religious justification. This 
inevitably precludes intellectual liberalism. The Welfare Party, willingly or 
unwillingly, confined the whole issue of civil rights to religious freedom, which in 
turn fed the militant attitudes of "secularist". While it was very quick in denouncing 
the violation of religious rights, the same eagerness was not observed in other 
spheres of individual liberties, except for demagogic rhetoric. With regard to their 
short experience in power, they did not do any better than their secular 
counterparts in improving fundamental civil rights. In addition, while it spoke of 
"religious freedom" in reference to Muslims, the concept of "toleration" was applied 
in the case of religious minorities, rather than "respect". 
In summary, it can be argued that the modernisation experience in the context of 
Turkey is restrictive in the sense that it represents rigid conservatism and a 
sacred" secularism, with particular values, morality and institutions that reject 
others". Constant attempts to re-impose a secular identity on society through 
socialization (education) and restrictive measures leads to the reinforcement of the 
unlimited control of the state, acting in the name of modernity, and turns it into a 
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pervasive power. However, that is co-ordinated with social groups that are socially 
and economically dependent on the state and, therefore, conveys the approved 
ideology. The state enforces its authority through the social groups empowered by 
the state and the social groups maintain their privileged positions by reproducing 
the notion of the "sacred/modernising" state. Given the legal restrictions 
concerning individual liberties, what is guaranteed by the Constitution does not 
exactly proclaim "rights" or"freedom", especially in the case of freedom to speak 
and freedom to believe, but "toleration" from the standpoint of the orthodox, i. e. 
official ideology. Its boundaries are contingent, with movement forwards and 
backwards. The head-scarf dispute is a symptom of serious social antagonism that 
signifies a rigid polarisation in the absence of a relevant consensus over "various 
identities", be they religious or ethnic. With no intention to create it, the rhetoric of 
democracy or civil rights remains mere talk without practical significance. The 
head-scarf has become the most prominent symbol of the conflict about what it is 
to be a member of the wider community. It is about power exercised by the 
strongest of the component groups, which imposes its values about terms of 
membership upon the rest. The eristic attitude of the "secular faction" conducts the 
whole issue as a one-way affair, which treats flexibility, compromise and critical 
views within democratic perspectives as betrayal, and is interested not in 
contributing to its understanding, but simply in overcoming opponents. A detailed 
analysis of this approach with respect to the media campaign against the Welfare 
Party has been seen in the previous chapter. 
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7.2.3. The Just System: A Structural Analysis 
This section looks at the Islamist ideology of the Welfare Party in order to locate 
it in the context of modern ideologies. This study argues that the centrality of the 
idea of "change" to attain a "good society" in contemporary Islamism positions it 
not as a separate and unrelated set of ideas, but a shared agenda set both by 
modernity, e. g., industrialisation and demand for equality of conditions or the 
extension of political participation, and by the re-generation of the "good religious 
community". The section sets out to argue whether the central ideas/arguments 
of Islamism as an ideology are relevant to contemporary politics and can be 
meaningful for organising frameworks for political debate and action. Therefore, 
it aims to discuss whether the whole concept of "ideology" with its connotation of 
a broad view of how society should be organised is problematic in itself. This, in 
turn, tries to illustrate in the Turkish context how the conceptual links between 
Islamism and Kemalism both borrow from the general structure of modern political 
ideologies, e. g., the criticism of existing (faulty) society and its inevitable or 
unconditional transformation towards a desired "good society", although each 
points to different preferred end results. Such an attempt might seem contradictory 
at the first instance as Kemalism is usually identified as the conveyor of modernity, 
while Islamism is anti-modernity. This reasoning initially connotes the basic 
assumption of modernity that individuals are free to apply their critical faculties to 
view the social and political order as the result of either human action or a divinely 
ordered political and social structure, i. e. Kemalism versus Islamism. It is, 
however, argued here that such a differentiation loses its significance at the 
theoretical level, given that adherence to a particular ideology (Kemalism), 
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combined with the concept of economic development strictly controlled by the 
state, elevates the ideology to the status of a faith that has to be accepted by all 
members of society. Ideological politics, with the emphasis firmly on a singular, 
discriminatory and non-pluralistic nature, therefore produces a "worldly divine 
order" and becomes an essential part of authoritarian politics, albeit one with the 
presence of democratic institutions. In such a political environment, all aspects of 
life are oriented towards a collective goal, which is proclaimed and interpreted by 
leaders, representing one particular culture, and is enforced by the state party or 
parties and its support organisations throughout society. 
7.2.3.1. The Nature of Economic Activity and Social Justice 
The Just System attempts to offer an example of "grand narratives". It developed 
from critiques of modernity and derived much of its strength and appeal from its 
perception of the disruptive effects of modernity. It is a combination of both secular 
and Islamic principles. It criticises both capitalism and communism in a similar 
manner to critiques of modernity, e. g. populist ideologies, although it is distinctive 
in that it incorporates Islamic thinking. It appeals to ideas of technologically 
catching up with more advanced countries, and of a community, though both may 
be paradoxical. The Welfare Party's manifesto, despite being some way from 
constituting a profound doctrine, shares a general structure with political ideologies 
of modernity: (a) it provides a criticism of existing (capitalist) society, condemned 
as imperfect, ill-fated and faulty, though its account is vague, partial, and 
incomplete; (b) hence, it contrasts existing society with a vision of "the good 
society" (ideal) that is to be attained and in which religion is the foremost provider 
295 
of all social values, although that is not explicitly expressed, and; (c) it offers a view 
of agency and the means by which the movement from the imperfect to that better 
society (emancipatory politics) is to be achieved. 93 This has certain implications for 
political action. First, it suggests that there is a set of basic and coherent principles 
upon which society should be constructed, and in principle it is possible to reach 
a consensus on these principles, but rather, this is a religious duty. Second, there 
exists, given the necessary conditions, an agency that is adequate to the task of 
social transformation, and hence this task is achievable. 
The concept of change in the Welfare Party's manifesto establishes its main link 
with the general structure of modern ideologies: a criticism of the existing society. 
Islamism borrows the idea of progress towards "the good society" and the idea of 
a single force creating that aspired society. Whether put forward by a single party 
or movement, it attempts to encapsulate everybody's vision of the good society by 
employing Islamic concepts. The Just System views change in cyclical rather than 
linear terms in the context of "Hak" (constant and absolute right) civilisation based 
on right and justice, and that of "Batlf' (absolute wrong) civilisation based upon 
power, i. e. good versus bad. In this sense, the history of human beings is 
explained in terms of the constant rise and fall of a new "Hak' civilisation, which 
is followed by the rise and fall of a "Batlf' civilisation. In this context, Western 
civilisation is classified as "Batlf', since it is claimed that it favours the rule of power 
and oppresses human beings. Contrarily, the civilisations established by the 
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prophets Abraham, Moses, Jesus and Mohammed throughout the history of 
human beings are classified as Hak civilisations since they are based on'justice'. 
From this point of view, it is implied that the fate of Western civilisation, which has 
produced capitalism and communism, is to collapse and be replaced by a new Hak 
civilisation which will bring prosperity and happiness to humans being (Adil DCjzen 
Bro§OrO). 
It is clear that the notion of change in the Welfare's Just System, i. e. the ideal of 
society that is to arise, bears the core elements of Islamic or Islamist economic 
thinking, the details of which is explained below. It borrows the Islamic concept of 
development that does not view history as a linear movement, but rather as having 
been periodically revitalised through prophecy until the advent of Islam, and 
through messianic and/or reform movements since the death of the Prophet 
Mohammed. This belief has important implications in developmental terms (Nasr, 
1989): firstly, it argues that underdevelopment is temporary, i. e. the situation of 
Muslim people will eventually change; secondly, this very change is about 
introducing and reasserting ideals, which had previously been realised, rather than 
attaining an utopia; and thirdly, change is evaluated in terms of its contribution to 
both the material sphere and human spirituality. 
In the criticism of modernity, while socialism is denounced for disregarding human 
nature and God-given rights, for example property rights, the capitalist system is 
criticised for taking materialism as its basis and neglecting the ethical and moral 
aspects of human beings. The use of interest to distort the distribution of income 
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in favour of the rich is also condemned. It is stated that while the Just System 
covers the positive aspects of both economic systems, such as open market, the 
legitimacy of profit, or economic planning, it avoids the negative aspects, such as 
usury, monopolisation, or artificial price fixing through central planning. These are 
apparently the very core issues touched upon by so-called "Islamic economics". 
In this context, the basic principles and advantages of the Just System over 
socialism and capitalism are summarized as: the balance between private and 
public property; profit, rather than interest; the prevention against monopolies; 
macro-economic planning; and taxes on wealth rather than income. It seems that 
the Just System is inspired by a wide range of ideas, which even sometimes 
oppose one another. It bases itself on the market system, in which the relationship 
between supply and demand determines prices, and the predominant form of 
ownership is personal or to some extent institutional or collective. To a point, it is 
claimed that a classless society is one of the advantages of the Just System. The 
populist rhetoric of the Welfare Party's manifesto is very striking given the populist 
characteristics of Turkish politics. These include: peace and dialogue instead of 
conflict between different economic as well as ethnic groups; the co-operation by 
all; prosperity for all; and the promotion of fast economic development through 
industrialisation. These principles are among the high ideals of the Just System. 
The duties of the state in order to attain that ideal situation are defined as: to 
provide security, public administration, judicial services, health service, education, 
and infrastructure; to produce macro planning, but not compulsory orders for 
private business and; to support economic subjects in their economic activities. 
These duties of the state are not different from those advocated by pro-secular 
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parties, but in fact are the Constitutional responsibilities of the state in Turkey. It 
is proposed that the state owns all non-private natural resources like water and 
forests, as well as providing certain conditions for production plants and 
workshops. However, natural resources can be allocated through just criteria to 
those who will utilise them. 
The Just System has common features with so-called "Islamic economic 
system(s)". However, it is necessary to emphasise that it is difficult to provide one 
coherent concept of Islamic economics since it is significantly dependent on the 
interpretation Of the holy texts. Economic thinking in Islam is distinctive because 
it is based on the divine Islamic law, Sharia, part of which is laid down and part of 
which is left to human discretion. In other words, the concept of Islamic economics 
requires the organization of economy along the principles laid out in the primary 
sources, the Quran and the Sunna (the tradition of the Prophet Mohammed) as 
well as the secondary sources of Sharia, which are consensus and analogy for the 
Sunni and reason for the Shia. Different or even opposing interpretations of the 
same text by different jurists or the existence of contradictory concepts in the 
sources of Sharia indicate that the interpretation of the holy texts is not a simple 
task, as indicated before. In other words, formulating a generic Islamic economic 
theory as well as a political theory is difficult since it depends on different 
perceptions of what "true Islam" is. It is commonly indicated that a number of 
substantial differences arise from the basic principles of Islam in key areas 
between Islamic economic system/s and the other systems, namely capitalism and 
communism (Nasr 1989; Nomani and Rahmena 1994; Presley and Sessions 
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1994). The context of Islamic economics rests on the notion of human nature in 
Islam; the concept of tawhid (belief in the Oneness of God); and the concept of 
justice. However, these are in turn heavily dependent on interpretation since the 
divine law does not contain straightforward definitions or solutions in particular 
fields, such as politics and economics, except clearly cited ordinances or 
limitations. These include, for example, restrictions on economic activities, the 
obligation to pay tax on wealth (zakat) and the prohibition of interest, hoarding, and 
excessive consumption. 
The concept of Islamic economics includes the initial assumption that once a 
society adheres to certain ethical rules, then, consequently that society and the 
individuals who reside in it can live in social harmony and advance to a higher 
state of equilibrium. In the Islamic economic system, a key role is played by the 
constant attempts to fabricate human nature according to "ideals". Nasr argues 
that the very notion of Islamic economics, firstly, begins with the nature and 
attributes of man and his/her limitations and responsibilities. In Islam, Man is 
God's representative on earth. Appropriately, the individual acts as the nexus 
between the spiritual and the worldly. In other words, the concept of equilibrium, 
which can be seen as the indication of social harmony and material happiness on 
earth, is inevitably interrelated to the Islamic doctrines of tawhid and justice, which 
guide the individual's spiritual yearning. In general, economic activity in an Islamic 
context is encouraged in harmony with the spiritual progress of the society of 
Muslims. The criterion of social harmony defined on the basis of existence of 
social justice seems to constitute the primary bases of the social ideal of Islamic 
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economics. This is to say, the objective of the economic activity is not to facilitate 
the maximisation of individual interest, but to create the kind of social setting that 
would contribute to the realization of unity and justice. This is followed by the fact 
that efficiency as a criterion of judgement of economic activity is based not only 
upon the interaction between supply and demand, but to a greater extent upon the 
existence of social conditions that would encourage greater spiritual realization for 
the society and individual (1989: 519-20). What this viewpoint implies is that the 
consumption and production relations in an Islamic economy are not bound by 
resources or possibility constraints, but rather by ethical restraints. Hence, the 
reference point for individuals in an Islamic economy is not what is possible, but 
what is permissible and ethical. The Islamic criteria for economic operation include 
maximising the long-term pleasure in the hereafter, i. e. seeking to maximise God's 
satisfaction, as well as satisfying short-term worldly pleasures. Therefore, "homo- 
Islamicus" is not a rational or selfish actor as the term homo-economicus implies, 
but rather s/he is aware of her/his spiritual needs, to which their material existence 
is subordinated. 
Secondly, it is the belief in tawhid, the Oneness of God, which gives meaning to 
economic activity. This means that there is oniy one source of power that is worthy 
of worship. Tahwid also constitutes the basis of all other principles of the faith. The 
interpretation of tawhid by traditional Islamic jurists differs from that by modernists, 
as explained earlier. The former consider tawhid to be an individual and personal 
concern that reflects one's commitment to God and His rule, and it finds its 
realization in the detailed practice of prayer. On the other hand, according to the 
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radical modern interpretation, monotheism provides the Muslim with a world-view 
that directs the individual towards a society that is free of contradictions. In the 
economic realm, tawhid is therefore interpreted as a call to abolish the exploitation 
of the weak by the strong. In this context, the abolition of interest is seen as the 
guarantor of the elimination of exploitation. The prohibition of interest is one of the 
most important principles of Islam. There is no justification for the payment of 
interest on loans. Islam seeks to establish a society which is based upon justice 
by banning interest (Quran 2: 239). For Islam, all income should be commensurate 
with work effort. Therefore, it is fairer for a provider of capital to share the profit or 
loss with the borrower than to obtain a fixed return, regardless of the outcome of 
the borrower's business. In addition, in Islamic belief interest originates and 
sustains structural inequalities in the economy. Therefore, the abolition of interest 
is not only a matter for the moral rectitude of society, but also one affecting the 
betterment of its socio-economic livelihood (Nasr, 1989: 521). 
Given the legal restraint in Turkey for political parties to conform to the secular 
principles, tawhid is not mentioned explicitly in the Just System. Instead, it 
emphasizes solidarity, the parallelism of interests of all and social harmony, which 
is based on a functionalist view of society. The Just System is against interest on 
the grounds that "money is neither a commodity nor a factor of production". It is 
argued that interest, which provides its owner with an additional consumption unit 
without additional production, leads to an increase in prices and in turn develops 
unjust and exploitative practices. As a result, the abolition of interest is justified by 
the Welfare Party on economic grounds in terms of its degenerative effect on 
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income distribution. A member of the Parliament stated that: 
"the abolition of interest is motivated not only by belief but also by economic need. 
We want the abolition of interest because not only Islam forbids it but also it 
damages the economy since it leads to monopoly, prevents investments and 
degenerates income distribution. " 
Similarly a party worker stated that: 
"... the Islamic economy is principally based on what is permitted and what is 
prohibited. Trade, money, economy, etc., all arise from these fundamentals. 
Money cannot be sold like goods. When you obeyed Islamic principles there would 
be no bribery, for example. Politics, economics and ethics are interrelated in 
Islam. " 
Instead, it promotes share-holding, a contract in which the lender of money will 
share in the outcome. If it results in a loss, he/she would suffer the loss and if it 
makes a profit, he/she will share in the profit. Therefore, it is claimed that the 
creditor-debtor relationship breaks down and the lender becomes a partner in the 
business or project who shares in the provision of enterprise and therefore is not 
distanced from the use to which the money is put. 
Thirdly, the concept of social justice is also important since it is presented as the 
basis of an ideal Islamic society and functions as the content of Islamic 
economics. Explaining the term justice in terms of either "equity", for example by 
Mutaharri (1985), or "equality", as by Shariati (1979), indicates different courses 
of socio-economic and political actions. In the context of the former, a just Islamic 
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society is considered to be one that would abolish discrimination and provide 
equal opportunities for all. Therefore, social justice means distributional equity, or 
fairness, rather than equality. Differences in human capability, effort, work habits 
etc., are seen as natural and should be rewarded accordingly. It is argued that the 
system of reward on the basis of differences in capability is not discriminatory, 
since God has not created equality in nature. In this sense, rewarding different 
contributions equally would constitute an injustice. This concept of Islamic justice 
puts the emphasis on equality of all before the law, and equality of opportunity for 
members of the Islamic community. It also guarantees the right to property 
ownership, as Islam secures private property as long as it is acquired justly and 
zakat is paid on it. On the other hand, in the second context, Islamic social justice 
is interpreted as a call for revolutionary change and the creation of a classless 
society based on absolute equality of income, wealth and even consumption. 
Capitalism is condemned as it gives way to exploitation and increases injustices 
by rewarding those who already possess more than their share. This argument 
is based on the idea that God is the creator and the owner of wealth, and people 
as the vicegerent of God are only able to use wealth in the form of a trusteeship 
from God (Quran 20: 6). Subsequently, it is argued that the only form of property 
ownership compatible with Islam is a social or collective one. What is important 
here is that the concept of tawhid or social justice leads to different and even 
opposing interpretations and courses of socio-economic or political action, even 
though each interpretation derives its legitimacy from Islam. This fact subsequently 
leads each interpretation to reach different conclusions about the nature and role 
of the state in an Islamic economy. From a more liberal point of view, it can be 
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argued in the context of Islam that an Islamic economic system operates on the 
fundamental principle that the forces of supply and demand should work freely in 
the determination of prices in the market. The principle of freedom of exchange, 
private property, the security of contract and the prohibition of price-fixing can all 
be deduced from the primary sources of Islam. The duties assigned to the state 
under Islam primarily consist of commanding, counselling, controlling and 
protecting. Only in exceptional circumstances is there a justification for state 
intervention. Even then, the objective of such an intervention is not to hinder 
freedom of trade but to secure more perfect information in the market place, or to 
regulate or organize economic activities so as to protect economic freedom without 
harming either buyers or sellers (Presley and Sessions, 1994: 585). 
However, from a statist perspective, state intervention which includes state 
interference, from general guidance and regulation to more direct state ownership 
and direction in many areas of economic activity, can be justified on the grounds 
of necessity, statutory reasons or the provision of social justice as a sine qua non 
condition for "the ideal Islamic state". If the promotion of social justice is set up as 
top-priority, then all factors, institutions and arrangements which hinder the 
attainment of such an objective have to be removed. Such intervention is justified 
on the grounds that the Islamic community has to provide its members with basic 
needs, that is, a minimum level of food, clothing, shelter, medical care and 
education (Quran 2: 275-9). This is financed by obligatory tax, zakat, which 
constitutes 2.5 percent of each Muslim's wealth, and voluntary dues. The degree 
and duration of such interventions are closely related to the level of economic 
development. Therefore, the economic system which is characterised by free 
. 305 
market prices may become one that is characterised by government control 
collective ownersh ip. 94 State or public convenience allows Islamic jurists to 
suspend some of the fundamental edicts of the religion, e. g. Islam guarantees the 
ownership of private property (Nomani and Rahmena, 1994: 48). The origin of the 
references on which interpretations are justified becomes important. One who 
uses the application of free market pricing would categorise the Islamic economic 
system as one with capitalist features, while another who uses the application of 
state-controlled prices based on secondary ordinances would characterise it as 
similar to planned economic systems. 
The Just System conceptualizes social justice in terms of equality of all before the 
law and equality of opportunities, but not that of absolute equality of income, 
wealth and consumption. Therefore, the aim is not to transform the existing 
relations of production, but to modify them with the injection of some redistributive 
measures, originating from religious or secular ethics. In this context, the term 
"social justice" is sometimes used synonymously with social security for all (that 
is, health insurance, pensions and unemployment benefits). As the economy is 
based on the market, economic activity is principally undertaken by private 
persons. It is emphasized that each part, which contributes to the production 
process, namely capital ownership, the workforce, and the state via infrastructure, 
receives the equivalent of what they have actually contributed, and the production 
of shares will take place under the guarantee of the constitution. It is very clear in 
the Just System that everyone will be rewarded according to their qualifications 
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See 1. Ahmed (1987) The Concept of An Islamic State for conflicting views on the extent of state 
intervention in an "Islamic economy". 
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and work effort, although, the state will provide those unable to work with social 
security. For the state to provide its citizens with their basic needs is treated as the 
most fundamental duty. It seems that taxes on wealth, or zakat, but not on income 
or profit, are treated by the Just System as the main tools for the redistribution of 
wealth, and therefore the provision of social justice in addition to the social 
security for all that is provided by the state. 
With regard to the interviews, social justice for the respondents was mainly 
summarised as: 
"... decreasing the very wide income gap between the rich and the poor by a 
redistribution policy which aimsto favourthose who have verylowlevels ofincome 
and living standards. " 
It is necessary here to look briefly at how the voters perceived the Just System in 
comparison to its justification by the members of the Welfare Party. As mentioned 
earlier, the economic policies of the Welfare Party perceived as important by the 
respondents cover all issues, including privatisation, industrialisation, 
development, the need to lower inflation and unemployment. They were related 
to the Just System by the MPs and the Party's workers. The approaches of most 
voters to the Just System are especially significant in comparison to those of the 
members of the Welfare Party since they symbolised a disbelief in the Just 
System, even though they voted for the Welfare Party. Most voters in the case 
study did not see that the Just System could be applicable in Turkey. A voter 
summarised their stance in general as that: 
"... the Just System could not work. / do not believe that the Just System is 
applicable in today's Turkey. Some policies of the Welfare Party, such as the Just 
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System, seem utopian to me, e. g. the abolition of interest or tax-free trade. / knew 
they could not manage these, given the economic structure of Turkey. " 
What is important about the voters is that most of them could not state any of the 
Just System's ideas, except for the abolition of interest. Yet, they often recalled 
general economic policies, such as privatisation or inclustrialisation. For example: 
"... economic policies, such as privatisation, had begun before the Welfare Party 
came to power. However, the Welfare Party is trying to privatise public utilities at 
their value but not less and it does so transparently. " 
But, most MPs and Party workers stated their aim as being to implement the Just 
System in order to solve problems covering economic, social, educational and 
moral spheres, as they classified them. For the MPs, the Just System was a very 
inclusive concept, which was framed with reference to contemporary economic 
problems, be they unemployment, foreign trade deficit or lack of heavy 
industrialisation. For example, an MP stated that: 
"... Our economic policy is to set the Just System into action... (that means] to 
manage heavy industrialisation, increase exports and provide a balanced foreign 
tra de. " 
An MP defined the concept of the Just System with reference to the abolition of 
interest, although he did not touch on how this would proceed. 
"... It is impossible to decrease inflation and increase production and welfare by 
only monetarist policies... The economy has to be monitored by ethical values. 
We want a new economic system in that there would be no tax on profits and 
lawful earnings, and increasing production would be given high preference. It is 
necessary to abolish interest. " 
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What is meant by economic development in the Just System to modify the existing 
economy was in general to lower and prevent inflation, unemployment, and to 
increase production and exports. An MP points out as follows: 
"... We as the Welfare Party want to manage the transformation of the rentier 
economy [referring to usury) in Turkey into a productive one ... We give high priority 
to industrialisation and the use of high technology.. a just distribution of national 
income. Production, employment and export are the key words to us. This is to 
say, an increase in production, which may be financed by internal or external 
agents, would lead to a decrease in unemployment. We are struggling to privatise 
the state enterprises at their market value. " 
In addition, another MP stated that: 
"... Industrialisation in the areas of medicine, textiles and the arms industry... We 
have to provide the necessary conditions for scientific development, such as 
investing in research projects and further educating and employing ourown human 
resources... " 
Similarly, the context of the Just System is illustrated by a party worker as: 
"... The Welfare Party wants to put an end to the prolonged budget deficit. Another 
issue is privatisation... We would like to manage heavy industrialisation and solve 
the unemployment problem and have a balanced foreign trade. " 
In summary, it becomes clear that the context of the Just System as well as the 
role of the state in the economy is primarily determined by the long-lasting 
problems of the Turkish economy and the level of development. For the Just 
System, the political and economic system is based upon justice, which is a very 
Islamic concept about the legitimacy of the ruler. It was argued that establishing 
a just political order would result in justice as a principle of order, equality, 
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prevention of oppression and exploitation, material and moral development, 
freedom, solidarity, and peace and prosperity for all. However, the context of all 
these remain to be determined. Given the legal restraints in Turkey, as mentioned 
earlier, it was impossible for the Welfare Party to submit a doctrinal or modern 
Islamist outlook on the nature of the state. Nevertheless, very few opinions may 
be drawn from the interviews. It should be mentioned that these are determined 
by the social, economic, political and intellectual contexts of Turkey since it shows 
that, referring to the discussion presented above, actors in Islamist movements do 
not demonstrate one single identity in their demands or projects, yet they adopt 
similar and often abstract languages in the name of Islam. The Welfare Party was 
a political party competing for power in the relatively democratic structure of 
Turkey and had to revitalise itself and its programme in the process of change. 
The evolution of its programme when compared to its predecessor in the 1970s, 
which was in favour of etatism in the economy in parallel with the social and 
economic transformation of Turkish society, during its election campaign in 1995 
indicated that its discourse or programme easily adapted itself to popular issues 
of the day, despite the maintenance of the very broad framework of the Just 
System. This presented a high idealism, therefore allowing populism, but 
programmatic vagueness. 
7.2.3.2. The Nature of Politics 
Given that Islamism has passionately protested against the disintegrating 
tendencies of modernity and over-emphasised the crisis of modernity, the Just 
System develops a critical stance, albeit a trivial one, towards the unsettling effects 
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of modernity as expressed through modernity's creation of a world in which 
disassociated individuals regard each other primarily as means by which to satisfy 
their own ends. Therefore, it incorporates and undertakes a challenge in particular 
to the universalism of the Enlightenment. In doing so, however, it reproduces 
another form of universalism, national (or religious) cultural traditions, which give 
people a (supposedly) distinct identity and a particular way of life, but which are 
seen to be in danger of being swept away by modernisation and globalization. The 
aspirations of modernity have pictured a society in which citizens would live in 
culturally homogenous, politically and economically self-determining nation-states, 
linked by symbols of civic union (Schwarzmantel 1998). But this ideal has been 
shattered by the rise of global markets, internal fragmentation, cultural diversity 
and growing ethnic nationalism. As a result, the ideological politics of Islamism 
seeks in its own way to offer a means of reintegrating or totalising the fragmented 
world. In this way, "Muslim identity" is reconstructed; the history and criteria of 
identity are constantly being redefined with important political implications; and 
boundariesof inclusion and exclusion are metaphorically and literally erected. Let's 
look at how identity and history are verbalised by an MP 
"... By the Westernisation programme, the Ottoman Empire was rejected as our 
history and Islam as our belief We are like a tree, the root of which is in the 
Eastern civilisation [Islam), although the branches of it are in Western civilisation. 
People started to ask 'Who are weT. We are a religious society deep-down, 
however, we have to conduct a secular life in external affairs. We have had to 
share Western values in the integration process with the West. Our identity crisis 
has influenced ourpoor economic performance, foreign policy and the psychology 
of our youth. " 
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The goal of regenerating the "good community" against the disruptive effects of 
modernity (Western i sati on) is formulated as some kind of "organic unity" that has 
to be restored in the face of the disintegrative tendencies of the modern market 
society. It is the idea of an organic community, which could take more or less 
backward-looking forms, suggests an idea of unity and cohesion, where Islamism 
implicitly resorts to the means of modern ideological thinking. The criticism of 
modernity, however, does not necessarily mean the defence of the old order. This 
vision of an organic society is "reactionary", as it includes a wish to revert to a 
mythical, golden age of community and the subordination of human reason to the 
requirements of religion, which would be primarily understood and interpreted by 
leaders. The appeal of Islamism in its various forms is precisely this idea of a 
(religious) community ( umma), with particular features built up over time to form 
its (self-perceived) history, culture and identity, and its defence against the 
degenerating effects of modernity (Westernism). The Just System's sanctioned 
transition to modernity is, in this sense, paradoxical since it involves certain kinds 
of goals, such as industrialisation, prosperity, and equality, yet it is a transition that 
is also to be accomplished through a sort of regression or retreat from modernity. 
There are two faces, one which looks to future (industrialised society), and the 
other to the past (the Ottoman millet system, as explained earlier). The Just 
System seeks to mobilise people for the task of economic progress, yet also to 
emphasise the weight of glorious traditions and the history of the religious 
community. The transcendental aim to re-unite the Muslim millet and mobilise 
people through Islamism, therefore, involves a manipulative appeal to history. The 
strength of this very identity is attached to some vision of community or of 
individuals held together despite the divisions of a market society. Given the 
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existence of various established states within the Muslim millet, the Just System 
is forced to provide a solution within its nation-state which creates and maintains 
a common culture that is serviced by a shared education system and integrated 
by a common language, all of which are necessary to provide the sense of 
community needed for a society. 
This is yet another example of how Islamism borrows, when necessary, the central 
arguments or means of modernity. The central argument of modernity is for: "a 
change in the environment will create a different (approved) type of human nature 
since human nature is moulded by the environment and the circumstances in 
which people grow up". As all ideologies offer a general view of society and a 
perspective of not just social and political transformation, but also the 
transformation of human nature, the realisation of "the approved-type individual" 
is at the very centre of the educational aspect of the Just System's politics. There 
is a policy of (re)creating Muslim consciousness, above all through the education 
system. Accordingly, the Welfare Party's manifesto incorporates the ethical nature 
of human beings within the concept of Just Moral System. This gives great 
importance to the moral education which is supposed to provide youth with self- 
confidence, good manners and discipline, though these are all open to 
interpretation. The transition of people is seen to be important for the transition to 
the Just System as well as to its maintenance. It is claimed that "morally educated 
people" would benefit society and undertake duties and responsibilities. It is 
assumed that morally educated people would not be obsessed with material 
happiness, but work according to ethical values. The questions what is moral and 
what is not, and according to whose values, remain to be answered. 
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Similar ideas can be picked out from the interviews. For a party worker: 
"... the Welfare party supports moral education that provides ouryouth with ethical 
values. So younger generations will work hard for the future of our nation, stay 
away from fraud, corruption and bribery and be respectful of the rights of others. " 
What is familiar to religious-oriented thinking, particularly to Islamist ideology, is 
that the source of serious social problems, such as gambling, drug addiction, 
prostitution, corruption, and crime, is seen to be in people's lack of sufficient ethics 
and morals. For example, an MP states that: 
"... Education is particularly important... We are in a socially dangerous process in 
which we have been losing our moral values. When you consider statistics for a 
conservative country like Turkey, it is scary. The amount of consumption of alcohol 
is higher than that of milk. Among the youth, the age of starting smoking is as low 
as age nine, that of drinking is fourteen and that of drug-taking is seventeen. In 
addition, fraud, bribery, and an increase in divorce are among our most serious 
social problems. All these can be prevented by education. We do not make a 
distinction on the source of educational policies whether they are domestic or 
foreign. However, we do question if it is suitable or beneficial to us when we are 
about to borrow. It is the same for legal codes. You cannot implement a law which 
is in conflict with the social structure of a society [implying the ban on head 
scarves]. Legal codes, as well as education, must be consistent with the social 
pattern of society in Turkey. As the law-makers we have to be bound by what the 
people want. For 'national' education we think of a national model. In family or 
school education we have to take into account the national characteristics 
[religion]. " 
The contents of the self, "we" and "our values", of course play their part. How to 
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achieve this lies in the reassertion of the self, "we", "self values" and history for 
respondents. 
"... the reconciliation with histoty. We have to stop denying our past and religion. 
We are Ottomans and Muslims. To do so is essential to cure our identity crisis. " 
(an MP) 
"... the reconciliation with history. The Welfare Party wants the people living in 
Turkey to reconcile themselves with their own past and culture, but not to be 
hostile to it. " (a party worker) 
An ahistorical approach is at work to fill the content of the "own past and own 
culture". The implementation of an alternative foreign policy alongside educational 
and economic policies in this context is about the reassertion of "self' identity in 
parallel with the "ideal", and the fight against imperialism. Similar values are 
shared between voters and members of the Welfare Party. Equal relations with the 
(imperialist) West are supposed to restore honour and power and cure the artificial 
"sense of inferiority". In this vein, the aim of the Islamic Union is put by an MP as 
being that: 
"... We support the 'Islamic Union'in foreign policy. That may be called by some a 
utopia. However, after the Second World War, the world has witnessed the 
establishment of such Unions, e. g. the NATO, the CENTO, the EU, etc. Islam in 
itself conveys a peaceful message... [it] is not imperialistic. It offers a life order that 
is consistent with human nature. We have to search for the most suitable life order 
for human beings. We are not doing this because we are against capitalism or 
communism. We have to make use of Islam as a belief, on the one hand. On the 
other hand, we should produce a synthesis from human-made systems. Although 
there are fifty-six countries, the population of which are mostly Muslim, among the 
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members of the United Nations they are not influential. The Muslim countries 
should come together to improve the balance between the East and the West. The 
total Muslim population in the world is around 1,5 billion. In the Security Council 
of the United Nations there are only five nations, all non-Muslim, which have the 
right to vote. The United Nations functions in accordance with Western interests. 
We have to put an end to that. Economic and cultural collaboration among the 
Muslim countries is inevitable in doing so. Comparing the rich and the poor Muslim 
countries, such as the United Arab Emirates and Bangladesh, we can even claim 
that the capital of the IMF comes from the rich ones since the capital of rich Muslim 
countries is in the hands of Western banks... Turkey has the potential to lead 
Muslim countries as we have inherited that historical mission, even though we 
refuse it. The D6 Project is a starting point and must be evaluated in that context. " 
A voter describes foreign policy as follows: 
"... Turkish foreign policy has been vety submissive to the West (the US). / might 
support Turkey's integration into the European Union. But, that should be in the 
interest of Turkey. " 
Significantly another voter expresses his demand for a change in foreign policy as 
follows: 
It an honourable foreign policy which would be designed to say'No'to the cultural 
and economic imperialism of the West over Eastern [Muslim] countries, which 
would sayNo'when necessary by taking into account our national interests, to the 
US or the European Union. Turkey has been suffering from a process of cultural 
imperialism, by which the West imposes its own language and religion. It is 
essential to be economically independent from the West. We do not refuse 
technology, but must be critical about the Western lifestyle. " 
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Giving another example concerning the view of a party worker: 
"... Turkey has been controlled for years by the West. / felt sympathy with leftist 
ideology, even though it refused any belief system, when / was an undergraduate 
student since it fought against imperialism. In the same vein, the Welfare Party is 
against imperialism, too. We desperately need an independent foreign policy. " 
The reassertion of identity is the underlying element in processing this change, as 
seen above. Therefore, reconstructing the human nature according to the ideal, 
which covers all aspects of social and political life and in which individual is bound 
by communitarian interests, historical consciousness and moral-religious values 
is thought to contribute to its evolution and maintenance. Intellectual workers, 
schoolteachers are to be agents in establishing this" Islamist" and patriotic 
consciousness. In this reasoning, it is the educated classes who would have the 
power to change their circumstances and (re)generate approved individuals, who 
wi II real ise and maintain "the good (Islamist) society". Yet the fact remains that such 
a perspective is capable of distortion. The following questions have central place 
within any kind of social-engineering: "what counts as education" and what 
differentiates education, indoctrination, instruction and training". Uncontrolled 
social engineering to create a new man or woman through indoctrination and 
compulsion would try to force people into a particular mould, to inspire them with 
loyalty to the leader, or party or regime, which has not been uncommon in Turkey. 
Given the socio-economic and political background of Turkey, one issue is central 
and that is what shapes the outlines of ideology for the Welfare as a political party. 
It also makes the Just System similar to the modernist Islamists: How is the 
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legitimacy of the political order in the transformative struggle of the Just System 
to be acquired? Returning to the interpretations of modernist Islamists, particularly 
lqbal, the basis of legitimacy is encapsulated in the key term of the "people's will". 
This is to be realised through universal suffrage in a competitive party system, as 
is the case in Turkey. At this point, it is imported to emphasise that in Turkey the 
crucial restraint for the Welfare in terms of expressing its identity was that, 
according to the legal structure in Turkey, for political parties it is illegal to base 
themselves and their programme on religious context. Article 69 of the Constitution 
states that 
"Political parties shall not engage in activities outside the lines of their status and 
programme, and shall not contravene the restrictions set forth in Article 14 of the 
Constitution; those that contravene them shall be dissolved permanently. " 
The implication of this for any political party is that it has to confirm in its 
programme to the basic characteristics of the Republic in order to function in the 
political realm (Article 2). Accordingly, the Welfare's joint programme with the True 
Path Party confirmed that 
"... The principles of Ataturk and the fact that the Turkish Republic is a democratic, 
secular and social state in which the principles of the rule of law will be essential 
common ground for the coalition government. " 
In addition, 
"On this basis, and in accordance with respect for our national and spiritual values, 
our government has accepted as a basic fact that the freedom of religion and 
conscience, freedom of enterprise and the freedom of thought are indispensable 
elements of our democracy... " (The Programme of 54 th Government read by 
Necmettin Erbakan in the Parliament, 1996). 
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Going back to the issue of "people's will", it was one of the key terms for the MPs, 
when the military through the NSC had been effectively drawing the course of 
political action. Here are some extracts from various interviews: 
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what we want is the sovereignty of people, not of the bureaucrats, democracy 
and an accountable state... Politics should be in the interests of the people who 
are governed, not vice versa" 
"... the state is not transcendental in our view. Otherwise, it substantially obstructs 
democracy, development and human rights, as we have found. We want a state 
in the service of the people, but not vice versa. " 
"... Democracy has been misunderstood by some in our country. They (referring to 
the so-called secular lobby) cannot stand what the people want. TheWelfareParty 
wants to see the people in power The national assembly is over all state 
institutions [implying the NSC]. Those who are recruited [military generals] should 
respect and obey those who are e/ected. " 
A party worker states that 
"democracy, freedom and human rights are inherent in Islam ... 
We [the Welfare 
Party] would like to represent the national will by means of democracy. " 
The key issue, however, is how to define the subject of the people's will in 
conjunction with the "ideal will", which would speak for the people. However, the 
members of the Welfare party often appealed to the popular term democracy, their 
approach to politics, as formulated in the Just System, which was overwhelmingly 
approved by them, also present a transcendental view of the state. The idea of the 
unity of the people as a collective subject risks the eradication of difference or 
plurality, and is an attempt to force the very plurality created by modernity in the 
sphere of civil society into one mould: "the ideal community" which is defined on 
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the organising principles of ideology as a single sovereign body. This ideal 
community is seen to be a single source of political virtue or the dominant wish for 
a single centre of power to express the public will (a single public will), of which 
certain actors would inevitably be the sole bearers, Islamists in this case. The main 
feature in such a model is the domination of a unitary centre of power, that can 
claim to express "the ideal will". Even though it claims to accommodate the 
plurality of identities, which is solidly based upon the context of the Ottoman 
millets, in the final analysis it champions the communitarian identity within these 
religious communities. Therefore, the ideal community consists of a single, 
homogeneous (Muslim) people bound together as a group of virtuous members 
of the community, and seeking to create a culture of unity and cohesion. The 
problem is that this common interest would not allow for the diverse interests of a 
differentiated society. While Islamists are strong in their insistence on the 
importance of (cultural and religious) identity, they are often reluctant to recognise 
the plurality of identities, given the various possible sources of identity, such as 
gender, class, ethnicity, nationality, and perhaps supra nationality. In this respect, 
Islamism with its essentialist idea of identity can often be highly backward- looking 
and hostile to the politics of modernity. Therefore, the idea of a free society in 
which people express their different identities and interests is quite incompatible 
with all forms of ideology, as these seek to impose a fixed pattern on society. The 
right to dissent, the right to be different, to assert one's individual reason, or 
freedom of speech, belief and assembly, lose their significance in the rush for 
community politics and identity (Milne 1983). Morever, this unity also requires the 
ability to distinguish the good member of the community from the bad member, or 
at least to identify those who are "enemies" in the struggle and attain and maintain 
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the "good society". The related dilemma regarding power is that the attempt to 
create a new subject leads to unlimited control by the state, which speaks in the 
name of the ideal community. This often turns the state into a pervasive power 
seeking to mould and create "new/approved type of man and woman". The attempt 
to achieve a radical reconstruction of society often results in a highly centralised 
state and the imposition of "virtue" onto its citizens. The institutions of modernity 
and education for example, can easily be used to manipulate and indoctrinate the 
citizens to be totally controlled. The totalising ideals of a "good society", therefore, 
can become the means of eradicating diversity, and, the state in this process, 
despite the formal existence of democratic institutions, becomes capable of 
controlling and manipulating her citizens. This aspiration with its implication of 
abolishing any distinction between public and private leads to a project of all- 
seeing intolerance of any ambiguity, which ultimately prohibits democracy. With 
regard to the political history of Turkey, ideological politics have already provided 
many examples of this sort of aspiration, let alone the closure of the Welfare by 
the Constitutional Court. In seeking to stamp onto society a view of "the good 
citizen or member", the insistence on unity and the refusal to accept aspects of 
reality that do not conform to this goal finds expression in repeated purges, the 
narrowing down of the circle of "virtuous citizens" to ever smaller circles. In turn, 
this involves constant attempts to regenerate the society (community) and 
preserve its unity. This has clearly been seen in the conflict over "head-scarf' in 
Turkish politics. 
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Conclusion 
This study is a contribution to the study of Islamism within the specific case of the 
Welfare Party. This is done: (a) by placing the phenomenon of the rise of the 
Welfare Party, with its distinctive Islamist manifesto in the right-wing of politics, into 
the context of developmental studies; (b) by analysing its Islamist manifesto in the 
context of modern ideologies, particularly populism and corporatism, and therefore 
by showing that Islamism should not exclusively be imprisoned into the cultural 
realms of Middle Eastern politics; (c) by making use of qualitative research 
methods in order to support the main arguments of the study with empirical facts. 
Since the 1950s, Islam has been considered a political force in Turkey and has 
been exploited to varying degrees by almost all the major political parties. The 
accession to power of the Democrat Party, which represented a liberal approach 
to religion, in 1950 has been treated in the literature as a "religious upheaval" 
against the secular state. However, there was no question of reimposing Islamic 
law or undoing secular reforms, except for a moderate approach to secularist 
policies compared to the militancy of the early years of the Republic. However, the 
formation of explicitly Islamist parties since the 1970s, when the industrial and 
financial capital established its domination over the course of capitalist 
development in disfavour of agricultural and commercial capital, meant that the 
question of why the Islamist parties had achieved relative electoral success (for 
example the National Salvation Party in 1970s and the Welfare Party in the 1990s) 
became the central foci of most studies. The rising popularity of the Welfare Party 
was initially signified by the local election of 1994, when it took over the 
municipalities of two major cities, Ankara and Istanbul, which were considered to 
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be models of modern and secular culture. Two years later, the party was brought 
to power in a coalition government. Studies which employ a 
cultural ist/geographical perspective in their attempt to evaluate social and political 
history in the framework of society's faults define culture as the key determinant 
of the evolution of a society, and overlook the nature of social relations. From this 
perspective, the relative success of an Islamist party is alarming, i. e. a threat to 
modern life, as it tends to interpret the phenomenon in terms of the result of a 
clash of civilisations and the failure of Muslims to assimilate European liberal 
ideas. In this study, first of all, it has been argued that in order to interpret the 
phenomenon of Islamism, analyses need to be free from the assumptions of the 
modernisation paradigm. The main shortcoming of culturalist perspectives lies in 
their approach to the nature of Turkish modernisation. The prominent features of 
Turkish modernisation which was aimed at a cultural transformation, rather than 
radical changes in existing social structures, have been authoritarianism and 
elitism, accompanied by a cult of leadership. This approach to modernity has 
sought legitimacy in the mission of elevating the people to contemporary 
civilisation, which is exclusively interpreted according to the definition of the 
"Westernised" elites, forwhom religion constitutes an obstacle to modernity. Public 
policies, when bound to religion in particular, are supposed to be shaped not as 
an outcome of the detached aggregation of interests within the society, but by the 
notion of leading the people, who are unaware of their "real interest", and of 
enlightening them by "a universal class of bureaucrats" until "the ideal position" set 
by Kemalism is reached. In this context, despite the formal existence of 
representative institutions, the demands of the electorate lose their significance as 
the "universal class of bureaucrats", often dominated by the military bureaucracy, 
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claims to be acting on behalf of the moral entity of the nation, or of an ideal, the 
components of which are exclusive to some identities. As the discourse of the 
"modernising" state has given modernisation (or Westernisation) and secularism 
as its raisons detre, the question of religion has to a large extent been removed 
from its psychological and social context, and instead been articulated in terms of 
a "reaction to modernity". Consequently, any manifestation of religious demands 
has been politicised and explained in terms of the rigidity and fanaticism of Islam, 
and its resistance to change. The core of the culturalist perspective with regard to 
Turkish modernisation a priori accepts the "progressive" role of the state, and 
subsequently of the military, as being that which commands the transition from 
traditionality to modernity and which adheres to Kemalism. It takes the issue of 
secularism as its key explanatory framework. However, it ignores the fact that 
Turkish secularism does not let religion have an autonomous existence, and bases 
its political analyses upon the cultural peculiarities of "traditional forces of the 
periphery" (backward) and "the modernising forces (state) of the centre" (modern) 
by looking for "impediments to the secularisation of Islamists". This might include 
the resistance of Muslim culture to modernity or the compromise of regimes to 
religion, for example the imposition of compulsory religious education since the 
1980s, the increase in religious publications or mosque buildings, or the 
advocation of a "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis". Although, these factors could have an 
effect to some extent, they cannot be determining factors of Islamism. In other 
words, it cannot be concluded that religion predetermines reality. Analyses based 
on these assumptions have relied on tired methodologies and clich6s. They have 
been unable to explain how, within the same generation that was subjected to the 
above-mentioned compromises of the regime, various competing ideologies have 
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continued to have an influence in the same socio-political context. The culturalist 
perspective, with its affirmation of" Oriental ism", is also unable to explain how, if 
the Muslim culture is unified, rigid and resistant to change, Islamists are open to 
change in the technological sphere. Assuming cultural characteristics in this way 
is very simplistic. 
Secondly, the culturalist perspective also tends to analyse the nature of military 
interventions in politicsfrom a cultural and functionalist framework. This approach 
conceives the military, since it sees itself as the guardian of Kemalism, as the 
institution most committed to the effective pursuit of "general interests". It 
conceives the military's role in terms of saving democracy from 'religious 
reactionaries', by assuming that the power vested within the military is a system 
property, but is not used for special interests. In addition, this approach willingly 
or unwillingly contributes to the belief that "those who do not believe in Kemalism, 
therefore in "modernism", are unfit to govern even though they are trusted with 
power through election". However, this study has argued that the military, after 
each military intervention, has been granted an increased share in political power 
through the National Security Council. It has special interests in the economic 
system and acts to preserve its privileged position. This approach has aimed to 
overcome the shortcomings of the cultural ist-functionalist account, and to provide 
insight into why the military, the most powerful and unaccountable institution of the 
state apparatus, leads the course of political action in any challenge to the political, 
social or economic status quo. This struggle was clearly observed in the case of 
the Welfare Party with its distinctive Islamist outlook, which presented itself as an 
alternative to the existing political and economic order, and with its commitment 
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to the nascent "Muslim bourgeoisie", as represented by the MOSiAD. 
Thirdly, it has indicated that Islamism differs from traditional Islam as an ideology 
for modern times, and uses the substance of Islam, for example the principles of 
social justice, consensus, consultation or rebellion against "unjust rulers", to 
develop a modern ideological structure in its competition for power. Islamism is fed 
by two sources: Islam is the source of identity and nostalgia, and Western modern 
political thought is the source of proposed grand narratives for political action. 
Therefore, it should not be seen as a common model for essentially Muslim 
societies as a result of their cultural fixity or rigidity, but analysed in terms of 
modern political movements in a framework which takes into account the patterns 
of development in societies experiencing such movements, with reference to the 
formation of the state, and its role in changing social relations and allocation of 
public resources. The selective use of religious texts and their varying 
interpretations by Islamists leads to controversies over what true Islam is and what 
it requires, and shows that it is not the religion which predetermines the course of 
political action, but vice versa. In this context, it is argued that the centrality of the 
idea of change in the Islamist manifesto of the Welfare Party, the Just System, 
towards a better and attainable goal established a link with the general agenda set 
by modernity. Islamism borrowed from both Islam and Western political thought 
when necessary. It reinterpreted (the Ottoman) history accordingly and attempted 
to selectively make use of its institutions. It is asserted that the Welfare Party's 
manifesto, despite being far from constituting a profound doctrine, shared a 
general structure with the political ideologies of modernity. This is denoted by its 
passionate criticism of existing society, heralding an alternative "Islamist good 
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society" and the attainment of this society through the leadership of those who 
already had or would have the "necessary and approved qualities" through 
education, or rather indoctrination. The transformation of the economic system, the 
functioning of which was tied to "the generation of new men and women with the 
necessary ethical foundation", was seen to be of central importance for the 
establishment of "good society". However, this change did not in any sense mean 
a radical transformation of social relations, but rather their modification and 
justification by implanting a few Principles of Islam, for example the prohibition of 
interest and the provision of justice by the ruler. It is important to reemphasise that 
the Just System was mainly justified on the basis of the handicaps of the existing 
economic system. It is argued that all aspects of social life in Islamism, as well as 
in Kemalism, are oriented towards preferred collective goals, which are proclaimed 
and interpreted by leaders representing one particular ideology and which should 
be enforced by the state. in this framework, the state, highly centralised and 
speaking in the name of the "ideal community", has the pervasive power to 
constantly indoctrinate its citizens and impose "collective goals" by denying the 
existence of a plurality of interests and identities. 
Having said that, fourthly, this study argued that in the twentieth century the 
discourse of Islamism, influenced by Islam and expressed through Islamic 
symbolism, resembles to those of populist movements in developing societies 
which have experienced: rapid dependent economic development; urbanisation, 
which outstripped the pace of industrialisation; spread of literacy, authoritarian 
rule; political and/or cultural foreign domination; and a sentiment of national 
humiliation. Here populism is very broadly used to refer to a moralistic discourse 
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that: glorifies common people; manifest a cultural expression of developmental 
crisis; believes in the possibility of controlling the modernisation process, and 
share a common characteristic of a search for a synthesis between the basic 
values of traditional culture of the society and the need for development; and 
emphases intra and/or international subordination and domination. The beliefs of 
various social groups as to how development might be achieved and their views 
as to the likely effects of alternative patterns of development are included. 
Correspondingly, although there are various and sometimes conflicting 
interpretations, interests and expectations within Islamist movements, there is a 
shared language which signifies their global context. For example, it is articulated 
in terms of a response to the problems of domestic development, cultural 
autonomy and imperialism. It is argued in this study that it is the incorporation of 
the notion of corporatism that helps populist rhetoric to declare a "third path", 
similar to that of Peronism or Nasserism, of development to bring about social 
justice, economic liberty and political sovereignty, while negating both capitalism 
and communism, which are looked upon as systems that would lead to the 
exploitation of humankind. It is important to reemphasize that populist movements 
are not anti-state either in ideology or in practice. What they oppose is the state 
in its present form. The third path can represents a kind of state capitalism, other 
forms of moderate capitalism or even neo-socialism. The unity of those 
movements does not lie in a unity of their specific social basis or programme, but 
lies in a certain shapelessness in ideas and the recurrent pattern of an ideal type 
of social relationship that integrates both realms of economic and cultural life. The 
idea of creating an organic egalitarian society in which class and social 
antagonism would be replaced by a community of believers united around the 
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banner of Islam shows the populist characteristic of Islamism and places it within 
a wider context of political ideologies. In this context, the corporatist state is 
delegated with the moral mission of purging the corrupt elements, providing social 
welfare and guiding the people toward salvation. Taking its implications from the 
indigenous traditions and values, populist ideology of Islamism champions "cultural 
(religious) nationalism", and uses traditional political symbolism and religious 
values for mass mobilisation. This is a common characteristic of populist 
movements, which has been even expressed in the form "continental nationalism" 
in Latin America and Africa. An idea of a golden age, which appeals to popular 
nostalgia, emphasises the special quality and uniqueness of the identity and 
culture in interaction with the supposed identity of "others". A conspiracy theory of 
history helps in reconstructing identity. Therefore, the "Islamification" of this re- 
constructed identity through the repeated re-interpretation of religious texts and 
history by a selective and ends-oriented approach becomes one of the core 
strugglesof political action against'corrupt and oppressive Westernised elites and 
their collaborator'. Islamism in its all formulation tends to be more successful in 
stressing cultural identity and seeking independence from the state than in spelling 
out class-specific social and economic objectives. 
Islamism cannot be denounced as a backward ideology compared to modernism, 
but rather it has a dual attitude to modernism. In general, it advocates that the 
products of modernity may be divided into two distinct types: the attractive and the 
repulsive. Attracted toward such modernist goals as progress, democracy, 
freedom and social justice, yet still sceptical of their historical precedents and 
contemporary problems, modernisation for Islamists implies more than the 
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replacement of the old by the new. They do not condemn technological or 
economic innovations, but do support modernisation in these fields through 
selective adaptation. In terms of the social aspects of modernisation, they are 
outraged by the violation of "traditional Islamic values", for example the question 
of appearance of women in public, as they interpreted them. In studying Islamism, 
this thesis has attempted to show that the ideas, interpretations and activities of 
Islamists should not be viewed in isolation from their context, as the assertions of 
people in a movement are often ideological justifications of what they stand for. 
Fifthly, this study has shown that in order to avoid the deficiencies of culturalist 
perspectives, the identification of the location of core capital within the class 
structure and its relations to the state and the dominant class is crucial for 
explaining Islamism with reference to its social basis, in a country which has been 
experiencing a capitalist mode of development supervised by the developmental 
state. In this context, it has been argued that, within a corporatist model of society 
which denies the existence of conf I icting interests, the state through etatistpolicies 
assumed a major economic role in promoting economic development, which would 
eventually lead to the rise of an industrial class in disfavour of other groups within 
the capitalist class. The state, which was solely represented by the Republican 
People's Party (RPP) throughout the single party regime, functioned as a class 
with its own political-economic project. An authoritarian approach to politics and 
the intensification of exploitative relations inherent in the national bourgeois 
developmental approach finally accelerated the growth of differentiation within the 
capitalist class in particular, and economic inequality and social polarisation in 
general, which finally led to the Democrat Party's government in 1950. It has been 
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discussed that opposition to the RPP's rule should not be reduced to a matter of 
"religious upheaval" where the Democrat Party is concerned, since it managed to 
overlap with general dissatisfaction with the RPP and to articulate religious 
opposition to the militant secularist policies. Rather, it should be analysed from a 
political economy point of view, as to who gets what, how, when and how much in 
the course of capitalist development. In this context, this thesis has argued that the 
success of the Welfare Party in the 1990s, with reference to its predecessors in 
the 1970s, was due to a combination of various factors which cannot be reduced 
to "the reaction of traditional forces to modernity". The Welfare Party with its 
populist as well as Islamist rhetoric, was able to mobilise various centres of 
opposition to mainstream politics including the major political parties of both right 
and left wings. Mainstream politics has been authoritarian in style, and 
undemocratic to a significant extent as far as, for example, "alternative identities", 
rather than "secular and Turkish" is exclusively defined within Kemalism, are 
concerned. It has been unable to control ever-increasing inflation and inequality 
in the distribution of national income, and unable to allay shortages, or to respond 
to demands and rising expectations. Finally, it was not only conceived, but also 
proved, to be open to bribery, fraud and corruption. Therefore, concerns with 
democracy, distributive justice and freedoms were already available for the 
Welfare Party to give voice to them. As seen in the case study with the 
interviewees, the respondents clearly expressed that they voted for the Welfare 
Party because of their general dissatisfaction with parties they had voted for 
before. This could be due to economic policies in general or religious issues in 
particular. Consequently, it is argued that it is misleading to suggest that, from a 
culturalist perspective that concentrates upon the lifestyles of the general 
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population compared to those of "urban and (Westernised) middle class", the 
Welfare represented a less modernised section of the population. Given the 
fragmentation of the Turkish party structure, it is argued that shifts in party 
alignment take place when economic policies supported by the dominant 
economic groups prove to be diminishing for the disadvantaged economic groups. 
With regard to the socio-economic backgrounds of the Welfare Party 
representatives, it is shown that they were middle class concerning their education 
and occupation, rather than members of traditional occupations. More importantly, 
the Welfare Party was the party that exemplified the increased functional 
differentiation within the capitalist class, and rallied on behalf of those factions of 
the bourgeoisie that were initially dislocated and have been discriminated against 
concerning the allocation of public resources. Anti-Western, anti-European Union 
and nationalist postures should be seen in this vein. This approach was also 
helpful in establishing an alliance of general dissatisfaction with a pro-Western 
foreign policy, which was conceived by the respondents as a source of humiliation 
and a means of enslaving Turkey to the Western powers. 
Finally, this study has argued that Islamism has provided a symbolic universe 
which has been reinterpreted and reformed with the aim of reconciling tradition, 
exclusively understood in terms of Islam, with modernity. The ideas of progress 
and democratic demands have been very central to Islamism, as seen in the 
interpretations of the first Islamists, such as Namik Kemal. It has been illustrated 
that the Turkish experience of modernism has been restrictive in the sense that it 
has conceived and presented the project of Westernisation as a struggle with the 
past, and consequently rejected its representatives, religions and traditions. The 
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rejection of Islam also meant the exclusion of the Islamic symbolic universe, which 
is a constitutive component of popular culture, since the principle of secularism is 
visualized in terms of the non-existence of religious symbols in the public sphere. 
Lifestyles other than Western ones have been identified as backward, reactionary 
and anti-modern, while modern life has been envisioned as being conducted in 
Western dress, consisting of a (supposedly) Western lifestyle. For example, the 
ban on head-scarves for professional women and students has been intensified 
in a democratic age of consumerism, which has experienced the substantial 
collapse of the monolithic elite culture, as Islam or Islamic symbols were always 
understood in terms of reaction and threat to modernity. In this context, the state 
plays a moralistic and pedagogical role in teaching and imposing a "modern" way 
of life. A kind of obsession with the absence of religious signs from the public 
sphere as the foremost sign of modernity suspends the notion of democracy in the 
struggle to establish and maintain "good (secular) society". As seen in the 
analyses of the interviews and the media content, the notion of "we" and "others" 
suggests a fictive unity of self and the essentialism entailed in the production and 
reproduction of such identities. Secularists think of themselves as the "Occidental, 
modern man", therefore the most praised model compared to the rest, particularly 
the "Oriental, irrational and fanatical others". Comparably, while Islamists 
challenge their descriptions by secularists and construct their identity as the "real 
we" in response to secularists, they apply the same methodology and continue to 
reproduce distorted and stereotyped notions of essentialist and exclusive identities 
of themselves and "Occidental others". This study has shown that disputes over 
identities in general and religious symbols in particular demonstrate an ever 
intensifying polarisation among the various component groups of society. The 
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state maintains and further contributes to this polarisation by narrowing the circle 
of "virtuous citizens" with reference to the fictitious concept of "internal enemies of 
the state", as unilaterally declared by the military. 
The Way Ahead For Future Research 
Athough there are numerous studies on Islamist movements, historical and 
contemporary, very few of them have provided substantial data on the social basis 
of Islamist movements. Throughout this study, it has been observed that more 
case studies, both quantitative and qualitative, which target various Islamist as 
well as secular groups, are needed in order to rescue analyses from the restrictive 
assumptions of the modernisation paradigm. There is a strong need for 
representative data on the micro level in order to map out the social basis of 
Islamism. A comparative approach that places Islamism within modern political 
ideologies and broaden its geographical borders can contribute to our 
understanding of the phenomenon, and avoid the narrow and reductionist 
definition of culture and the overestimation of its effects on political action. 
Researchers who concentrate on Turkey need to be critical of both Kernalism and 
Islamism. Islamism needs to be analysed from a developmental point of view. 
Religion as a research subject needs to be placed in its social and psychological 
context in a process of rapid development in order to rescue studies from the 
terrain of "high politics" and to avoid the misinterpretation of religion in terms of the 
rhetoric of "reaction and threat". Only a few studies have utilised this approach. 
334 33 
Appendix 1: Interviews' Questions 
Questions I 
For MPs and Workers 
1. What is your sex? 
MaleCl FemaleD 
2. What is your age? 
-2013 20-290 30-390 40-490 50-590 60+(: ) 
3. What is your marital status? 
SingleD M2rriedD WiclowedD DivorcedC3 
4. How many children do you have? 
10 20 30 40 50 MoreD 
5. What are the ages of your children? 
-JOCI 10-190 20-290 30-390 40-490 50+0 
6. What is your education? 
IlliterateD Reading and WritingQ PrimaryD SecondaryCl High-schoolO 
UniversityO FurtherCl 
7. What is your parents' education? (Please specify one of the categories above) 
Mother 
Father 
8. What is the education of your children? 
PrimaryD SecondaryCl High-schoolEl UniversityEl FurtherD 
9. What is your occupation? 
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10. What is your wife's/ husband's occupation? 
11. What are your children' occupations, if they are not at school? 
12. What are your parents' occupations? 
Mother 
Father 
13. Did you change your occupation? 
YesCl NoO 
If yes, when? 
why? 
14. Where are you from? 
15. If you migrated to Ankara, what was the reason for it? 
EducationD EmploymentO Others[3 
please specify 
16. How long have you been living in Ankara? 
-5yearsCJ 5-9yearsO 10-14yearsO 15-19yearsO 20-24years[D 25-29 
yearsCl 
30-340 35+0 
17. Which party (ies) have you voted for since ... ? (depends on respondents'ages) 
18. What are/were the three most important policies of the Welfare Party? 
19. What does/did the Welfare Party offer to its voters? 
20. In what way does/did the Welfare Party differ from other parties? 
336 
Questions 11 
For Voters 
1. What is your sex? 
MaleQ FemaleJ 
2. What is your age? 
-201J 20-29D 30-390 40-490 50-590 60+D 
3. What is your marital status? 
SingleD MarrieclD WiclowedO DivorcedC] 
4. How many children do you have? 
11: 1 20 30 40 50 MoreCI 
5. What are the ages of your children? 
-100 10-190 20-290 30-390 40-490 50+0 
6. What is your education? 
IlliterateD Reading and WritingCl PrimaryQ SecondaryO High-schoolD 
UniversityCl FurtherO 
7. What is your parents education? Please specify one of the categories above. 
Mother 
Father 
8. What is the education of your children? 
PrimaryQ SecondaryC3 High-schooIC3 UniversityEl FurtherD 
9. What is your occupation? 
10. What is your wife's/ husband's occupation? 
11. What are your children' occupations, if they are not at school? 
337 
12. What are your parents' occupations? 
Mother 
Father 
13. Did you change your occupation? 
Yes(: ) NoU 
If yes, when? 
14. Where are you from? 
15. If you migrated to Ankara, what was the reason for that? 
EducationCl EmploymentO OthersCl 
please specify 
16. How long have you been living in Ankara? 
-5yearsF-) 5-9yearsO 10-14yearsEl 15-19yearsEl 20-24yearsEl 25-29 
yearsCl 
30-340 35+0 
17. Which party(ies) have you voted for since ... ? (depends upon respondents' 
ages) 
18. What do you think the three most important policies of the Welfare Party 
are/were? 
19. What reason/s led you to vote for the Welfare in the last general election? 
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Glossary 
askeri: all those groups belonging to the military or religious elite with complete tax 
exemption. 
giftlik: land workable by a pair 
(gift) of oxen by a peasant family; or a big farm consisting of several raiyyet giftliks 
under the control of an absentee landlord. 
dervi, ý. - member of a tarikat. 
devýirme: (i) periodic 'collection' or levy of male children for sultan's household 
from Christian communities withint the Ottoman empire to be trained as military 
and adminstrative personnel, many to the highest rank. (ii) also a person so 
recruited. 
evkaf plural of vakif. 
fetva: legal opinion based on Sharia law. 
gecekondu: squatter dwelling (lit. 'built at night'. ) 
Hadith: sayings attributed to Prophet Muhammad. 
ibadat: matters of devotion within Islam. 
ifma: consensus (usually of jurists). 
iltizam: tax-farming. 
imam: Muslim prayer leader; also successors to the Prophet recognised by Shii 
Muslims. 
kadl., judge. in Sharia courts 
Millet. a religious community, the autonomous organisation of which is formally 
recognised by the Islamic state. 
miri: belonging to the ruler or to the state. 
muamalat: matters pertaining to social dealings within Islam. 
mukataa: a renting contract or the rent itself. 
mOft&: an official learned in Islamic law who is in charge of Islamic affairs for a 
province or distict and able to pronounce a fetva. 
ortak9lkul: a sharecropper slave working for his/her owner on the basis of that the 
owner of the means of production shares the product with him/her equally. 
reaya: all those groups, Muslim or non-Muslim, outside the askeri class, engaged 
in economic activities and thus subject to taxes. 
sipahi: provincial cavalery man sustained by revenue grant 
Sunni: a subscriber to the orthodox interpretation of Islam. 
354 
Sunna: the sayings, ways and traditions of Prophet Muhammad. 
SUfi: mystic. 
-FeyhOlislam: chief m0ft of the Ottoman Empire. 
, ýharia: originally path or way. Islamic canon law as stipulated in the Quran and 
Hadith. 
, Fhii: the party of Ali. Those Muslims who claim that after the death of Muhammad 
the legitimate imamate or the politico-religious leadership belonged to Ali, the 
cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet, and to his descendants. 
Tanzimat: radical Ottoman westernising reforms introduced in the period 1839-76. 
tarikat: Islamic mystical order or fraternity. 
tawhid: oneness, unification, strictly signifying monotheism, but taken by some to 
signify a holistic world view. 
tekke: lodge of a tarikat. 
t1mar the assignment of taxes to cavalryman or state official in return for service 
to the state. 
ulema: scholars or people trained in religious sciences. 
umma: the Muslim community as a whole. 
vaklf., religious or charitable foundation created by an endowed trust fund 
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